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Foreword 
In	July	2010	the	National	Biosecurity	Committee	endorsed	an	initiative	to	apply	the	National	
Framework	for	Biosecurity	Benefit	Cost	Analysis	(BCA)	to	all	BCAs	that	evaluate	future	
biosecurity	investments.	It	aims	to	ensure	national	consistency	and	transparency	in	BCAs	to	
improve	efficiency	and	timeliness	of	management	decisions	on	biosecurity	investments.	A	
national	core	capacity	for	biosecurity	BCAs	has	been	created	within	ABARES	as	part	of	this	
initiative.	
ABARES	is	undertaking	BCAs	on	alternative	options	to	manage	selected	potential	or	existing	pest	
and	disease	incursions.	ABARES	consults	with	relevant	experts	and	stakeholders	and	then	
communicates	the	results	and	policy	implications	to	decision‐making	entities.	These	entities	
include	consultative	committees,	the	National	Management	Group	and	the	National	Biosecurity	
Committee.	
Potential	socio‐economic	impacts	of	an	outbreak	of	foot‐and‐mouth	disease	in	Australia	has	been	
prepared	as	part	of	a	series	of	BCAs	under	the	national	core	capacity.	
Australia	is	free	of	foot‐and‐mouth	disease,	a	highly	contagious	livestock	disease.	An	outbreak	is	
expected	to	have	large	economic	and	social	consequences.	In	order	to	minimise	these	impacts,	
this	report	seeks	to	provide	input	into	the	policy	decision‐making	process	about	future	
investments	in	preparedness	and	control	policy	measures.	
This	report	assesses	the	economic	and	social	impacts	of	a	foot‐and‐mouth	disease	outbreak	and	
presents	a	benefit	costs	analysis	of	three	different	eradication	strategies	based	on	hypothetical	
outbreak	scenarios.		
	
Paul	Morris	
Executive	Director	
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Summary 
Australia	is	free	of	the	highly	contagious	foot‐and‐mouth	disease	(FMD),	which	affects	cloven	
hoofed	animals	including	cattle,	sheep,	goats,	pigs,	deer,	buffalo	and	camelids.	This	disease	has	
serious	economic	and	social	implications	for	countries	producing	and	exporting	livestock	and	
livestock	products.	When	countries	have	an	outbreak	of	FMD	their	livestock	export	products	
become	subject	to	trade	bans	designed	to	reduce	the	risk	of	transmission	of	the	disease	to	
livestock	in	other	countries.	For	exporters,	this	results	in	product	being	diverted	to	domestic	
markets	where	it	sells	at	much	lower	prices	(due	to	the	increase	in	supply).	Since	Australia	
exports	around	60	per	cent	of	livestock	production,	mostly	to	markets	sensitive	to	FMD,	an	
outbreak	would	seriously	affect	our	livestock	producers,	related	agricultural	business	and	other	
industries.	
This	report	evaluates	potential	economic	costs	and	identifies	the	social	impacts	of	a	hypothetical	
FMD	outbreak	in	Australia.	The	findings	will	inform	policy	on	future	management	strategies	and	
help	minimise	the	costs	of	an	FMD	outbreak.	
ABARES	modelled	disease	control	strategies	for	three	scenarios:	
 A	small	outbreak	in	North	Queensland,	where	most	cattle	are	raised	on	extensive	
rangelands.	
 A	small	outbreak	in	Victoria’s	Goulburn	Valley,	which	has	a	high	density	of	livestock	and	
intensive	dairy	farms.	
 A	large	multi‐state	outbreak	that,	by	the	time	of	detection,	has	spread	from	Victoria	to	all	
eastern	states	(New	South	Wales,	Queensland,	South	Australia,	Victoria	and	Tasmania).	
Disease	control	strategies	examined	included:	
 for	the	small	and	large	outbreaks	
‐ stamping	out,	which	involves	destruction	and	disposal	of	animals	in	infected	and	
dangerous	contact	premises	
‐ stamping	out	with	extensive	vaccination,	which	requires	vaccination	of	all	FMD‐
susceptible	animals	within	a	designated	ring	surrounding	infected	and	dangerous	
contact	premises;	and	removal	of	vaccinated	animals	once	the	disease	is	contained	
 for	the	large	multi‐state	outbreak	(in	addition	to	the	above)	
‐ stamping	out	with	targeted	vaccination,	which	includes	the	vaccination	of	all	cattle	and	
sheep	on	mixed	cattle	and	sheep	farms	within	a	designated	ring	surrounding	infected	
and	dangerous	contact	premises.	In	outbreak	areas	outside	the	high‐risk	ring,	stamping	
out	(without	vaccination)	is	undertaken.	
An	outbreak	of	FMD	in	Australia	would	have	adverse	economic	impacts	on	producers	and	other	
industries	within	and	beyond	the	outbreak	area.	Financial	losses	and	eradication	activities	
would	also	have	social	impacts.	Findings	suggest	these	economic	and	social	impacts	can	be	
reduced	by	the	choice	of	eradication	strategy.	For	example,	vaccination	could	play	a	beneficial	
role	in	some	outbreak	situations.	Impacts	could	also	be	reduced	by	resuming	market	access	
quickly	(where	feasible),	response	preparedness	and	use	of	communication	before	and	during	
an	outbreak.	
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Economic	impact	
An	FMD	outbreak	would	have	large	direct	and	indirect	economic	impacts.	Producers	of	FMD‐
susceptible	livestock	would	bear	most	of	the	revenue	losses	as	a	result	of	restrictions	on	
imports.	Flow‐on	effects	to	other	industries	would	contribute	to	the	regional	and	national	
impacts	of	an	outbreak.	
Direct	impact	
Loss	of	exports	and	depressed	domestic	prices	would	significantly	reduce	the	revenues	of	
producers.	For	the	simulated	examples	of	two	small	FMD	outbreaks	in	Queensland	and	Victoria,	
assuming	that	export	markets	lift	bans	on	Australian	product	quickly,	modelling	predicts	
revenue	losses	of	between	$5.6	billion	and	$6.2	billion	(in	present	value	terms)	over	10	years,	
depending	on	the	response	strategy	used	(Table	S1).	
In	the	event	of	a	large	multi‐state	FMD	outbreak,	ABARES	estimates	revenue	losses	of	between	
$49.3	billion	and	$51.8	billion	(in	present	value	terms)	over	10	years	(Table	S1).	These	revenue	
losses	account	for	around	99	per	cent	of	direct	economic	costs,	with	the	remaining	1	per	cent	
being	the	cost	of	disease	control.	The	cost	of	control	increases	with	the	size	of	an	outbreak	
because	more	animals	must	be	managed.	Control	costs	are	estimated	at	between	$60	million	and	
$373	million,	with	$6.3	million	to	$60.2	million	required	in	compensation	for	animals	destroyed	
during	control	procedures.	
The	estimated	total	direct	impact	does	not	take	into	account	potential	gains	to	Australia’s	
domestic	consumers	from	reduced	prices	for	livestock	products.	Consumer	gains	would	reduce	
the	economic	losses	as	discussed	below.	The	ABARES	estimates	of	total	revenue	losses	include	
export	market	loss	and	loss	from	reduced	domestic	prices.	
Table S1 Present value of total direct economic losses for livestock producers over 10 years 
Scenario/strategy	 Control	costs
($b)	
Revenue	losses	
($b)	
Total	direct	cost
($b)	
Large	multi‐state	outbreak
Stamping	out	 0.37 51.84	 52.21
Stamping	out	with	extensive	vaccination	 0.35 49.54	 49.89
Stamping	out	with	targeted vaccination	 0.32 49.29	 49.62
Small	outbreak	in	Victoria
Stamping	out	 0.10 5.90	 6.00
Stamping	out	with	extensive	vaccination	 0.09 6.17	 6.26
Small	outbreak	in	North	Queensland	
Stamping	out	 0.06 5.58	 5.64
Stamping	out	with	extensive	vaccination	 0.06 5.90	 5.96
Note: Present value costs calculated at a discount rate of 7 per cent. 
Source: ABARES 
Other	industry	and	regional	impacts	
Other	industries	may	be	positively	or	negatively	affected	by	the	outbreak,	depending	on	their	
relationship	with	livestock	industries.	Selected	input	providers	to	FMD‐susceptible	livestock	
production	(for	example,	transport,	trade	and	feedstock	suppliers)	could	see	reductions	in	the	
present	value	of	production	of	$11.5	billion	over	10	years.	Some	industries	that	are	competitors	
in	production—such	as	grain	and	horticulture	and	their	downstream	processors—are	likely	to	
benefit,	with	an	estimated	increase	in	the	present	net	value	of	production	of	$15	billion	over	
10	years,	compared	with	no	FMD	outbreak.	These	increases	are	the	result	of	resources,	such	as	
land,	being	diverted	from	livestock	to	other	agricultural	uses.	
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The	large	multi‐state	outbreak	scenario	would	reduce	Australia’s	gross	domestic	product	by	an	
estimated	0.16	per	cent	($23.6	billion	in	present	value	terms)	over	10	years,	while	the	small	
Victorian	outbreak	would	result	in	a	reduction	of	0.03	per	cent	($4.6	billion).	Regions,	states	and	
territories	would	be	affected	to	varying	degrees,	with	larger	effects	in	regions	more	reliant	on	
FMD‐susceptible	industries,	even	where	they	are	outside	the	outbreak	area.		Some	economies,	
such	as	in	Western	Australia,	may	benefit	if	the	movement	of	resources	lowers	domestic	costs	of	
production	in	other	industries	(such	as	lower	cost	of	labour	for	mining)	and	increases	
international	competitiveness	(Table	S2).	The	regional	analysis	also	accounts	for	the	benefits	to	
Australian	consumers	of	lower	prices	for	livestock	products.	
Table S2 Estimated regional, state and national impacts—scenarios using stamping out 
Jurisdiction	 Gross	product—small outbreak Gross	product—large	outbreak
(%) ($m) (%)	 ($m)
New	South	Wales	 –0.01 –605 –0.12	 –5 794
Victoria	control	area	 –0.28 –809 –0.92	 –2 695
Rest	of	Victoria	 –0.04 –1 207 –0.30	 –9 336
North	Queensland	control	area	 –0.66 –315 –0.61	 –293
Rest	of	Queensland	 –0.18 –5 112 –0.31	 –8 755
South	Australia	 0.01 100 0.01	 116
Western	Australia	 0.14 3 345 0.14	 3 395
Tasmania	 –0.06 –163 –0.18	 –464
Northern	Territory	 0.06 112 0.15	 267
Australian	Capital	Territory 0.03 100 –0.01	 –41
Australia	 –0.03a –4 554	b –0.16	a	 –23 600 b
a weighted total change in gross product b Change in gross domestic product. 
Source: ABARES 
Comparison	with	other	studies	
There	have	been	several	studies	into	the	impacts	of	FMD	outbreak	in	Australia	undertaken	in	
recent	decades.	The	most	comparable	studies	are	those	undertaken	by	the	Centre	for	
International	Economics	and	Productivity	Commission.	
In	its	estimates	of	losses	for	the	Australian	livestock	industry	from	FMD,	the	Centre	for	
International	Economics	(2010)	modelled	two	scenarios:	a	six‐month	contained	outbreak	and	a	
one‐year	extensive	outbreak.	The	losses	under	the	one‐year	outbreak	were	around	$18	billion	in	
which	100	per	cent	of	export	markets	were	closed	in	the	first	year.	Market	access	losses	
represented	90	per	cent	of	total	losses	with	export	markets	taking	between	two	to	four	years	to	
fully	recover,	depending	on	the	size	of	the	outbreak.	
The	Productivity	Commission	(2002)	estimated	income	losses	to	the	Australian	livestock	and	
meat	processing	sector	of	a	large	FMD	outbreak	(12	months	to	eradicate)	at	$12.8	billion	to	
$14.8	billion	over	10	years	(or	$17.3	billion	to	$20	billion	inflated	to	2012–13	dollars),	with	
around	75	per	cent	of	this	cost	accounted	for	by	export	revenue	losses.	The	study	assumed	
recovery	of	access	to	all	export	markets	in	three	months	after	the	eradication	of	the	disease.	The	
higher	estimates	in	the	ABARES	study	reflect	expected	market	access	requirements	from	trading	
partners	due	to	a	longer	time	out	of	the	market	and	a	greater	loss	of	market	share.	The	ABARES	
assumptions	are	based	on	data	from	FMD	outbreaks	overseas	and	Australia’s	experience	with	
other	livestock	diseases.	
Social	impacts	
In	the	event	of	an	FMD	outbreak,	social	impacts	will	occur	at	the	individual,	household	and	
community	levels.	Producers	of	FMD‐susceptible	livestock	and	anyone	involved	in	the	
agricultural	supply	chain	and	the	response	staff	may	be	affected.	As	a	result,	the	cumulative	
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effects	on	individuals	and	households	will	be	felt	by	communities,	activities,	services	and	social	
cohesion.	
Many	social	impacts	are	generated	by	the	loss	of	income—such	as	mental	health	issues,	changed	
gender	roles	and	reduced	welfare.	Other	impacts	may	result	from	the	control	measures	used	to	
manage	and	eradicate	FMD.	For	example,	people	living	in	control	and	restricted	areas	around	an	
outbreak	are	more	likely	to	experience	mental	health	issues	caused	by	movement	restrictions,	
culling	and	vaccination.	These	conditions	can	contribute	to	feelings	of	loss	of	control,	animal	
welfare	concerns,	uncertainty	and	social	isolation.	
The	severity	of	these	impacts	will	be	influenced	not	only	by	the	size	of	the	outbreak	and	time	out	
of	export	markets,	but	also	the	vulnerability	of	a	community	and	its	ability	to	recover.	
Communities	with	good	economic	performance	and	socio‐advantage	are	likely	to	deal	better	and	
recover	more	quickly	from	an	FMD	outbreak.	
Choice	of	eradication	strategy	
Historically,	stamping	out	has	been	used	to	manage	FMD	outbreaks.	It	ensures	disease	
eradication	and	a	swift	return	to	disease‐free	status	and	access	to	international	markets.	
However,	it	involves	the	rapid	destruction	and	disposal	of	large	numbers	of	stock.	This	can	be	
highly	resource	intensive	and	can	also	lead	to	criticism	within	the	community.	More	recently	
several	countries	have	combined	vaccination	with	stamping	out	to	achieve	effective	control	of	
FMD.	Removal	of	vaccinated	animals	can	delay	the	time	to	regain	market	access	after	eradication	
is	achieved.	However,	early	vaccination	may	assist	with	or	be	essential	for	effective	disease	
control	(Matthews	2011).	Targeted	vaccination	was	examined	to	explore	the	effectiveness	of	
control	in	a	situation	where	resources	to	undertake	widespread	extensive	vaccination	may	not	
be	available.	
The	ABARES	study	did	not	examine	the	vaccinate‐to‐live	strategy,	where	vaccinated	animals	are	
allowed	to	remain	in	the	population	and	are	not	stamped	out	after	the	outbreak	is	controlled.	
This	approach	was	adopted	during	the	2010–11	outbreak	in	the	Republic	of	Korea.	Two	years	
later,	the	World	Organisation	for	Animal	Health	has	still	not	declared	the	country	FMD‐free	and	
acceptability	to	trading	partners	remains	unclear.	
The	rate	of	FMD	spread	during	an	outbreak	is	expected	to	vary	depending	on	the	virus	strain,	
climatic	conditions	and	type	of	livestock	production	system.	When	selecting	the	most	
appropriate	eradication	strategy	for	an	FMD	outbreak,	factors	to	consider	include	likelihood	of	
rapid	containment,	economic	cost	and	social	impact.	Results	of	this	study	show	that	combining	
vaccination	with	stamping	out	is	an	important	tool	for	eradication	in	some	cases.	
Least	cost	strategy	
Determining	which	disease	eradication	strategy	will	have	the	least	economic	cost	will	depend	on	
the	initial	conditions	of	the	outbreak	and	the	type	of	production	system	in	the	outbreak	area.	
Under	all	the	scenarios	examined,	total	direct	economic	costs	were	minimised	by	the	eradication	
strategy	that	restored	market	access	fastest.	
Stamping	out	is	shown	to	be	the	most	cost‐effective	strategy	for	smaller	outbreaks	in	extensive	
livestock	production	systems,	such	as	the	hypothetical	outbreak	in	North	Queensland’s	cattle	
producing	rangelands.	In	extensive	production	areas,	rates	of	disease	spread	are	expected	to	be	
low,	requiring	fewer	resources	for	culling	and	disposal.	For	smaller,	slower‐spreading	
outbreaks,	resources	are	likely	to	be	adequate	to	find	and	remove	infected	herds	using	stamping	
out.	
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For	the	outbreak	scenario	in	the	extensive	production	area	of	North	Queensland,	ABARES	
compared	stamping	out	only	and	vaccination	with	stamping	out.	Vaccination	provides	no	
reduction	in	the	expected	time	to	eradicate	the	outbreak.	The	additional	time	required	to	
remove	vaccinated	animals	from	the	population	means	delays	in	regaining	an	FMD‐free	status	
and	market	access.	Using	vaccination	adds	to	the	time	out	of	export	markets	and	increases	
expected	revenue	losses	from	export	bans	from	$5.6	billion	to	$6	billion	(in	present	value	terms)	
over	10	years	(Table	S1).	
For	the	small	outbreak	scenario	in	Victoria’s	Goulburn	Valley	intensive	high	density	production	
area,	combining	vaccination	with	stamping	out	was	shown	to	reduce	eradication	time	compared	
with	stamping	out	only.	Vaccination	also	reduced	the	variability	in	time	to	eradicate	the	disease	
and	reduced	the	chance	of	an	extended	outbreak	occurring.	However,	on	average,	the	reduction	
in	eradication	time	was	not	sufficient	to	offset	the	delay	in	market	access	associated	with	the	
removal	of	vaccinated	animals.	The	use	of	vaccination	therefore	increased	the	expected	cost	of	
an	outbreak	from	$6	billion	to	$6.3	billion	(in	present	value	terms)	(Table	S1).	
For	potentially	larger,	fast‐spreading	outbreaks,	resources	may	not	be	adequate	to	keep	up	with	
stamping	out	requirements,	with	the	risk	that	the	outbreak	will	not	be	adequately	controlled.	In	
the	large	multi‐state	outbreak	scenario,	vaccination	allowed	earlier	return	to	trade,	even	when	
taking	into	account	the	need	to	remove	vaccinated	animals	from	the	population	in	order	to	
regain	disease‐free	status	from	the	World	Organisation	for	Animal	Health.	For	the	large	
outbreak,	the	reduction	in	eradication	time	with	vaccination	more	than	offset	the	additional	time	
required	to	deal	with	vaccinated	animals,	allowing	a	quicker	resumption	of	trade.	As	a	result,	the	
total	direct	cost	of	combining	targeted	vaccination	with	stamping	out	is	estimated	at	$2.6	billion	
less	than	with	using	stamping	out	alone	(Table	S1).	Under	these	circumstances,	vaccination	is	
likely	to	be	an	effective	disease	management	tool,	offering	greater	certainty	in	reducing	the	time	
taken	to	contain	and	eradicate	the	disease.	
Of	the	two	vaccination	strategies	examined	for	the	large	multi‐state	outbreak,	targeted	
vaccination	was	shown	to	reduce	the	time	for	eradication.	Extensive	vaccination	requires	a	large	
diversion	of	resources	from	stamping	out	to	vaccination,	increasing	the	chances	of	the	disease	
escaping	containment.	With	targeted	vaccination,	the	significantly	fewer	animals	vaccinated	
require	less	time	for	removal,	meaning	that	trade	access	is	regained	more	quickly.	
Social	impact	of	eradication	strategies	
Impacts	of	an	eradication	strategy	on	communities	in	affected	regions	need	to	be	considered	in	
evaluating	different	control	options.	The	social	impact	analysis	found	that	participants	were	
confused	about	the	different	response	strategies	available,	how	and	when	they	should	be	used	
and	their	impacts.	The	study	found	a	general	preference	for	stamping	out	among	commercial	
livestock	producers,	who	believed	it	was	the	fastest	option	for	removing	an	FMD	threat.	
However,	if	stamping	out	was	seen	to	be	failing,	vaccination	was	preferred.	Uncertainty	about	
the	use	of	a	strategy	could	lead	to	frustration	and	delayed	or	inappropriate	responses	by	
producers,	reducing	the	effectiveness	of	an	eradication	strategy.	In	the	event	of	an	FMD	
outbreak,	producers	and	members	of	the	supply	chain	should	be	provided	with	information	on	
the	response	strategies	and	their	implications.	This	will	ensure	cooperation	and	reduce	
confusion	and	uncertainty.	
In	selecting	a	control	strategy,	the	wider	community	should	also	be	considered.	Members	of	the	
public	are	likely	to	prefer	the	method	that	provides	greatest	perceived	animal	welfare	benefits.	
Internationally,	government	policies	perceived	to	have	adverse	animal	welfare	implications	are	
attracting	public	outcry.	This	includes	the	use	of	stamping	out	strategies,	especially	where	large	
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numbers	of	animals	are	culled.	For	example,	in	the	United	Kingdom	and	the	Netherlands,	the	
mass	culling	and	images	of	burning	pyres	and	burials	in	2001	shocked	the	public	on	animal	
welfare	grounds.	In	2010–11	the	slaughter	of	apparently	healthy	animals	and	the	methods	used	
during	an	FMD	outbreak	in	the	Republic	of	Korea	attracted	criticism	globally.	Using	vaccination	
for	large	outbreaks	would	avoid	large‐scale,	pre‐emptive	destruction	and	disposal	of	animals	
and	the	resulting	social	and	environmental	costs.	
Reducing	market	access	losses	
Most	of	the	economic	costs	from	a	hypothetical	FMD	outbreak	arise	from	revenue	losses	caused	
by	immediate	and	prolonged	export	bans	by	Australia’s	FMD‐sensitive	markets.	This	study	has	
taken	a	more	comprehensive	approach	than	previous	studies	in	estimating	revenue	losses	from	
lost	export	earnings	in	the	event	of	an	FMD	outbreak.	Advice	from	the	Department	of	Agriculture	
and	the	industry	suggests	that,	for	most	FMD‐sensitive	markets,	regaining	market	access	and	
market	share	will	take	much	longer	than	the	time	required	for	the	World	Organisation	for	
Animal	Health	to	restore	Australia’s	FMD‐free	status.	This	is	because	importing	countries	will	
need	to	satisfy	themselves	that	Australian	livestock	and	livestock	products	are	safe.	
This	study	highlights	the	potential	cost	of	prolonged	restrictions	to	access	of	export	markets.	
Over	10	years,	minimal	trade	restrictions	following	a	small	outbreak	would	result	in	expected	
revenue	losses	of	around	$6	billion,	compared	with	losses	of	up	to	$52	billion	(in	present	value	
terms)	with	extended	trade	restrictions	following	a	large	outbreak	(Table	S1).	
Re‐establishing	market	access	quickly	is	vital	in	reducing	the	impact	of	an	outbreak.	
Partnerships	between	industry	and	government	could	help	prioritise	negotiations	with	key	
markets	and	products,	address	biosecurity	risk	mitigation	requirements	for	each	partner	and	
help	reach	agreement	to	restore	market	access.	In	preparation	for	an	outbreak,	these	
partnerships	could	develop	strategies	to	meet	certification	requirements	and	commodity	
specific	measures	such	as	FMD	treatments	for	wool	and	dairy	products;	they	could	also	establish	
pre‐agreed	trading	arrangements	with	trading	partners,	such	as	the	Australia–New	Zealand	
trans‐Tasman	FMD	Action	Plan.	
Although	not	examined	in	this	study,	zoning	may	allow	trade	to	recommence	faster	and	mitigate	
losses	from	closed	market	access.	It	would	be	beneficial	to	identify	the	conditions	under	which	
zoning	may	be	considered	acceptable	to	trading	partners,	ensuring	that	diversion	of	resources	to	
establish	and	maintain	FMD‐free	zones	in	Australia	is	possible.	Examining	the	potential	for	
importing	countries	to	accept	exports	from	countries	declared	FMD‐free	using	vaccination‐to‐
live	could	help	alleviate	public	pressure	against	FMD	eradication	programs	and	allow	markets	to	
reopen	quickly.	
Domestic	consumer	responses	in	the	event	of	an	FMD	outbreak	were	not	examined	in	this	study.	
It	was	assumed	that	domestic	consumers	will	respond	to	lower	domestic	prices	by	consuming	
greater	quantities	of	meat	and	other	livestock	products.	However,	if	product	diverted	to	the	
domestic	market	was	rejected	by	consumers	due	to	misconceptions	about	food	safety,	the	
market	losses	would	be	greater	than	those	estimated	in	this	study.	Maintaining	consumer	
confidence	during	an	outbreak	will	help	prevent	greater	economic	and	social	impacts.	
Response	preparedness	arrangements	
Given	the	large	economic	cost	and	associated	social	impacts	of	both	small	and	large	FMD	
outbreaks,	biosecurity	efforts	aimed	at	reducing	the	likelihood	of	an	FMD	outbreak	are	
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fundamental.	The	Department	of	Agrigulture’s	ongoing	biosecurity	efforts	help	keep	Australia	
free	from	FMD	by	managing	controls	at	the	border.	
Resourcing	of	surveillance	(to	allow	early	detection)	and	emergency	response	(to	allow	rapid	
eradication)	are	necessary	to	prevent	the	spread	of	FMD	to	multiple	regions	or	states	and	reduce	
the	possibility	of	economic	and	social	impacts	of	an	outbreak	escalating.	Preparation	for	an	
outbreak	could	reduce	resource	constraints,	allow	more	rapid	control	of	an	outbreak	and	reduce	
outbreak	impacts.	Preparation	includes	simulation	exercises,	arrangements	for	producers	to	
participate	in	control	activities	and	improvements	for	tracing	at‐risk	livestock.	
Further	investment	in	a	standardised	system	of	national	livestock	traceability	could	also	aid	the	
technical	response	to	an	FMD	outbreak	and	the	capacity	for	Australian	industries	to	regain	
market	access.	Successful	implementation	of	the	livestock	standstill	with	reliable	livestock	
tracing	will	provide	accurate	and	timely	information	on	the	extent	of	the	disease	spread.	
Decision‐makers	need	this	information	to	identify	at‐risk	animals,	choose	optimal	response	
measures	and	manage	vaccinated	animals.	Reliable	livestock	traceability	could	enhance	trading	
partner	confidence	in	Australia’s	ability	to	control	an	outbreak	and	in	claims	of	FMD‐free	status	
and	proof	that	FMD‐free	requirements	have	been	met.	
An	outbreak	of	FMD	involving	feral	animals	in	Australia	was	not	considered	in	the	ABARES	
study.	Such	an	outbreak	might	delay	detection	of	disease,	increase	the	extent	of	an	outbreak,	
complicate	and	delay	disease	eradication	and	compromise	demonstration	of	being	disease	free.	
Where	feral	animal	populations	are	assessed	as	posing	an	unacceptable	risk,	resources	may	be	
required	to	implement	control	programs	under	the	Australian	Veterinary	Emergency	Plan	
(AUSVETPLAN)	Wild	Animal	Response	Strategy.	
Communication	
Communication,	pre	and	post‐outbreak,	can	reduce	the	social	impact	of	an	FMD	outbreak.	This	
will	require	a	communication	strategy	that	is	well	understood	by	the	livestock	industry,	
government	agencies	and	support	staff	involved	in	a	response	strategy.	Few	case	study	
participants	were	aware	of	current	communication	protocols	between	state	agency	staff	and	
support	staff.	Communication	about	the	roles	and	responsibilities	of	those	involved	in	the	
response	team	is	essential	to	reduce	confusion.	A	clear	communication	strategy	explaining	
financial	compensation	policies	would	alleviate	stakeholder	concerns	and	build	confidence	in	
the	government’s	ability	to	respond	to	an	FMD	outbreak.	
An	FMD	response	plan	and	its	implementation	present	opportunities	to	manage	the	social	
impacts	of	an	FMD	outbreak.	Social	impacts	in	the	control	area	could	be	reduced	by	engaging	
local	residents	and	producers,	giving	producers	the	option	to	participate	in	eradication	activities	
and	providing	mental	health	support	from	response	staff	with	people	skills.	
Online	information	about	FMD	does	not	appear	to	be	reaching	its	target	audience.	Some	
producers,	stock	agents	and	livestock	transporters	are	unaware	of	FMD	implications	and	
associated	response	plans.	Producers	do	not	actively	seek	FMD‐related	information;	they	are	
more	concerned	about	common	diseases	and	have	difficulty	justifying	the	time	required	to	
research	a	disease	they	consider	less	likely	to	occur.	
Some	businesses	may	require	financial	support	during	an	outbreak	and	recovery.	Additional	
support	identified	by	the	social	impact	analysis	includes	direct	compensation	or	financial	
support	from	government	and	indirect	support	from	banks	holding	loans.	Engagement	by	the	
	xv	
	
Department	of	Agriculture	with	agencies	and	institutions	able	to	provide	support	(for	example,	
Centrelink	and	charity	organisations)	would	alleviate	the	financial	and	social	impacts.	
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1 Introduction 
Australia	is	free	of	foot‐and‐mouth	disease	(FMD),	a	highly	contagious	viral	infection	of	cloven	
hoofed	mammals,	including	cattle,	sheep,	goats,	pigs,	deer,	buffalo	and	camelids.	FMD	outbreaks	
in	the	United	Kingdom,	Japan	and	the	Republic	of	Korea	show	the	disease	can	enter	and	spread	
in	FMD‐free	countries	with	sophisticated	biosecurity	systems.	And	it	can	impose	significant	
economic	and	social	costs.	
An	FMD	outbreak	results	in	trade	restrictions	on	an	exporter’s	livestock	products	as	importing	
countries	try	to	minimise	the	risk	of	introducing	the	virus.	For	Australia,	a	large	exporter	of	
FMD‐susceptible	products,	the	loss	of	export	markets	is	likely	to	increase	the	supply	of	livestock	
products	onto	the	domestic	market.	This	would	significantly	reduce	domestic	prices	and	result	
in	large	losses	in	producers’	revenue.	An	outbreak	can	also	lead	to	significant	social	disruption	in	
the	surrounding	communities.	
This	report	evaluates	potential	economic	costs	and	identifies	the	social	impacts	of	a	hypothetical	
FMD	outbreak	in	Australia.	The	findings	will	inform	policy	on	future	management	strategies	to	
minimise	the	costs	of	an	FMD	outbreak.	In	evaluating	potential	economic	costs	of	an	FMD	
outbreak,	ABARES	applied	the	National	Framework	for	Biosecurity	Benefit–Cost	Analysis	(BCA).	
This	framework	was	endorsed	in	2010	by	the	National	Biosecurity	Committee	to	ensure	national	
consistency	and	transparency	in	undertaking	BCAs	designed	to	improve	the	efficiency	and	
timeliness	of	management	decisions	on	biosecurity	investments.	
To	examine	the	costs	and	benefits	of	FMD	management	strategies	in	Australia,	plausible	disease	
outbreak	scenarios	were	developed	and	simulated	using	the	AusSpread	epidemiological	disease	
spread	model.	The	scenarios	are	for	hypothetical	small	outbreaks	in	North	Queensland	and	in	
Victoria	and	a	large	multi‐state	outbreak	originating	in	Victoria	and	spreading	to	other	eastern	
states.	ABARES	identified	two	main	control	strategies	to	control	and	ultimately	eradicate	the	
disease—stamping	out	and	combining	stamping	out	with	ring	vaccination.	These	were	evaluated	
against	each	outbreak	scenario.	Two	options	were	tested	for	the	stamping	out	with	vaccination	
strategy:	in	the	first	option,	only	at‐risk	cattle	were	targeted	for	vaccination;	in	the	second	
option,	all	animal	types	were	vaccinated.	
To	estimate	the	economic	impacts	of	an	FMD	outbreak,	results	from	the	spread	modelling	were	
used	as	input	into	two	separate	models,	AgEmissions	and	AusRegion	(ABARES	2011).	
AgEmissions	estimated	direct	revenue	losses	for	affected	producers	and	AusRegion	estimated	
economy‐wide	impacts	of	an	FMD	outbreak.	Potential	social	impacts	for	individuals,	households	
and	communities	in	Australia	from	an	FMD	outbreak	were	assessed	through	a	literature	review	
and	discussions	with	focus	groups	in	Victoria	and	Queensland.	
Report	structure	
Chapter	2	explores	FMD	and	its	management	internationally	and	in	Australia.	Chapter	3	
discusses	the	outbreak	scenarios	and	control	strategies	considered	in	this	analysis.	Estimated	
operational	costs	of	implementing	alternative	response	strategies	are	also	examined.	Chapter	4	
details	the	economic	impacts	of	an	FMD	outbreak	and	the	methods	used	for	estimating	direct	
and	indirect	costs.	Chapter	5	presents	the	results	of	the	economic	modelling.	Chapter	6	
highlights	social	impacts	that	may	result	from	an	FMD	outbreak	and	the	consequences	of	
implementing	control	measures.	Impacts	on	producers	and	other	stakeholders	at	a	personal,	
family	and	community	level	are	discussed.	Chapter	7	examines	ways	to	minimise	the	social	
impact	of	an	outbreak.	
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2 The disease and its management 
FMD	is	a	highly	contagious	viral	disease	of	cloven	hoofed	animals,	including	cattle,	sheep,	goats,	
pigs,	deer,	buffalo	and	camelids.	Human	infections	are	rare	and	do	not	result	in	serious	disease	
(DAFF	2011).	In	livestock,	FMD	has	high	rates	of	morbidity	but	mortality	rates,	particularly	in	
adult	animals,	are	low.	Animals	can	spread	the	FMD	virus	for	several	days	before	showing	
clinical	signs	of	the	disease,	and	the	virus	can	remain	for	long	periods	after	clinical	recovery	
(DAFF	2011).	Despite	anecdotal	reports,	carriers	(other	than	African	buffalo)	do	not	appear	to	
have	infected	susceptible	animals	(DAFF	FMD	Taskforce,	pers.	comm.,	14	June	2013).	
Various	measures	can	be	used	to	control	and	eradicate	FMD,	including:	
 imposing	movement	restrictions	on	livestock	and	livestock	products	
 quarantine	of	premises	that	are	infected,	suspected	to	be	infected	or	that	tracing	has	deemed	
at‐risk	of	infection	
 destruction	and	disposal	of	infected	and	at‐risk	livestock;	disinfection	of	contaminated	
materials	on	infected	premises	and	of	materials	that	have	had	high‐risk	contact	with	infected	
premises	
 vaccination	to	increase	the	resistance	of	susceptible	animals	and	to	reduce	their	
infectiousness	should	they	become	infected.	
Under	World	Organisation	of	Animal	Health	guidelines,	to	regain	FMD‐free	status	for	trade,	a	
country	must	wait	a	designated	period	after	the	last	infected	case	was	removed	and	submit	
supporting	documentary	evidence.	The	waiting	period	depends	on	the	control	strategy	
implemented	(OIE	2011a).	Eradication	measures	that	may	be	taken	and	the	waiting	periods	are:	
 Stamping	out—mandatory	slaughter	of	all	susceptible	animals	on	infected	properties	and	
burning	or	burial	of	carcasses.	Animals	in	other	herds	that	have	been	either	exposed	to	the	
infection	through	direct	contact	with	an	infected	animal	or	the	pathogen	must	be	
slaughtered	and	disposed	of	appropriately.	Free	status	without	vaccination	is	reinstated	
after	a	minimum	waiting	period	of	three	months	after	the	last	case	was	eradicated.	
 Stamping	out	with	ring	vaccination	of	all	susceptible	animals	and	subsequent	removal	of	
vaccinated	animals	from	the	population.	An	FMD‐free	status	is	reinstated	after	a	minimum	
waiting	period	of	three	months	when	all	vaccinated	animals	have	been	slaughtered.	
 Vaccination	without	slaughter	of	all	vaccinated	animals.	Free	status	is	reinstated	after	a	
waiting	period	of	six	months	after	the	last	case	or	the	last	vaccination	(whichever	event	
occurs	last),	provided	a	serological	survey	based	on	the	detection	of	antibodies	to	non‐
structural	proteins	of	FMD	virus	demonstrates	the	absence	of	infection	in	the	remaining	
vaccinated	population.	
Methods	of	foot‐and‐mouth	control	
The	Organisation	for	Economic	Co‐operation	and	Development	(OECD)	countries	have	used	
stamping	out	to	manage	FMD	outbreaks.	This	is	to	ensure	quick	eradication,	a	swift	return	to	
disease‐free	status	and	access	to	international	markets	(Junker	et	al.	2009).	However,	the	
destruction	and	disposal	of	large	numbers	of	infected	and	at‐risk	stock	can	lead	to	public	outcry.	
For	example,	large‐scale	culling	in	the	United	Kingdom	in	2001	led	to	widespread	criticism	of	the	
government	for	not	using	vaccination	as	part	of	its	control	measures	(Anderson	2002;	Campbell	
&	Lee	n.d.).	
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In	some	circumstances,	early	vaccination	may	assist	with	or	be	essential	for	effective	disease	
control	(Matthews	2011).	The	use	of	vaccination	may	be	particularly	effective	in	areas	of	high	
cattle	density	and	when	resources	for	surveillance	and	stamping	out	are	limited	(Matthews	
2011).	Several	countries	have	combined	vaccination	with	stamping	out	to	achieve	effective	
control	of	FMD	after	stamping	out	alone	failed,	such	as	the	Netherlands	in	2001	(Bouma	et	al.	
2003)	and	Japan	in	2010.	The	Republic	of	Korea	adopted	a	vaccinate‐to‐live	policy	in	2011	after	
3	million	animals	had	been	culled	using	vaccination	with	stamping	out	strategy	and	a	stamping	
out	only	strategy	(Hagerman	et	al.	2011).	Governments	in	Japan	and	the	Republic	of	Korea	have	
overcome	their	initial	concerns	that	vaccination	would	delay	regaining	FMD‐free	status.	
Australia’s	management	of	foot‐and‐mouth	disease	
In	Australia,	the	Council	of	Australian	Governments	recently	endorsed	the	Model	Arrangements	
for	Leadership	during	Emergencies	of	National	Consequence.	The	arrangements	provide	a	
framework	to	guide	government	decisions	and	coordination	at	the	national	and	state	and	
territory	levels	during	an	FMD	outbreak	(AGD	2009).	Together	with	the	Australian	
Government’s	Agricultural	Incident	Plan,	a	coordinated	response	can	be	established	for	
agricultural	incidents	such	as	FMD	that	may	impact	on	Australia’s	agricultural	production	
industries	(DAFF	2012).	
In	the	event	of	an	FMD	outbreak,	response	management	will	initially	rely	on	the	emergency	
animal	disease	response	plan	drawn	up	by	the	affected	jurisdiction’s	chief	veterinary	officer	and	
approved	by	the	Consultative	Committee	on	Emergency	Animal	Disease	and	National	
Management	Group	in	line	with	policy	in	the	Australian	Veterinary	Emergency	Plan	
(AUSVETPLAN)	(AHA	2012).	
The	AUSVETPLAN	FMD	Disease	Strategy	Manual	details	the	policy	and	management	response	for	
emergency	animal	diseases	in	Australia.	The	policy	response	involves:	
 stopping	the	spread	of	the	disease	by	imposing	animal	movement	restrictions	
 stamping	out	and/or	vaccination	
 minimising	the	time	to	acquire	FMD‐free	status	through	the	implementation	of	a	response	
plan	capable	of	achieving	quick	eradication	
 reducing	social	and	financial	disruption	(AHA	2011).	
The	National	Biosecurity	Committee	of	the	Primary	Industries	Standing	Committee	has	
developed	a	National	FMD	Action	Plan	to	guide	collaborative	national	action	to	improve	
Australia’s	FMD	preparedness.	
Movement	restrictions	on	animals,	people	and	equipment	is	a	key	feature	of	Australia’s	planned	
response.	In	the	event	of	a	detection	or	strong	suspicion	of	FMD,	a	temporary	national	standstill	
of	all	susceptible	animals	will	be	immediately	implemented	for	at	least	72	hours.	During	this	
time	the	tracing	of	animals,	people	and	products	will	be	conducted	to	identify	routes	of	
transmission	and	locate	suspect	premises	where	infected	animals	are	yet	to	show	clinical	signs	
of	FMD.	An	inner	restricted	area	will	be	established	around	infected	properties	and	movement	of	
livestock	to	and	from	these	properties	restricted.	An	outer	control	area	may	be	established	
based	on	proximity	to	an	infected	property.	
AUSVETPLAN	states	that	the	default	policy	for	an	FMD	response	is	to	‘contain,	control	and	
eradicate	the	disease	to	re‐establish	the	FMD‐free	status	of	Australia	as	quickly	as	possible,	
while	minimising	social	and	financial	disruption’	(AHA	2012).	The	primary	strategy	involves	
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stamping	out	and	can	be	supported	by	other	strategies	including	vaccination,	which	may	be	
approved	to	assist	control	of	an	outbreak	under	some	circumstances	(AHA	2012).	Vaccination	
may	be	a	considered	from	day	one	of	an	emergency	response	to	FMD,	according	to	a	recent	
endorsement	by	the	Standing	Council	on	Primary	Industries	(SCoPI	2012).	A	more	detailed	set	of	
guidelines	is	being	developed	for	the	use	of	vaccination	in	the	event	of	an	FMD	outbreak	in	
Australia	(SCoPI	2012).	
Control	strategy	to	minimise	socio‐economic	impacts	
FMD	management	strategies	should	also	seek	to	minimise	the	overall	socio‐economic	impact	on	
the	Australian	community.	Different	control	strategies	will	affect	different	elements	of	the	total	
disease	cost,	including	economic	impacts,	social	impacts	and	operational	control	costs.	
Economic	impacts	
Most	impacts	resulting	from	FMD	incursions	are	attributed	to	sales	revenue	losses	from	the	loss	
of	major	export	markets	for	livestock	and	livestock	products	and,	to	a	lesser	extent,	to	declines	
in	prices	of	these	products	in	the	domestic	market.	While	lower	prices	in	the	domestic	market	
will	benefit	consumers,	these	would	not	be	sufficient	to	offset	the	losses	to	producers.	The	length	
of	time	export	markets	remain	closed	could	be	significantly	influenced	by	the	type	of	measures	
used	to	control	disease,	depending	on	the	nature	and	location	of	an	outbreak.	
Historically,	most	livestock	producing	and	exporting	FMD‐free	countries	(including	Australia)	
have	used	stamping	out	to	reduce	losses	and	ensure	swift	eradication	and	an	early	resumption	
of	trade.	Stamping	out	may	only	be	effective	where	available	resources	to	contain	and	eradicate	
the	outbreak	are	sufficient	and/or	the	outbreak	occurs	in	a	location	where	the	disease	is	
expected	to	spread	at	a	low	rate,	with	much	less	demand	on	resources	for	its	management.	
In	situations	where	management	of	high	rates	of	disease	spread	put	greater	demands	on	
resources,	a	stamping	out	only	strategy	could	result	in	the	outbreak	overwhelming	available	
resources	and	rapidly	spreading	in	an	uncontrolled	manner.	Lessons	from	the	2001	UK	outbreak	
indicate	that	the	limiting	factor	in	fighting	a	fast	spreading	disease	like	FMD	is	likely	to	be	the	
capacity	to	destroy	and	dispose	of	infected	animals.	
In	such	situations	vaccination	can	be	used	to	slow	the	spread	of	the	disease	to	ensure	
eradication	success.	Vaccination	significantly	reduces	the	number	of	herds	that	need	to	be	
slaughtered	to	control	disease	spread,	enabling	available	resources	to	deal	with	infected	herds.	
Resources	could	be	diverted	from	slaughtering	and	disposal	to	vaccination,	which	would	
generally	require	less	labour.	
Each	management	strategy	has	different	human	and	operational	resource	implications.	Selecting	
the	best	strategy	for	a	successful	and	cost‐effective	eradication	will	depend	on	knowledge	of	
available	capacity	at	the	time	of	the	outbreak	and	the	epidemiology	of	the	virus	in	the	affected	
environment.	
Social	impacts	
The	alternative	strategies	considered	in	this	analysis	have	social	impacts	on	producers	and	their	
families	in	the	affected	regions.	Some	of	these	social	impacts	are	common	to	all	strategies	and	
are	less	relevant	for	selecting	a	management	option.	
An	example	of	a	source	of	social	impact	is	community	concern	about	mass	culling	and	disposal	of	
animals	for	containment	and	eradication.	Such	sentiments	may	have	increased	since	the	highly	
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publicised	control	operations	during	the	2001	UK	FMD	outbreak.	Consideration	of	community	
concern	when	formulating	control	policies	and	strategies	may	result	in	the	selection	of	a	
solution	that	involves	less	animal	culling	or	less	intensive	animal	culling.	
Social	impacts	are	difficult	to	estimate	in	monetary	terms	because	they	cannot	be	determined	by	
market	operations.	An	approximation	of	their	cost	would	require	a	comprehensive	and	costly	
population	survey	to	establish	the	average	monetary	value	each	individual	is	prepared	to	forgo	
in	order	for	animals	not	to	be	culled.	However,	it	is	unlikely	that	this	method	could	be	used	to	
estimate	the	non‐monetary	personal	and	household	consequences	and	outcomes	of	a	potential	
FMD	outbreak	event.	
Operational	control	costs	
Each	of	the	alternative	control	strategies	contains	a	different	mix	of	operational	activities,	with	
each	mix	requiring	a	certain	level	of	investment	for	its	implementation.	Control	costs	for	each	
strategy	represent	a	minor	proportion	of	the	total	disease	cost.	Where	there	is	an	insignificant	
difference	in	the	impact	of	each	strategy	differences	in	costs	could	influence	the	choice	of	
strategy.	
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3 Evaluating control strategies for 
disease outbreak scenarios 
The	size	of	an	outbreak	must	be	identified	in	order	to	assess	its	socio‐economic	impacts	and	test	
the	cost	effectiveness	of	alternative	control	strategies.	In	an	actual	outbreak	situation,	even	
though	the	size	of	an	outbreak	is	unknown	when	it	is	first	detected,	an	eradication	strategy	has	
to	be	selected.	Eradication	is	then	attempted	in	accordance	with	the	AUSVETPLAN	and	using	
available	resources.	
An	eradication	approach	must	consider	many	factors	that	will	be	known	only	at	the	time	of	the	
outbreak.	These	include	early	reports	of	the	initial	infection	area,	the	rate	of	spread,	anticipated	
resources	and	other	supporting	epidemiological	data.	This	information	can	be	used	to	assist	in	
decision‐making	during	the	outbreak	and	will	influence	which	eradication	approach	is	selected.	
In	this	socio‐economic	assessment,	ABARES	used	the	AusSpread	epidemiological	model	
(described	later	in	this	chapter)	to	simulate	different	types	of	outbreak	scenarios	and	determine	
the	cost	of	successfully	eradicating	such	outbreaks	through	the	use	of	stamping	out	or	a	
combination	of	stamping	out	and	vaccination.	Output	from	AusSpread	was	then	used	to:	
 assess	the	costs	of	eradicating	these	hypothetical	foot‐and‐mouth	(FMD)	outbreaks	
 quantify	the	economic	costs	(Chapter	4)	
 assess	the	social	impacts	of	FMD	disease	spread	for	comparison	of	the	control	strategies	
(Chapter	5).	
Outbreak	scenarios	
The	rate	of	spread	of	FMD	would	vary	depending	on	virus	strain,	climatic	conditions	and	the	
physical	characteristics	of	livestock	production	systems.	For	example,	FMD	is	likely	to	spread	
more	rapidly	in	the	more	intensive	livestock	production	systems	of	temperate	southern	
Australia	than	under	the	more	extensive	pastoral	grazing	systems	of	northern	Australia.	The	size	
of	a	potential	outbreak	would	depend	on	external	factors	such	as	availability	of	resources	to	
combat	the	disease	and	the	time	elapsed	before	the	disease	was	detected.	The	rate	of	spread	
would	influence	the	effectiveness	and	direct	control	costs	of	strategies	adopted	to	combat	the	
disease.	
Outbreak	scenarios	were	selected	to	assess	the	differences	in	economic	and	social	impacts	that	
may	occur	between	different	regions.	Biosecurity	Animal	Division	of	DAFF	developed	
hypothetical	outbreak	scenarios	for	this	analysis	(Appendix	A):	
 A	small	outbreak	in	North	Queensland,	where	production	is	predominantly	extensively	
raised	cattle	on	rangelands.	
 A	small	outbreak	in	Victoria’s	Goulburn	Valley,	which	has	a	high	density	of	livestock	and	a	
large	number	of	intensive	dairy	farms.	
 A	large	multi‐state	outbreak	that,	by	the	time	of	detection,	has	spread	from	Victoria	to	all	
eastern	states	(New	South	Wales,	Queensland,	South	Australia,	Victoria	and	Tasmania).	
This	multi‐state	outbreak	would	take	longer	to	control	and	eradicate	than	the	smaller	outbreaks.	
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Eradication	strategies	
It	is	assumed	that	FMD	in	all	three	outbreak	scenarios	can	be	controlled	and	eradicated	using	
stamping	out	only	and	vaccination	with	stamping	out	and	the	subsequent	decontamination	of	
the	farm.	Stamping	out	combined	with	ring	vaccination	involves	the	vaccination	of	animals	on	
premises	within	a	designated	radius	of	infected	and	dangerous	contact	premises.	Following	
control	of	the	outbreak	all	vaccinated	animals	are	removed.	
Two	approaches	to	vaccination	were	examined:	
 extensive	vaccination—vaccination	of	all	susceptible	animals	(cattle,	sheep	and	pigs)	in	the	
designated	vaccination	rings	
 targeted	vaccination—within	designated	high‐risk	vaccination	rings,	all	cattle	are	vaccinated	
and	sheep	on	mixed	cattle	and	sheep	farms	are	also	vaccinated.	In	other	outbreak	areas	
outside	this	high‐risk	ring,	stamping	out	(without	vaccination)	is	undertaken.	
For	all	outbreak	scenarios	stamping	out	only	and	stamping	out	with	extensive	vaccination	were	
evaluated.	For	the	large	multi‐state	outbreak	scenario	the	stamping	out	with	targeted	ring	
vaccination	strategy	was	also	considered.	This	strategy	represents	a	more	selective	approach	to	
vaccination	that	may	be	considered	where	supply	of	vaccine	and/or	resources	to	administer	it	
are	limited,	such	as	in	a	rapidly	spreading	multi‐state	outbreak.	Accordingly	a	targeted	
vaccination	program	is	applied	based	on	epidemiological	advice,	in	which	only	cattle	in	high‐risk	
areas	of	Victoria	are	targeted,	with	sheep	in	these	areas	only	vaccinated	on	mixed	cattle–sheep	
farms.	This	area	represents	the	main	focus	of	disease	spread	and	the	greatest	risk	of	rapid	
spread	given	high	farm	and	animal	densities.	
The	use	of	zoning	to	attempt	to	establish	an	FMD‐free	zone	for	international	trade	purposes	was	
not	considered	in	this	study	because	of	uncertainties	about	its	possible	impact	on	eradication	
effort	and	acceptance	by	trading	partners.	Australia’s	national	policy	on	the	use	of	zoning	in	
emergency	animal	disease	outbreaks	such	as	FMD	is	unclear	on	how	zoning	might	be	
implemented	and	whether	it	would	divert	significant	resources	from	the	response	to	an	
outbreak.	Diverting	resources	from	controlling	the	disease	to	establishing	a	zone	could	be	
counterproductive,	as	it	would	increase	the	likelihood	of	the	disease	escaping	containment.	It	is	
also	unclear	whether	zoning	would	be	accepted	by	trading	partners.	Any	agreement	would	
require	significant	bilateral	negotiations	between	Australia	and	the	trading	partner	(DAFF	FMD	
Taskforce,	pers.	comm.,	14	June	2013).	
Analysis	of	the	potential	costs	and	benefits	of	establishing	FMD‐free	zones	to	mitigate	market	
access	costs	is	outside	the	scope	of	this	study.	
Modelling	disease	spread	using	AusSpread	
The	establishment	and	spread	of	hypothetical	FMD	incursions	for	each	of	these	outbreak	
scenarios	and	eradication	strategies	were	modelled	using	DAFF’s	AusSpread	regional	FMD	
simulation	model	(Garner	&	Beckett	2005;	Beckett	&	Garner	2007)	(Box	1).	As	the	model	is	
stochastic,	100	simulation	runs	for	each	eradication	strategy	and	each	outbreak	were	completed	
(Appendix	A).	A	stochastic	model	accounts	for	random	effects	in	forecasting.	AusSpread	
generates	a	range	of	epidemics	each	time	it	is	run,	even	with	the	same	parameter	settings	and	
produces	a	probability	distribution	of	likely	outbreak	durations	for	each	scenario.	The	output	of	
each	variable	used	in	the	estimate	of	economic	cost	is	the	average	of	the	spread	model	outputs	
from	all	simulations.	
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Box 1 Description of AusSpread model 
AusSpread	is	a	stochastic	spatial	simulation	model	developed	to	study	spread	and	control	of	FMD	in	livestock	
populations.	It	simulates	disease	spread	at	the	farm	level	in	daily	time	steps,	allowing	for	interactions	between	farms	
with	different	animal	species	and	different	production	types.	Seven	different	default	farm	types	are	identified—
specialist	beef,	dairy,	sheep,	pig,	mixed	beef–sheep,	smallholders	and	feedlots.	The	model	allows	for	the	spread	of	
disease	through	animal	movements,	local	spread,	indirect	contacts,	saleyards	and	by	windborne	spread.	The	
attributes	and	spatial	location	of	individual	farms,	saleyards,	weather	stations,	local	government	areas	and	various	
other	features	of	the	regional	environment	are	incorporated	into	the	model	(Appendix	A).	
An	outbreak	can	be	considered	in	two	phases.	First,	before	the	first	reporting	of	FMD	(pre‐detection	or	silent	phase),	
the	disease	can	readily	spread	with	the	normal	pattern	of	animal	movements	and	other	forms	of	interaction	within	a	
region.	Hence	the	size	and	impact	of	a	potential	outbreak	will	depend	on	external	factors	such	as	the	time	elapsed	
before	the	disease	is	detected.	Second,	once	the	disease	has	been	confirmed,	a	control	and	eradication	program	is	
initiated	(response	phase)	and	disease	spread	will	be	hampered	by,	for	example,	restrictions	on	the	movement	of	
livestock	and	reductions	in	inter‐farm	contact,	by	the	identification	and	culling	of	animals	on	affected	farms	or	by	
vaccination.	
AusSpread	is	configured	to	support	the	range	of	mitigation	measures	described	in	Australia’s	veterinary	
AUSVETPLAN	for	FMD	(AHA	2012).	This	includes	quarantine	and	movement	restrictions,	stamping	out,	surveillance,	
tracing,	pre‐emptive	culling	options	and	vaccination	strategies.	Users	can	select	mitigation	options	from	within	this	
range	to	suit	any	particular	response	strategy.	The	efficacy,	efficiency	and	eventual	success	of	any	control	operation	
are	determined	in	part	by	the	balance	between	demand	for,	and	availability	of,	resources.	
AusSpread	is	parameterised	such	that	the	application	of	mitigation	measures	on	each	day	of	the	simulation	is	
implemented	only	to	the	level	of	available	resources.	The	user	can	specify	the	availability	of	teams	over	time	to	
undertake	surveillance,	culling	and	vaccination.	If	available	resources	are	insufficient	to	accommodate	all	the	
operational	activities	scheduled	for	a	given	day,	a	backlog	builds	up	and	is	carried	over	to	the	next	day.	
Allowing	likely	duration	of	outbreak,	number	of	infected	and	destocked	farms,	dangerous	contact	premises	and	
number	of	animals	culled	and	vaccinated	to	be	estimated—FMD	spread	is	simulated	100	times	for	each	of	the	
eradication	strategies	and	for	each	outbreak	scenario	(Appendix	A).	
AusSpread	output	for	alternative	control	strategies	
Results	from	AusSpread—the	epidemiological	model	used	to	study	the	spread	and	control	of	
FMD	in	livestock	populations—show	that	the	eradication	time	and	number	of	animals	culled	
vary	with	the	control	strategy	implemented.	The	effect	of	the	control	strategy	on	these	two	
variables	differs	depending	on	the	potential	size	and	location	of	an	outbreak	and	the	production	
system	affected.	
Effect	of	production	system	
Outbreaks	in	extensive	productions	areas	(such	as	the	North	Queensland	outbreak	scenario)	are	
likely	to	experience	lower	rates	of	virus	dissemination	and	require	limited	control	resources.	
The	use	of	vaccination	in	this	scenario	had	little	effect	in	reducing	the	number	of	animals	culled	
or	the	time	taken	to	eradicate	the	disease.	
However,	in	the	Victorian	small	outbreak	scenario	(where	production	is	largely	intensive),	
vaccination	reduced	the	number	of	animals	culled	by,	on	average,	about	21	per	cent	and	the	
duration	of	the	outbreak	by,	on	average,	6	per	cent	compared	with	the	stamping	out	strategy	
(Table	1).	This	demonstrates	the	difference	in	effectiveness	of	vaccination	in	a	high	density	
livestock	production	system	(Victoria)	compared	with	a	less	intensive	system	(North	
Queensland).	In	situations	where	disease	spreads	rapidly,	particularly	where	resources	to	
identify	and	remove	infected	herds	may	be	limited,	vaccination	can	be	effective	in	containing	an	
outbreak.	
Effect	of	the	size	of	outbreak	
Increased	effectiveness	of	the	use	of	vaccination	with	potentially	larger	outbreaks	is	
demonstrated	by	simulation	results	for	Victoria	of	small	and	large	outbreak	scenarios.	
	9	
	
Combining	stamping	out	with	targeted	vaccination	in	the	large	outbreak	reduced	the	number	of	
animals	culled	in	Victoria	by	81	per	cent,	and	the	outbreak	duration	by,	on	average,	30	per	cent	
compared	with	stamping	out.	This	reduction	is	significantly	greater	than	that	for	the	small	
Victorian	outbreak.	Previous	research	has	shown	that	mass	culling	could	be	demanding	in	terms	
of	overall	resource	requirements	if	vaccination	is	not	used	to	ease	the	pressure	on	resources,	
especially	in	a	fast	and	widespreading	outbreak.	
Supporting	evidence	from	earlier	research	
ABARES	earlier	research,	using	the	same	epidemiological	model,	found	the	stamping	out	
strategy	to	be	the	higher	cost	option	in	eradicating	an	outbreak	in	Victoria,	particularly	where	
the	virus	was	initially	widespread	and	availability	of	resources	needed	to	manage	containment	
through	culling	and	disposal	of	infected	and	at‐risk	animals	was	uncertain.	That	analysis	found	
that	a	20	per	cent	reduction	in	availability	of	resources	to	combat	the	disease	could	more	than	
double	the	expected	cost	of	an	outbreak	under	a	stamping	out	strategy.	By	contrast,	the	expected	
cost	of	the	combined	stamping	out	with	extensive	vaccination	strategy	is	estimated	to	increase	
by	only	6	per	cent,	indicating	that	this	would	be	a	preferred	management	strategy	under	a	
situation	where	adequate	capacity	for	successful	culling	and	disposal	operations	is	not	certain	
(Abdalla	et	al.	2005).	
The	Abdalla	study	also	tested	the	effect	of	increasing	the	time	assumed	to	elapse	between	
incursion	and	first	detection	on	the	potential	cost	of	the	outbreak.	With	an	assumed	one‐week	
delay	in	detecting	the	disease,	the	estimated	probability	of	containment	became	very	low	under	
the	stamping	out	strategy,	resulting	in	substantial	expected	costs,	with	the	vaccination	strategy	
likely	to	be	the	least‐cost	option	under	these	circumstances.	Nonetheless,	the	escalation	in	
expected	costs	of	a	disease	outbreak	as	a	result	of	late	discovery	could	be	considerable	under	
both	strategies,	suggesting	that	early	detection	would	be	paramount	if	disease	costs	were	to	be	
significantly	curtailed.
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Table 1 Impacts of FMD outbreak scenarios and alternative control strategies, Australiaa 
Scenario/state/strategy Eradication	time	
(days)	
Animals	culled	(no.) Animals	vaccinated	
(no.)	
Decrease	eradication	
time	(%)	c	
CV	for	days	b	
Large	multi‐state	outbreak	 	
New	South	Wales 	
Stamping	out	 64 5 405 – – 0.10	
Stamping	out	with	extensive	vaccination	 71 5 282 61 895 –10.9 0.11	
Queensland	 	
Stamping	out	 61 2 465 – – 0.14	
Stamping	out	with	extensive	vaccination	 67 2 251 5 703 –9.8 0.10	
Victoria	 	
Stamping	out	 155 114 665 – – 0.57	
Stamping	out	with	extensive	vaccination	 113 40 402 403 591 27.1 0.15	
stamping	out	with targeted	vaccination	 109 41 802 135 788 29.7 0.17	
South	Australia 	
Stamping	out	 63 4 227 – – 0.40	
Stamping	out	with	extensive	vaccination	 66 3 530 80 041 –4.8 0.23	
Tasmania	 	
Stamping	out	 57 418 – – 0.10	
Stamping	out	with	extensive	vaccination	 62 484 21 014 –8.7 0.04	
National	subtotals 	
Stamping	out	 155 127 180 – – –	
Stamping	out	and	extensive	vaccination	 113 51 949 572 244 27.1 –	
National	total 109 54 316 135 788 29.7 –	
Small	outbreak	in	Victoria	 	
Stamping	out	 103 48 812 – – 0.35	
Stamping	out	with	extensive	vaccination	 97 38 624 269 065 5.8 0.14	
Small	outbreak	in	North	Queensland	 	
Stamping	out	 68 18 703 – – 0.07	
Stamping	out	with	extensive	vaccination	 68 18 650 9425 –0.3 0.09	
a Values are averages estimated from 100 simulations. b Coefficient of variation for eradication time. c Relative to stamping out. 
Source: ABARES estimate; Garner 2012 
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Other	factors	for	choosing	between	strategies	
The	results	with	all	strategies	showed	a	degree	of	variability.	Vaccination	was	the	most	effective	
at	reducing	the	variation	in	outcome,	especially	in	intensive	production	systems	or	with	large	
outbreaks.	This	is	reflected	by	the	small	coefficients	of	variation	in	the	duration	of	eradication	
for	strategies	involving	vaccination	(Table1).	This	shows	that	very	large	outbreaks	are	most	
likely	to	occur	when	stamping	out	on	its	own	is	used—these	large	outbreaks	occur	when	
resources	are	inadequate	to	rapidly	find	and	decontaminate	infected	premises.	The	findings	
suggest	that	vaccination	is	likely	to	be	useful	when	resources	to	effectively	implement	stamping	
out	are	stretched	(due	to	the	size	of	the	outbreak	or	high	rates	of	spread)	and	risk	mitigation	is	
prioritised	to	reduce	the	likelihood	of	a	large	outbreak	occurring.	
The	model	results	suggest	that,	with	the	stamping	out	policy,	there	is	a	chance	the	disease	could	
get	out	of	control	for	extended	periods,	as	shown	by	the	right‐hand	tail	of	outbreak	duration	
under	this	strategy	(Figure	1;	Figure	2).	By	contrast,	using	vaccination	would	reduce	the	chances	
of	the	disease	escaping	containment	and	delaying	eradication.	The	reduced	frequency	of	
extended	eradication	time	with	vaccination	is	a	key	benefit	of	implementing	this	strategy.	
Figure 1 Frequency distribution of time to eradicate the large foot‐and‐mouth outbreak	
	
SO = stamping out. SORVe = stamping out with extensive vaccination. SORVt = stamping out with targeted vaccination 
Note: Frequency of eradication based on 10‐day intervals. 
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Figure 2 Frequency distribution of time to eradicate the small foot‐and‐mouth outbreaks 
	
SO = stamping out. SORVe = stamping out with extensive vaccination. 
Note: Frequency of eradication based on 10‐day intervals. 
The	study	has	also	clearly	shown	that,	in	a	large	outbreak,	targeting	vaccination	to	higher	risk	
species	and	areas	is	a	better	approach	than	vaccinating	all	susceptible	species	in	all	infected	
areas.	In	Victoria,	the	total	number	of	animals	vaccinated	in	the	extensive	vaccination	is	triple	
that	of	the	targeted	vaccination,	while	the	total	number	culled	during	extensive	vaccination	is	
estimated	to	be	twice	as	large	as	during	targeted	vaccination.	Modelling	suggested	it	takes	
longer	to	eradicate	the	disease	using	extensive	vaccination.	This	is	due	to	the	size	of	the	
vaccination	program	and	diversion	of	resources	from	culling	infected	animals	to	vaccination.	
Control	costs	
In	this	analysis,	the	cost	of	eradication	for	each	scenario	is	broken	into	cost	of	labour,	
decontamination,	slaughter	and	disposal,	hire	of	equipment	and	facilities,	stores	and	laundry.	
Values	are	estimated	from	spread	model	results	and	previous	studies	(Abdalla	et	al.	2005;	
Garner,	Roche	&	Wicks	2011)	(Box	2).	This	approach	provides	a	more	accurate	representation	of	
the	potential	costs	for	an	outbreak	in	Australia	than	using	aggregate	cost	estimates	for	outbreak	
experiences	elsewhere.	
Control	costs	for	each	scenario	by	control	strategy	were	estimated	for	affected	states	and	
nationally	(Table	2).	In	all	scenarios	and	strategies,	estimated	control	costs	are	highest	in	
Victoria.	This	is	not	surprising	since	Victoria	was	the	worst	affected	state	and	had	the	highest	
infection	rate	in	the	hypothetical	scenarios	examined.	Victoria	was	also	the	only	state	where	the	
use	of	vaccination	reduced	control	costs	when	compared	with	using	stamping	out	only.	On	
average	the	percentage	reductions	in	costs	are	estimated	at	5.2	per	cent	for	the	small	outbreak	
and	over	30	per	cent	for	the	large	outbreak.	
For	the	large	multi‐state	outbreak,	nationwide	control	costs	could	vary	depending	on	what	type	
of	strategy,	or	combination	of	strategies,	is	adopted	to	control	the	disease:	
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 If	a	stamping	out	strategy	was	adopted	in	all	states,	eradication	costs	would	be	the	highest,	at	
an	estimated	$373	million,	on	average.	
 If	a	strategy	of	targeted	ring	vaccination	to	curtail	the	rate	of	disease	spread	was	adopted	in	
Victoria	with	other	states	only	stamping	out,	overall	control	costs	are	estimated	to	decline	by	
13	per	cent	to	$324	million,	on	average.	
 If	all	states	except	Victoria	adopted	vaccination,	the	cost	would	be	reduced	on	average	to	
$347	million,	or	by	only	7	per	cent.	
These	results	indicate	that	under	the	large	outbreak	scenario,	while	the	use	of	extensive	
vaccination	reduces	control	costs	in	Victoria,	it	raises	these	costs	in	other	states.	With	limited	
cases	of	disease	in	New	South	Wales,	Queensland,	South	Australia	and	Tasmania,	the	results	of	
disease	spread	modelling	showed	little	variation	in	the	number	of	animals	culled	under	both	
stamping	out	alone	and	stamping	out	combined	with	vaccination	strategies.	This	means	that,	
while	the	cost	of	stamping	out	infected	animals	and	dangerous	contacts	are	similar	for	the	two	
strategies,	an	added	cost	of	vaccinating	uninfected	animals	is	incurred	in	the	vaccination	
strategy.	
Total	control	costs	are	shown	to	be	significantly	smaller	for	the	small	outbreaks	compared	with	
the	large	outbreak.	Control	costs	in	the	large	outbreak	are	as	high	as	84	per	cent	above	costs	in	
the	small	outbreak	(Table	2).	
Although	not	considered	in	this	report,	an	outbreak	of	FMD	involving	feral	animals	in	Australia	
could	delay	the	detection	of	disease,	increase	the	spread,	delay	disease	eradication	and	proof	of	
disease‐free	status.	Resources	for	control	programs	to	undertake	the	AUSVETPLAN	Wild	Animal	
Response	Strategy	may	be	required	where	feral	animal	populations	are	assessed	as	posing	an	
unacceptable	risk.	This	will	increase	the	cost	of	controlling	an	outbreak.	
Table 2 Total foot‐and‐mouth control costs by strategy and state a 
Scenario/strategy	 Vic.	
($m)	
Qld
($m)	
NSW	
($m)	
SA
($m)	
Tas.	
($m)	
Total	
($m)	
Large	multi‐state	
outbreak	
	 	
Stamping	out	 153	 55 58 56 51	 373
Stamping	out	with	
extensive	vaccination	
107	 60 64 60 56	 347
Stamping	out	with	
targeted	vaccination	b	
104	 55 58 56 51	 324
Small	outbreak	in	
Victoria	
	 	
Stamping	out	 96	 na na na na	 96
Stamping	out	with	
extensive	vaccination	
91	 na na na na	 91
Small	outbreak	in	North	
Queensland	
	 	
Stamping	out	 na	 61 na na na	 61
Stamping	out	with	
extensive	vaccination	
na	 62 na na na	 62
Note: a Values are averages estimated from 100 simulations. b Targeted vaccination in Victoria only and stamping out in all 
other states. na Not applicable. 
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Box 2 Estimating control costs 
Abdalla	et	al.	(2005)	estimated	decontamination	costs	for	each	industry	based	on	labour	requirements	and	the	hire	of	
necessary	equipment	for	operations.	These	costs	differ	between	industries	depending	on	the	construction	of	
properties	in	each	industry.	Decontamination	costs	are	estimated	at	$50	000	per	piggery,	$35	000	per	dairy	
enterprise	and	$20	000	per	sheep	and	beef	cattle	enterprises.	Furthermore,	Garner,	Roche	and	Wicks	(2011)	have	
assumed	that	the	decontamination	costs	for	mixed	sheep	and	beef	cattle	farms	are	similar	to	estimates	for	beef	and	
sheep	provided	above	and	are	one‐quarter	of	these	costs	for	smallholder	farms,	where	a	smallholder	farm	has	an	
average	of	15	animals	per	property.	Decontamination	covers	all	properties	where	infected	and	dangerous	contact	
herds	are	slaughtered.	
In	this	analysis,	it	is	assumed	that	vaccinated	properties	do	not	undergo	decontamination.	However,	a	small	number	
of	properties	close	to	the	vaccinated	properties	may	be	decontaminated.	If	this	were	to	occur,	actual	costs	of	control	
for	strategies	involving	the	use	of	vaccination	would	be	slightly	higher	than	values	estimated	in	this	analysis.	
The	stamping	out,	slaughter	and	disposal	of	infected	and	dangerous	contact	animals	is	estimated	at	around	$15	000	
for	a	herd	of	4	000	sheep	or	pigs	and	a	similar	amount	for	400	head	of	beef	or	dairy	cattle	(Abdalla	et	al.	2005).	It	is	
assumed	that	the	slaughter	and	disposal	of	infected	and	dangerous	contact	animals	is	undertaken	on	farms.	
Disease	spread	modelling	in	the	ABARES	analysis	simulates	emergency	vaccination	where	a	single	dose	is	adequate,	
as	vaccinated	animals	are	assumed	to	be	earmarked	for	slaughter.	The	costs	for	labour,	cold	storage,	consumable	
items	and	delivery	are	estimated	to	be	$4.12	per	dose,	based	on	costs	indexed	from	Garner,	Roche	and	Wicks	(2011).	
The	total	labour	costs	for	administration	of	the	control	strategies,	such	as	the	cost	of	administration,	monitoring,	
surveillance	activities	and	the	running	of	local	disease	control	centres,	is	based	on	estimates	provided	in	Garner,	
Roche	and	Wicks	(2011).	It	is	assumed	that	all	control	centres	will	operate	until	the	region	or	state	is	declared	disease	
free.	
In	the	ABARES	analysis	all	costs	are	estimated	in	2011–12	dollars.	
Compensation	costs	
As	specified	in	the	government	and	livestock	industry	cost‐sharing	deed,	the	Emergency	Animal	
Disease	Response	Agreement,	farmers	are	to	be	compensated	for	slaughtered	animals	in	
accordance	with	prevailing	livestock	market	prices.	Arrangements	for	compensation	payments	
where	producers	are	forced	to	have	their	stock	destroyed	are	based	on	the	market	value	of	
stock.	When	affected	properties	are	no	longer	quarantined,	producers	can	apply	for	additional	
compensation	equal	to	the	difference	between	their	initial	compensation	payment	and	the	
market	value	of	the	replacement	stock.	Compensation	is	based	on	the	replacement	market	value	
(Abdalla	et	al.	2005).	
Under	the	Emergency	Animal	Disease	Response	Agreement	(EADRA	2001),	compensation	is	to	
be	paid	to	the	owner	of:	
 any	livestock	or	property	that	is	destroyed	for	the	purpose	of	eradication	or	prevention	of	
the	spread	of	an	emergency	animal	disease	
 any	livestock	that	was	certified	by	an	accredited	veterinarian	to	have	died	of	the	disease	or	
livestock	that	would	have	been	compulsorily	slaughtered	had	they	not	died.	
The	deed	also	states	that:	
In determining the compensation to be paid no allowance shall be made for loss of profit, loss 
occasioned by breach of contract, loss of production or any other consequential loss whatsoever 
(in the context of the deed) (EADRA 2001). 
For	this	analysis,	livestock	prices	per	head	for	each	industry	were	obtained	for	2011	from	the	
ABARES	Australian	Agricultural	and	Grazing	Industries	Survey.	Based	on	the	current	provisions	
in	the	deed	it	is	assumed	in	this	study	that	the	slaughter	of	vaccinated	animals	would	be	
undertaken	through	abattoirs,	with	no	compensation	provided	for	these	animals.	Changes	to	this	
policy	would	increase	the	estimated	cost	of	compensation.	
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Compensation	payments	were	estimated	for	each	disease	outbreak	scenario	and	control	strategy	
(Table	3).	On	average,	costs	vary	between	$6.3	million	and	$60.2	million,	depending	on	the	size	
and	location	of	the	outbreak	and	control	strategy	employed	to	eradicate	the	disease.	
Table 3 Total compensation costs by strategy and state a 
Category	 Vic.
($m)	
Qld
($m)	
NSW
($m)	
SA	
($m)	
Tas.	
($m)	
Total
($m)	
Large	multi‐state	outbreak
Stamping	out	 56.3 1.3 1.4 1.0	 0.3	 60.2
Stamping	out	with	extensive	vaccination	 17.9 1.3 1.3 0.8	 0.3	 21.6
Stamping	out	with	targeted	vaccination	b	 36.4 1.3 1.4 1.0	 0.3	 40.3
Small	outbreak	in	Victoria
Stamping	out	 16.4 na na na	 na	 16.4
Stamping	out	with	extensive	vaccination	 12.0 na na na	 na	 12.0
Small	outbreak	in	North	Queensland	
Stamping	out	 na 6.3 na na	 na	 6.3
Stamping	out	with	extensive	vaccination	 na 6.3 na na	 na	 6.3
a Values are averages estimated from 100 simulations. b Targeted vaccination in Victoria only and stamping out in all other 
states. na Not applicable. 
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4 Modelling economic impacts of a 
disease outbreak 
Once	the	presence	of	foot‐and‐mouth	disease	(FMD)	is	confirmed	in	a	country,	most	other	
countries	will	immediately	ban	the	importation	of	its	FMD‐susceptible	livestock	products.	Trade	
bans	on	Australian	exports	following	an	FMD	outbreak	could	cause	substantial	economic	losses.	
For	a	large	exporter	of	livestock	and	livestock	products	such	as	Australia—which	exports	
70	per	cent	of	production	value	from	FMD‐susceptible	livestock	and	livestock	products	(Box	3;	
Table	4)—economic	losses	from	trade	bans	can	far	outweigh	the	cost	of	control	(Horwitz	2012).	
An	FMD	outbreak	in	Australia	could	result	in	direct	economic	costs	to	industry	and	flow‐on	
effects	to	other	related	industries	and	the	economy.	Choosing	an	FMD	management	strategy	will	
involve	several	trade‐offs	as	the	strategy	employed	will	influence	the	operational	control	costs,	
duration	of	the	outbreak,	duration	of	export	market	access	restrictions	(Abdalla	et	al.	2005)	and	
the	flow‐on	effects	of	these	to	other	industries.	These	trade‐offs,	as	well	as	the	social	impacts,	
need	to	be	considered	in	selecting	a	management	strategy.	
Economic	impacts	
An	outbreak	of	FMD	is	expected	to	generate	direct	economic	costs	to	FMD‐susceptible	livestock	
industries,	and	flow‐on	effects	to	related	industries	and	other	sectors	of	the	economy	(Figure	3).	
Figure 3 Economic impacts from a foot‐and‐mouth outbreak 
 
Source: ABARES 
The	direct	cost	is	the	total	cost	borne	by	livestock	industries.	This	comprises	two	elements:	
revenue	losses	in	the	livestock	industry	as	a	result	of	losses	both	in	domestic	and	export	markets	
and	the	cost	of	control	strategies	(Chapter	3).	The	annual	revenue	loss	will	depend	on	the	
products	excluded	from	trade	and	the	time	to	regain	access	and	recover	trade	(Box	4).	Economy‐
wide	effects	are	the	combined	revenue	losses	or	gains	throughout	the	economy	as	a	result	of	
outbreak‐induced	changes	in	supply	of	and	demand	for	FMD‐affected	products.	It	represents	the	
direct	and	flow‐on	effects	on	the	economy.	
Flow‐on	effects	from	an	FMD	outbreak	can	impose	economic	costs	on	other	industries	
(Rich	2004)	including	upstream	and	downstream	industries	related	to	agriculture	and	rural	
tourism.	The	interdependence	of	business	enterprises	in	rural	areas	can	result	in	income	and	job	
losses	in	businesses	related	to	agriculture,	with	large	sections	of	the	community	negatively	
affected.	For	example,	in	2001	FMD	outbreaks	in	the	United	Kingdom	resulted	in	the	closure	of	
markets,	abattoirs	and	haulage	companies	and	several	agricultural	advisors,	shearers	and	other	
	
Loss	of	markets	Slaughtered	animals	
Livestock	revenue	lossesControl	costs	
Direct	economic	cost Economy‐wide	impacts	
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rural	contractors	lost	their	jobs	(Barclay	2005).	In	Australia,	an	outbreak	could	also	affect	
tourism,	transport	and	sport	(DAFF	2005).	There	may	also	be	some	benefits	to	consumers	in	
terms	of	lower	prices.	
Box 3 Australian production and trade of FMD‐susceptible livestock, 2010–11 
Table	4	summarises	Australia’s	production	and	export	statistics	for	FMD‐susceptible	commodities,	including	red	
meat,	live	exports	and	other	livestock	products	such	as	wool	and	milk	products.	
	
These	statistics	illustrate	that	revenues	generated	from	FMD‐susceptible	commodities	are	due	to	the	large	revenues	
generated	from	exports.	Therefore,	trade	restrictions	on	these	commodities	may	result	in	large	revenue	losses	to	
Australian	livestock	producers.	In	2010–11the	volume	of	beef	and	sheep	meat	exports	was	approximately	63	per	cent	
of	total	production	and	the	value	of	beef	and	sheep	exports,	including	live	exports,	(at	wholesale	prices)	was	
estimated	at	65	per	cent	of	the	gross	value	of	production.	The	quantity	of	wool	exports	in	2010–11	was	approximately	
equal	to	annual	domestic	production	and	valued	at	$3	048	million	(fob).	The	value	of	dairy	products	exported	(at	
wholesale	prices)	was	estimated	at	46	per	cent	of	the	gross	value	of	production.	However,	the	impact	on	the	pork	
industry	is	expected	to	be	less	severe	because	in	2010–11	the	value	of	pork	exports	(at	wholesale	prices)	was	
estimated	at	10	per	cent	of	the	total	value	of	pork	production.	
	
Australia’s	meat	exports	are	currently	concentrated	in	a	few	major	markets.		In	2010–11	beef	and	veal	meat	exports	
(at	wholesale	prices)	was	estimated	to	represent	64	per	cent	of	Australia’s	gross	production	value.	Japan,	the	United	
States	and	Republic	of	Korea	imported	around	69	per	cent	of	total	exports	in	the	same	year	(ABARES	2012).	The	
majority	of	Australia’s	live	cattle	and	sheep	exports	are	destined	for	Asia	and	the	Middle	East.	The	United	States	is	the	
largest	destination	for	Australian	lamb,	accounting	for	around	20	per	cent	of	the	volume	of	exports.	Other	destinations	
for	lamb	include	the	China,	European	Union,	Japan	and	Middle	East.	The	Middle	East	is	a	major	destination	for	
Australian	sheep	meat,	with	mutton	accounting	for	46	per	cent	of	the	volume	of	Australian	exports	in	2010–11.	The	
largest	importers	of	Australian	pig	meat	in	2010–11	were	Singapore	(53	per	cent	of	export	value),	New	Zealand	(14	
per	cent)	and	Papua	New	Guinea	(9	per	cent)	(ABS	2013).	By	contrast,	milk	products	are	exported	to	many	countries,	
with	the	largest	market	in	Japan,	followed	by	Singapore	and	China.	
	
Products	not	examined	here	may	also	be	affected	by	trade	bans,	including	other	livestock	products	such	as	offal	and	
hides	and	agricultural	inputs	such	as	used	farm	machinery	(Appendix	B).	
	
Table 4 Australian production and exports of FMD‐susceptible commodities, 2010‐11  
Commodity	 Production Exports	 Domestic	
meat	
consumption
Sector	 Herd	
numbers	
(m)	
Slaughtered
(m)	
Quantity
(kt)	
Gross	
value
($m)	
Quantity
(kt)	
Value	
($m	
fob)	
Quantity/
person
(kg)	
Beef	meat	a	 25.9	 8.1 2 133 7 164 937 4	328	 33.9
Live	cattle	exports	 na	 na 728	c 660 728	c 499	 na
Dairy	cattle	(milk	
production)	
2.6	 na 9 101	b 3 932 488	d 2	345	 na
Sheep	meat	 73.1	 23.2 514 2 513 243 1	429	 9.5
Live	sheep	exports	 na	 na 2 916	c 348 2 916	c 348	 na
Wool	 na	 na 429 2 673 444 3048	 na
Pig	meat	 0.3	e	 4.6 342 919 31 106	 24.6
a The quantity of beef produced from dairy cattle is included in the value for beef meat. b Milk production in megalitres 
(ML). c Number of animals million. d Butter, cheese, casein, skim and whole milk powder exported (kt). e Number of sows. 
na Not applicable. 
Source: ABARES 2013 
Modelling	the	economic	impacts	of	a	foot‐and‐mouth	outbreak	
Output	from	AusSpread	hypothetical	scenarios	(Chapter	3)—number	of	animals	culled	and	time	
to	eradicate	FMD—combined	with	the	expected	time	to	access	and	recover	markets	was	input	
into	two	economic	models	(Figure	4):	
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 AgEmissions	is	used	to	estimate	revenue	losses	to	livestock	producers	due	to	export	
suspensions.	The	market	effects	combined	with	the	estimates	of	cost	of	control	(Chapter	3)	
constitute	the	direct	costs	of	an	outbreak.	
 AusRegion	is	used	to	estimate	the	economy‐wide	effects	from	an	outbreak—overall	effects	
on	the	Australian	economy,	including	on	directly	affected	upstream	and	downstream	
industries.	
For	both	models,	a	period	of	10	years	was	used	to	quantify	the	economic	effects	of	an	FMD	
outbreak.	This	was	to	allow	sufficient	time	for	economic	agents	and	variables	to	adjust	to	the	
effects	of	FMD	outbreaks	considered	in	this	study.	The	present	value	of	these	effects	was	
calculated	using	a	7	per	cent	discount	rate	based	on	the	2010	edition	of	the	Australian	
Government’s	Best	practice	regulation	handbook.	
Figure 4 Framework to estimate economic impacts of a foot‐and‐mouth outbreak 
 
Source: ABARES   
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Box 4 Estimating economic impacts 
In	the	event	of	an	outbreak,	concerns	about	disease	transmission	are	likely	to	result	in	immediate	closure	of	export	
markets	for	FMD‐susceptible	commodities	from	Australia.	These	products	will	then	be	diverted	to	the	domestic	
market,	depressing	prices.	The	domestic	market	response	following	an	FMD	outbreak	is	represented	in	Figure	5,	
where	supply	and	demand	of	susceptible	commodities	in	the	domestic	market	before	an	FMD	outbreak	are	
represented	by	S1	and	D1,	respectively.	At	the	world	equilibrium	price	(Pw)	the	quantity	exported	is	ES1—the	
difference	between	the	quantity	of	product	supplied	(Q1)	and	the	quantity	of	product	demanded	in	the	domestic	
market	(Qd).	
	
With	closure	of	export	markets	following	an	outbreak,	assuming	that	100	per	cent	of	FMD‐susceptible	products	are	
diverted	to	the	domestic	market,	domestic	supply	would	increase	from	Qd	to	Q1,	with	prices	falling	from	Pw	to	P2.	
	
Within	Australia,	management	of	an	FMD	outbreak	would	result	in	quarantine	and	slaughter	of	infected	or	at‐risk	
livestock.	Shifting	the	commodity	supply	curve	from	S1	to	S2,	reducing	the	quantity	supplied	in	the	domestic	market	to	
Q2	at	price	to	P3.	
	
In	addition,	if	domestic	consumers	have	food	safety	concerns	the	domestic	market’s	ability	to	absorb	excess	product	
will	fall.	A	decline	in	domestic	demand	will	result,	shifting	D1	to	D2	and	further	depressing	domestic	prices	to	P4.	
	
If	export	markets	remain	closed	for	an	extended	period,	suppliers	will	adjust	to	a	new	equilibrium	where	the	quantity	
supplied	equals	quantity	demanded	at	Q3	and	price	P5.	Initially,	consumers	will	benefit	with	meat	supplied	at	
depressed	prices;	however,	producers	will	supply	a	smaller	quantity	at	prices	below	pre‐incursion	world	prices.	
Figure 5 Domestic market response to a foot‐and‐mouth outbreak
 
	
Modelling	direct	impacts	
The	livestock	industry	revenue	losses	were	modelled	using	AgEmissions—the	ABARES	dynamic	
multi‐regional,	multi‐commodity,	forward‐looking	partial	equilibrium	model	(Thorpe	&	Klijn	
2002)	(Box	5).	
The	model	is	used	to	estimate	revenues	losses	for	livestock	producers	in	each	scenario	and	
strategy,	with	and	without	an	FMD	outbreak.	The	impact	of	an	FMD	outbreak	is	estimated	as	
deviations	in	revenue	from	the	reference	case.	Compensation	costs	are	not	included	in	the	
calculation	of	direct	costs	because	they	are	already	accounted	for	in	the	estimate	of	revenue	
losses.	
Two	model	adjustments	were	incorporated	in	AgEmissions	to	estimate	the	revenue	losses.	First,	
the	quantity	of	FMD‐affected	products	exported	from	Australia	is	restricted	to	the	proportion	of	
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annual	exports	recovered	following	an	FMD	outbreak	(see	‘Market	access	assumptions’).	Second,	
state	livestock	herds	were	reduced	to	account	for	livestock	culled	during	outbreaks.	Data	for	
these	values	were	obtained	from	AusSpread	and	it	is	assumed	that	once	removed	from	the	herd,	
livestock	animals	do	not	generate	any	revenue	for	producers.	
Box 5 AgEmissions model 
AgEmissions	is	a	forward‐looking	model	that	projects	the	annual	volume	of	agricultural	commodities	produced	and	
consumed	domestically,	by	state,	quantities	traded	with	the	rest	of	the	world	and	the	national	price	that	balances	
regional	supplies	with	domestic	and	export	demand	for	each	commodity.	
The	model	contains	supply	and	demand	equations	for	15	agricultural	commodities—including	meat	from	grass‐fed	
and	feedlot	cattle,	meat	and	dairy	products	from	dairy	animals,	sheep	meat,	pig	meat,	wool,	other	animals	and	
broadacre	crops.	AgEmissions	also	contains	animal	inventory	constraints	to	determine	the	annual	size	of	livestock	
herds	and	the	number	slaughtered	annually	in	each	state.	Land	resource	constraints	limit	land	used	for	cropping	and	
grazing	activities,	while	feed	constraints	divert	coarse	grains	to	animal	feed.	
Inverse	demand	functions	for	each	commodity	are	specified	as	a	function	of	real	gross	domestic	product,	an	index	of	
real	prices	and	the	quantity	of	commodity	consumed	by	region	and	year.	The	marginal	cost	of	a	commodity	is	a	
function	of	the	quantity	of	the	commodity	produced	and	the	opportunity	cost	of	land	required	in	production.	
The	forward‐looking	feature	in	AgEmissions	allows	for	adjustments	in	livestock	herd	numbers	to	meet	long‐run	
equilibrium	conditions.	The	feature	assumes	that	producers	have	perfect	information	regarding	the	future	state	of	
Australian	agricultural	production	systems	and	the	behaviour	of	their	trading	partners.	This	allows	producers	to	
make	decisions	each	year	that	aim	to	generate	maximum	profits	in	the	long	term.	
For	example,	following	an	FMD	outbreak	export	restrictions	are	imposed	that	stop	the	trade	of	FMD‐susceptible	
product.	Producers	observe	severe	restrictions	on	exports	in	the	medium	term	that	are	not	completely	removed	in	the	
long	term.	In	response	to	severe	export	restrictions	in	the	medium	term,	producers	are	forced	to	sell	large	quantities	
of	FMD‐susceptible	commodities	into	the	domestic	market	at	low	prices.	When	producers	foresee	that	exports	will	not	
return	to	pre‐incursion	levels,	they	will	gradually	reduce	stock	numbers	to	ensure	profits	are	maximised.	
ABARES	incorporated	an	inventory	equation	in	the	model	to	ensure	that	sales	of	excess	supply	into	the	domestic	
market	that	occur	following	a	large	FMD	incursion	will	occur	over	a	two	years,	softening	the	decline	in	prices.	
Modelling	economy‐wide	impacts	
The	economy‐wide	effects	of	an	FMD	outbreak	were	estimated	using	AusRegion,	the	ABARES	
bottom‐up,	multi‐regional,	multi‐sectoral,	recursive	dynamic	computable	general	equilibrium	
model	of	the	Australian	economy.	
AusRegion	explicitly	specifies	inter‐sectoral	and	inter‐regional	dependencies	that	arise	from	
decentralised	economic	decisions	for	production,	consumption	and	trade.	In	its	most	
disaggregated	form,	AusRegion	has	43	sectors—including	forestry,	fisheries	and	16	agricultural	
sectors—representing	all	eight	Australian	states	and	territories.	For	this	study,	the	commodity	
aggregation	includes	six	livestock	sectors,	six	other	agricultural	sectors	and	three	food	
processing	sectors.	The	agricultural	database	for	AusRegion	is	drawn	largely	from	the	ABARES	
farm	survey	data.	
AusRegion	simulates	the	effect	of	a	change	in	one	or	several	parts	of	an	economy	(such	as	the	
agriculture	sector)	on	the	rest	of	the	economy.	In	an	FMD	outbreak	losses	in	the	affected	
livestock	sectors	are	expected	to	flow	through	to	the	meat	processing	industries	and	to	input	
providers	of	the	affected	livestock	sectors	(such	as	feed	suppliers)	and	then	through	to	the	state	
and	national	economies.	In	this	analysis	AusRegion	simulates	this	effect,	estimating	industry‐
specific	and	economy‐wide	impacts	such	as	gross	state	product	(GSP),	gross	regional	product	
(GRP)	and	gross	domestic	product	(GDP).	The	GRP	values	are	produced	for	states	where	the	
outbreak	starts	and	values	are	presented	within	and	outside	the	control	area.	GSP	values	are	
estimates	for	the	remaining	affected	states	and	GDP	for	the	nationwide	effect.	
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In	AusRegion,	the	effect	of	FMD	on	the	whole	economy	is	modelled	by	exogenously	shocking	the	
livestock	levels	to	reflect	culling	of	infected	animals	and	reducing	export	volumes	to	reflect	
estimated	trade	restrictions.	To	estimate	the	economic	effects	of	each	scenario,	AusRegion	is	
simulated	twice.	The	first	simulation	is	the	reference	case,	which	reflects	a	business	as	usual	
economic	trajectory	for	10	years;	the	second	sets	of	simulations	estimate	the	impact	of	each	
FMD	scenario	compared	with	the	business	as	usual	situation.	The	estimated	impacts	are	
deviations	from	the	reference	case.	
Market	access	assumptions	
Market	access	assumptions	were	developed	for	this	analysis	to	address	concerns	raised	by	
Matthews	(2011)	regarding	values	used	in	previous	studies.	Matthews	concluded	that	past	
studies	had	assumed	‘that	international	market	access	would	be	speedily	restored	following	
eradication’.	However,	Matthews	(2011)	noted	that	key	importing	countries	would	set	their	own	
timetables	to	convince	themselves	that	eradication	was	achieved.	This	time	frame	would	extend	
beyond	that	established	by	the	World	Organisation	of	Animal	Health	(OIE).	Further	details	on	
the	estimate	of	market	assess	assumptions	is	provided	in	Appendix	B.	This	could	be	of	greater	
relevance	where	the	outbreak	is	widespread	across	many	regions	of	the	country.	
Market	access	assumptions	for	large	outbreak	
For	a	large	outbreak	affecting	multiple	regions	in	Australia,	assumptions	on	the	time	to	regain	
markets	and	the	proportion	of	trade	recovered	following	eradication	of	the	disease	were	
obtained	through	a	survey	of	experts.	This	was	followed	by	a	workshop	to	arrive	at	an	agreed	set	
of	assumptions	to	be	used	in	modelling	the	economic	costs	of	restrictions	on	Australia’s	exports	
of	FMD‐susceptible	products.	
To	develop	country‐specific	trade	assumptions,	ABARES	and	the	DAFF	FMD	Taskforce	sought	
feedback	from	industry	bodies	and	assistance	from	areas	of	DAFF—including	Animal	
Biosecurity	–	Food;	Trade	and	Market	Access;	and	Office	of	Chief	Veterinary	Officer.	For	each	
importing	country,	participants	considered	the	factors	that	would	affect	the	time	to	recommence	
trade:	
 OIE	guidelines	for	recovery	of	a	country’s	FMD‐free	status	
 country‐specific	requirements	for	proof	of	disease‐free	status	that	could	involve	research	
activities	and	negotiations	
 operational	requirements	(such	as	health	certificates)	following	agreement	to	resume	trade.	
Factors	considered	for	market	share	recovery	included	product	substitution	by	other	
international	livestock	suppliers	and	the	type	of	product.	For	example,	because	Australia	is	a	
dominant	supplier	of	wool,	the	wool	export	market	is	expected	to	recover	relatively	quickly	once	
Australia	can	satisfy	time,	temperature	or	disinfection	requirements.	By	contrast,	export	
markets	for	beef	may	not	fully	recover	since	competitors	in	the	world	beef	trade	can	supply	
market	requirements.	
Based	on	market	access	assumptions	developed	for	each	importing	country,	the	proportion	of	
total	exports	that	could	be	exported	was	estimated	for	each	year	after	eradication.	Figure	6	
shows	estimates	for	the	large	outbreak	scenario,	which	would	take	five	months	to	eradicate	
using	the	stamping	out	strategy.	It	is	assumed	that	once	the	disease	has	been	eradicated	and	
vaccinated	animals	removed,	the	additional	time	to	regain	market	access	will	be	equivalent	for	
all	response	strategies.	Thus	the	difference	between	market	access	recoveries	for	the	response	
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strategies	with	a	large	multi‐state	outbreak	scenario	will	be	determined	by	the	eradication	time	
and	time	to	remove	vaccinates,	as	shown	for	beef	for	the	large	outbreak	scenario	(Figure	7).	
Figure 6 Annual commodities exports following a large outbreak—5 months for 
eradication using stamping out 
	
Note: Expected annual proportion of commodity exported is estimated as the assumed percentage of market share 
regained for each country, weighted by the proportion of exports to a destination. 
Source: ABARES 
Figure 7 Annual beef exports for different outbreak scenarios and eradication strategies 
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 SO = stamping out. SORVe = stamping out with extensive vaccination. SORVt = targeted vaccination. 
Note: Expected annual proportion of commodity exported is estimated as the assumed percentage of market share 
regained for each country, weighted by the proportion of exports to a destination. 
Source: ABARES 
	
Key	features	of	these	assumptions	are:	
 Export	of	FMD‐susceptible	products	to	endemic	and	free	markets	is	closed	following	an	
outbreak.	In	the	first	year	following	an	outbreak	there	is	virtually	no	export	of	livestock	
products	except	for	wool	and	there	may	be	some	trade	to	endemic	markets	(Figure	6).	In	this	
analysis,	big	markets	(not	recognised	as	FMD‐free	by	the	OIE)	such	as	the	Republic	of	Korea	
or	China	remain	closed	to	Australian	exports	even	after	meeting	the	OIE’s	requirements.	This	
assumption	is	based	on	the	situation	in	the	United	States	where	a	bovine	spongiform	
encephalopathy	outbreak	created	difficulties	for	US	exporters	in	accessing	the	Korean	
market.	
 In	this	study,	export	closures	for	Australia’s	meat	products	last	longer	than	assumed	in	
previous	FMD	impact	studies,	such	as	the	Productivity	Commission	(2002).		
 Biosecurity	requirements	for	an	individual	country	were	assumed	to	be	the	same	across	
meat	products.	Entry	requirements	for	live	sheep	and	cattle	for	an	individual	country	were	
assumed	to	be	the	same.	After	accounting	for	differences	in	requirements	between	importing	
countries,	beef	has	the	lowest	market	share	recovery	in	year	10	(around	80	per	cent),	
followed	by	pork	(87	per	cent)	and	sheep	meat	(92	per	cent).	With	the	exception	of	wool	and	
live	sheep,	Australia	does	not	recover	trade	to	pre‐incursion	levels	in	10	years.	Productivity	
Commission	(2002)	estimates	assumed	full	recovery	for	beef	in	year	eight,	lamb	in	year	four	
and	mutton	in	year	five.	
Market	access	assumptions	for	small	outbreak	
For	the	small	outbreaks,	assumptions	for	the	return	of	market	access	were	based	on	a	best‐case	
outcome.	The	duration	of	market	closure	as	a	result	of	a	small	FMD	outbreak	will	also	depend	on	
the	willingness	of	trading	partners	to	accept	Australian	products	once	the	OIE	officially	
recognises	FMD‐free	status.	Outbreaks	confined	to	one	production	region	and	quickly	eradicated	
are	expected	to	result	in	a	faster	return	to	trade;	quick	resumption	of	trade	reflects	greater	
confidence	by	trading	partners	in	Australia’s	disease‐free	status	and	gives	competitors	less	time	
for	market	substitution.	
Duration	of	market	closure	with	a	small	outbreak	could	vary	for	different	trading	partners,	
depending	on	their	level	of	confidence	in	Australia’s	free	status	and	efforts	by	Australia	to	
reassure	importers.	In	the	absence	of	a	clear	indicator	of	the	length	of	trade	suspension	in	the	
event	of	a	small	FMD	outbreak,	it	is	assumed	that	all	countries	accept	current	OIE	guidelines	for	
regaining	FMD‐free	status	and	allow	trade	accordingly.	Market	closure	period	constitutes	the	
time	taken	for	eradication	and	removal	of	vaccinates	to	be	completed,	plus	a	three‐month	
waiting	period,	starting	from	when	the	last	infected	and/or	vaccinated	animals	were	killed.	In	
strategies	where	vaccination	is	used,	it	is	assumed	that	after	destroying	the	last	case	of	infection	
it	would	take	another	month	to	slaughter	all	vaccinates.	Figure	7	provides	an	example	of	quick	
recovery	of	export	markets	for	beef.	
Estimates	of	market	recovery	are	highly	optimistic.	Countries	may	adopt	a	level	of	protection	
higher	than	OIE	guidelines	(WTO	1998).	This	would	increase	the	minimum	time	to	regain	
market	access	even	after	successful	eradication	of	a	small	FMD	outbreak	(Appendix	B).	The	time	
required	to	prove	FMD‐free	status	to	the	OIE	may	be	more	than	three	months.	For	example,	
Japan’s	application	to	be	officially	recognised	by	the	OIE	as	FMD‐free	in	October	2010	was	
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delayed	120	days	after	submission,	214	days	after	decontamination	of	the	last	case	(APHIS	
2011;	OIE	2011b).	These	factors	should	be	considered	when	interpreting	results	from	the	small	
outbreak	scenario	simulations.	
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5 Economic impacts of a disease 
outbreak 
The	direct	costs	of	a	foot‐and‐mouth	disease	(FMD)	outbreak	in	Australia	are	estimated	as	the	
sum	of	revenue	losses	to	the	livestock	industry	and	control	costs.	Cost	estimates	are	large,	
amounting	to	billions	of	dollars	for	both	the	small	outbreak—where	FMD	is	confined	to	a	small	
production	area—and	a	large	outbreak	involving	all	eastern	states	of	Australia.	However,	the	
direct	costs	of	a	small	outbreak	are	significantly	smaller	than	those	of	a	large	outbreak.	
The	size	of	revenue	losses	to	the	livestock	industry	are	mostly	determined	by	export	trade	
restrictions	resulting	from	an	FMD	outbreak.	Export	restrictions	account	for	delays	in	the	time	
to	regain	access	to	export	markets	and	limitations	on	the	amounts	of	exports	regained.	As	
discussed	in	Chapter	4,	delays	in	accessing	export	markets	and	limitations	on	the	amount	of	
export	regained	are	more	severe	in	the	large	outbreaks	than	they	are	for	the	small	outbreaks.	
Details	for	the	direct	costs	estimated	by	size	of	outbreak,	location	and	eradication	strategy	are	
provided	in	Table	5.	
Table 5 Present value of direct costs of foot‐and‐mouth disease across 10 years 
Scenario/strategy	 Revenue	losses ($b) Total	
revenue	
losses	to	
livestock	
producers	
c	($b)	
Control	
costs		
($b)	
Direct	
economic	
costs	
($b)	
Beef	
meat		
a	
Sheep	
meat		
b	
Pork Wool Dairy	
product	
Large	multi‐state	outbreak
Stamping	out	 32.26	 10.22	 1.11 2.19 6.05 51.84 0.37	 52.21
Stamping	out	with	
extensive	
vaccination	
30.88	 9.74	 1.05 2.19 5.69 49.54 0.35	 49.89
Stamping	out	with	
targeted	vaccination	
30.84	 9.66	 1.05 2.19 5.55 49.29 0.32	 49.62
Small	outbreak	in	Victoria
Stamping	out	 0.79	 1.42	 0.16 2.20 1.33 5.90 0.10	 6.00
Stamping	out	with	
extensive	
vaccination	
0.88	 1.46	 0.18 2.21 1.44 6.17 0.09	 6.26
Small	outbreak	in	North	Queensland	
Stamping	out	 0.73	 1.36	 0.14 2.20 1.16 5.58 0.06	 5.64
Stamping	out	with	
extensive	
vaccination	
0.82	 1.41	 0.16 2.20 1.31 5.90 0.06	 5.96
a Values are estimated as the sum of revenues losses from grain‐fed beef, grass‐fed beef, beef from dairy animals and the 
meat equivalent for live cattle exports. b Values are estimated as the sum of revenue losses for sheep meat and the meat 
equivalent of live sheep exports. c Revenue losses include the losses to producers and the cost of compensation to 
government. 
Large	outbreak	scenarios	
If	an	FMD	outbreak	were	to	occur	in	Victoria	and	spread	to	the	other	eastern	states	of	Australia,	
direct	costs	are	estimated	at	between	$49.6	billion	and	$52.2	billion	(in	present	value	terms)	
over	10	years,	depending	on	the	strategy	to	eradicate	the	disease	(Table	5).	Regardless	of	the	
method	used	to	manage	the	disease,	revenue	losses	to	the	industry	(which	includes	cost	of	
compensation	from	the	government)	are	around	99	per	cent	of	the	total	direct	cost,	while	the	
cost	of	eradicating	the	disease	is	less	than	1	per	cent,	or	about	$350	million.		
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In	the	large	outbreak	scenario,	restrictions	on	exports	could	last	for	several	years	for	some	
countries	and	products,	with	market	share	not	fully	recovering	in	10	years.	With	loss	of	access	to	
export	markets,	livestock	prices	in	Australia	would	fall	significantly	as	products	destined	for	
exports	are	diverted	to	the	domestic	market.	
Following	a	large	outbreak	and	in	response	to	the	extended	loss	of	export	markets,	producers	
would	reduce	the	animals	held	in	the	first	two	years.	This	increases	production	of	meat	and	
reduces	production	of	livestock	products	such	as	dairy.	With	reduced	livestock,	production	of	
meat,	wool	and	dairy	would	be	reduced	in	subsequent	years.	Since	exports	of	meat	and	dairy	are	
not	expected	to	fully	recover	after	10	years	following	a	large	outbreak,	production	and	livestock	
numbers	would	remain	below	the	baseline	(without	FMD).	
For	example,	beef	exports	in	the	large	outbreaks	are,	on	average,	94	per	cent	below	the	
reference	case	in	the	first	year,	increasing	to	approximately	20	per	cent	below	in	the	tenth	year.	
The	first	year	would	see	an	on	average	20	per	cent	increase	in	meat	production	and	an	estimated	
13	per	cent	increase	in	the	second	year	as	producers	reduce	livestock	held	(Figure	8).	With	
exports	restricted	at	20	per	cent	below	the	reference	case	in	the	long	term,	production	is	
estimated	to	remain	5	per	cent	below	the	level	in	the	reference	case	and	optimal	herd	size	levels	
at	8	per	cent	below	the	baseline	in	the	tenth	year.	
Figure 8 Change in grass‐fed beef production relative to the baseline 
	
SO = stamping out. SORVe = extensive vaccination. SORVt = targeted vaccination. 
Source: ABARES 
With	diversion	of	product	to	the	domestic	market	(and	increased	meat	production	in	the	short	
term),	domestic	prices	would	be	significantly	depressed	but	are	estimated	to	recover	over	
10	years	to	about	80	per	cent	of	their	original	value.	This	is	illustrated	for	beef	in	Figure	9,	where	
beef	prices	are	projected	to	fall	by	80	per	cent	in	the	first	year	following	an	outbreak,	with	an	
estimated	66	per	cent	of	production	diverted	to	the	domestic	market.	This	decline	is	consistent	
with	the	69	per	cent	fall	in	pork	price	in	Taiwan	when	40	per	cent	of	pork	production	was	
diverted	to	the	domestic	market	following	an	FMD	outbreak	in	1997	(Chang,	Hsia	&	Griffith	
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2005).	Beef	exports	are	not	expected	to	fully	recover	over	the	10‐year	simulation	period,	and	
revenue	losses	accumulate	as	beef	prices	remain	below	those	in	the	reference	case	(Figure	9).	
Figure 9 Change in grass‐fed beef prices relative to the baseline price 
	
SO = stamping out. SORVe = extensive vaccination. SORVt = targeted vaccination. 
Source: ABARES 
Of	the	FMD‐susceptible	livestock	examined,	the	beef	industry	bears	the	largest	decline	in	
revenue	at	on	average	around	$31	billion	or	62	per	cent	of	the	revenue	losses	for	all	affected	
livestock	industries	(Table	5).	The	remaining	industries	affected	by	an	FMD	outbreak	face	
smaller	losses,	with	the	effect	on	the	pork	industry	the	smallest.	While	losses	from	export	
restrictions	on	these	industries	are	smaller,	these	industries	also	respond	by	diverting	exports	to	
the	domestic	market	and	are	also	faced	with	reduced	prices.	The	pork	industry	is	least	affected	
because,	in	addition	to	being	a	relatively	small	industry,	it	exports	only	around	15	per	cent	of	its	
production.	
Dairy	cow	numbers	are	reduced	in	the	first	year	on	average	by	21	per	cent	as	a	result	of	export	
restrictions	in	the	large	outbreak.	These	numbers	return	to	baseline	levels	only	with	the	removal	
of	export	restrictions.	Given	a	reduction	in	herd	numbers	the	production	of	Australian	dairy	
products	is	also	reduced.	The	more	severe	the	export	restrictions,	the	larger	are	surpluses	
diverted	to	the	domestic	market,	which	lowers	dairy	product	prices.	
Wool	exports	in	the	large	outbreaks	are	restricted	to	about	44	per	cent	of	the	baseline	level	in	
the	first	year,	96	per	cent	in	the	second	and	100	per	cent	in	the	remaining	year	on	average.	The	
comparatively	rapid	recovery	of	wool	export	markets	relative	to	other	products	is	a	key	driver	
of	the	comparatively	low	revenue	losses.	
Of	the	eradication	strategies	examined,	vaccination	(particularly	targeted	vaccination)	is	shown	
to	be	the	least	costly	strategy	for	a	large	outbreak.	The	cost	of	this	strategy	is	estimated	at	
$2.5	billion	lower	than	the	cost	of	a	stamping	out	strategy.	Compared	with	stamping	out,	
targeted	vaccination	with	stamping	out	reduces	eradication	time	by	46	days	on	average,	
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allowing	market	access	to	be	recovered	earlier,	even	with	an	additional	month	waiting	time	to	
remove	vaccinated	animals.	
Small	outbreak	scenarios	
With	the	best	case	of	early	access	to	and	full	recovery	of	export	markets,	the	direct	cost	of	a	
small	FMD	outbreak	to	Australia	is	significantly	smaller	than	the	cost	of	a	large	outbreak.	This	
cost	is	estimated	at	between	$5.6	billion	and	$6.2	billion	(in	present	value	terms)	over	10	years,	
depending	on	the	outbreak	location	and	the	strategy	to	eradicate	the	disease.	As	with	the	large	
outbreak,	approximately	99	per	cent	of	direct	costs	in	a	small	outbreak	scenario	are	from	
revenue	losses	to	the	livestock	industry,	with	eradication	costs	accounting	for	an	average	of	
1.3	per	cent	of	direct	costs	or	around	$80	million.	On	average,	the	direct	cost	of	a	small	FMD	
outbreak	is	estimated	at	$45	billion	(or	88	per	cent)	smaller	than	the	average	cost	of	a	large	
outbreak.	This	is	driven	by	highly	optimistic	assumptions	for	regaining	market	access	for	the	
small	outbreak.	Control	costs	decline	on	average	by	$280	million	or	78	per	cent	between	
scenarios.	With	such	large	falls	in	revenue	losses	and	control	costs,	it	makes	economic	sense	to	
contain	and	eradicate	an	FMD	outbreak	quickly.	
The	direct	cost	of	a	small	outbreak	in	a	more	extensive	production	area	in	North	Queensland	is	
slightly	smaller	than	the	cost	of	a	small	outbreak	in	an	intensive	production	area	in	Victoria	
(Table	5).	The	more	extensive	production	system	in	Queensland	results	in	a	smaller	supply	
shock	from	control	actions.	More	significantly,	it	allows	faster	eradication	of	the	disease.	
resulting	in	quicker	market	access	recovery	and	reduced	direct	costs.	
In	response	to	the	expected	short	closure	of	export	markets,	production	of	meat	products	are	
reduced	in	the	first	year	as	farmers	hold	on	to	livestock.	In	the	second	year,	meat	production	is	
estimated	to	increase	in	response	to	the	recovery	of	export	markets,	reducing	surplus	stocks.	
This	is	illustrated	for	beef	in	Figure	8,	where	exports	are	restricted	for	the	first	year	but	fully	
recover	in	the	second	year.	This	results	in,	on	average,	a	30	per	cent	reduction	in	production	in	
the	small	outbreaks	in	the	first	year	and	a	10	per	cent	increase	in	beef	stocks.	In	the	second	year	
production	for	the	small	outbreak	increases	on	average	to	27	per	cent	over	the	baseline,	
offsetting	the	initial	fall	in	production	in	the	first	year	in	response	to	the	recovery	of	export	
markets.	This	would	be	achieved	by	reducing	surplus	stocks	generated	in	the	first	year.	
As	in	the	large	outbreak,	the	diversion	of	product	to	the	domestic	market	reduces	prices	
received.	With	producers	holding	some	stock	back,	the	fall	in	prices	for	the	small	outbreak	is	not	
as	great	as	in	the	large	outbreak.	Beef	prices	in	the	small	outbreak	scenarios	are	only	projected	
to	fall	by	approximately	10	per	cent	in	the	first	year	of	the	outbreak.	Prices	have	recovered	close	
to	baseline	values	by	the	fifth	year,	with	restrictions	on	Australian	exports	fully	removed	from	
year	two	onward	(Figure	9).	
The	pork	and	lamb	industries,	like	the	beef	industry,	incur	market	costs	from	the	restriction	of	
exports.	For	both	pork	and	lamb,	export	restrictions	for	the	small	outbreaks	are	less	than	those	
for	the	large	outbreaks;	hence,	the	losses	are	smaller	(Table	5).	The	direction	of	trends	in	sheep	
and	pork	prices,	production	and	stock	numbers	are	identical	to	those	for	beef.	Losses	to	the	beef	
industry	are	smaller	than	those	for	other	FMD‐affected	industries	(with	the	exemption	of	pork)	
in	the	small	outbreak	scenarios,	despite	market	access	being	similar	for	all	products.	
In	the	small	Victorian	outbreak,	stocks	of	dairy	cows	are	projected	to	fall	by	1.3	per	cent	in	the	
first	year,	reducing	dairy	production.	The	faster	recovery	of	markets	results	in	relatively	smaller	
market	losses	following	small	outbreaks,	compared	with	large	outbreaks.	
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The	wool	industry	bears	the	largest	cost	of	around	$2.2	billion	or	around	37	per	cent	of	the	total	
livestock	industry	losses	in	the	smaller	outbreak	scenarios.	The	pork	industry	was	the	least	
affected	sector.	In	the	small	outbreaks,	exports	are	restricted	to,	on	average,	48	per	cent	of	the	
base	line	levels	in	the	Victorian	outbreak	(using	stamping	out)	and	100	per	cent	in	subsequent	
years.	
In	both	small	and	large	outbreak	scenarios,	revenue	losses	for	the	wool	industry	are	similar,	
with	slightly	higher	loss	in	the	smaller	outbreaks.	This	reflects	the	influence	of	assumed	inelastic	
demand	for	wool	in	the	short	run	based	on	market	power	from	Australia’s	large	global	
production	of	wool.	These	results	may	change	if	the	time	out	of	the	market	for	wool	was	
extended	beyond	that	assumed	in	the	large	outbreak	scenario.	
Stamping	out	is	shown	to	be	the	least	costly	strategy	if	an	outbreak	is	small.	In	Queensland,	
where	the	production	areas	is	not	intensive,	spread	is	slow	and	can	be	quickly	and	effectively	
controlled	with	stamping	out,	the	time	required	for	eradication	using	stamping	out	and	
vaccination	are	similar.	For	the	small	Victorian	outbreak,	vaccination	reduced	eradication	time	
by	6	days	compared	with	stamping	out	(Table	1).	In	both	small	outbreaks,	the	return	of	export	
markets	would	be	delayed	with	vaccination	compared	to	using	stamping	out	as	a	result	of	the	
additional	one	month	to	manage	vaccinates.	As	a	result,	the	direct	costs	of	an	outbreak	with	
vaccination	are	greater	than	when	using	stamping	out	(Table	5).	
Economy‐wide	impacts	
ABARES	used	the	AusRegion	model	to	evaluate	wider	economic	impacts	of	a	large	outbreak	
scenario	and	a	small	outbreak	scenario	in	Victoria,	each	controlled	using	stamping	out.	Results	
shown	illustrate	possible	impacts	on	regional,	state	and	the	national	economies,	as	well	as	
effects	on	industries	that	are	linked	to	FMD‐susceptible	industries.	The	regional/state/economy‐
wide	effects	reported	incorporate	all	economic	changes	and	show	that	the	magnitudes	of	
impacts	vary	by	area.	
Also	reported	is	a	selection	of	other	industries	that	may	be	affected	by	the	outbreak	but	that	are	
not	classified	as	FMD	susceptible.	Findings	show	that	while	some	industries	lose,	others	could	
benefit	from	an	FMD	outbreak.	The	reported	economy‐wide	effects	(Table	6)	are	not	directly	
comparable	with	the	other	industry	effects	(Table	7)	due	differences	in	the	units	of	
measurement.	The	economy‐wide	effects	are	estimated	in	value	added	terms	(that	is	net	of	
material	input	costs),	while	the	other	industry	effects	are	estimated	in	gross	revenue	(inclusive	
of	material	input	costs).	
In	principle,	direct	impacts	on	FMD‐susceptible	livestock	(Table	5)	and	flow‐on	effects	to	other	
industries	(Table	7)	can	be	added.	However,	it	is	not	possible	in	this	case	due	to	differences	in	
the	characteristics	of	the	two	models.	
Large	outbreak	
The	large	FMD	outbreak	scenario	is	estimated	to	reduce	gross	domestic	product	by	0.16	per	cent	
($23.6	billion	in	present	value	terms)	over	10	years.	The	large	outbreak	scenario	affects	the	
regions	selected	for	the	small	outbreak	scenarios	of	Victoria	and	North	Queensland	and	the	
remaining	states	and	territories	to	a	varying	degree.	The	control	areas	of	Victoria	and	
Queensland	are	highly	affected	with	their	gross	regional	product	estimated	to	fall	by	0.92	per	
cent	and	0.61	per	cent,	respectively,	over	10	years.	A	region’s	economic	reliance	on	the	affected	
industries	influences	the	level	of	impact.	
Potential	socio‐economic	impacts	of	an	FMD	outbreak	in	Australia	 ABARES	
30	
By	contrast,	economies	such	as	that	in	Western	Australia	are	estimated	to	benefit	from	an	
expansion	in	mining	and	related	sectors	as	resources	are	reallocated	to	these	industries.	The	
industries	become	more	competitive	internationally	due	to	lower	domestic	costs	of	production,	
such	as	labour	cost	and	cost	of	borrowing	money,	due	to	overall	lower	prices	as	the	outbreak	
slows	economic	activity.	
Table 6 Estimated regional, state and national impacts—large foot‐and‐mouth outbreak 
controlled using stamping out 
Jurisdiction	 Gross	product	
(%) ($m)
New	South	Wales	 –0.12 –5 794
Victoria	control	area	 –0.92 –2 695
Rest	of	Victoria	 –0.30 –9 336
North	Queensland	control	area	 –0.61 –293
Rest	of	Queensland	 –0.31 –8 755
South	Australia	 0.01 116
Western	Australia	 0.14 3 395
Tasmania	 –0.18 –464
Northern	Territory	 0.15 267
Australian	Capital	Territory –0.01 –41
Australia	 –0.16 a –23 600 b
a weighted total change in gross product b Gross domestic product. 
Source: ABARES 
Industries	that	are	input	providers	to	the	FMD–affected	industries	are	expected	to	be	adversely	
affected	by	the	outbreak;	these	include	service	providers	such	as	transport,	trade	and	feedstock	
suppliers.	By	contrast,	industries	that	are	competitors	in	production	are	expected	to	benefit	
from	the	outbreak.	The	present	value	of	the	gross	value	of	production	or	revenue	of	input‐
providing	industries	is	estimated	to	decline	by	$11.5	billion,	0.32	per	cent	lower	than	in	the	
absence	of	the	outbreak.	Agricultural	and	food	processing	industries	other	than	livestock	are	
estimated	to	expand;	these	include	grain	production,	horticulture	production	and	their	
downstream	processors.	Collectively,	they	are	estimated	to	increase	their	production	by	
2.2	per	cent	($15	billion	in	present	value	terms)	over	10	years.	
The	impact	on	service	provider	and	directly	competing	industries	is	provided	to	show	there	are	
gainers	and	losers	apart	from	the	directly	FMD‐affected	livestock	industries.	Industries	other	
than	those	reported	here	are	also	impacted	indirectly	by	the	outbreak;	these	include	mining,	
most	of	manufacturing	and	services.	
Table 7 Change in revenue of other selected industries—large foot‐and‐mouth outbreak 
controlled using stamping out 
Jurisdiction	 Production	of	service	providing	
industries	a	
Production	of	competing	industries	
b	
(%) ($m) (%)	 ($m)
New	South	Wales	 –0.27 –3 244 2.00	 3 904
Victoria	control	area	 –0.43 –388 2.27	 753
Rest	of	Victoria	 –0.61 –5 077 1.78	 2 237
North	Queensland	control	area	 –0.05 –2 12.16	 146
Rest	of	Queensland	 –0.35 –2 650 3.60	 4 943
South	Australia	 –0.09 –218 1.16	 1 053
Western	Australia	 0.11 409 2.18	 1 808
Tasmania	 –0.46 –311 0.63	 107
Northern	Territory	 0.04 10 4.69	 84
Australian	Capital	Territory –0.10 –46 0.30	 4
Australia	 –0.32	c –11 516 2.19	c	 15 038
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a Examples of service providing industries include transport, trade and feedstock providers. b Examples of competing 
industries include grain production, horticulture and other livestock production. c Weighted total percentage change. 
Source: ABARES 
Small	outbreak	
Return	of	market	access	was	assumed	to	occur	within	three	months	for	the	small	Victorian	
outbreak.	A	uniform	53	per	cent	reduction	in	exports	across	all	livestock	and	livestock	products	
was	applied	for	the	first	year.	By	contrast,	for	the	large	outbreak	scenario,	larger	and	varying	
levels	of	export	reductions	were	applied	to	different	livestock	products	over	longer	periods.	As	a	
result,	the	small	outbreak	scenario	has	a	smaller	economy‐wide	impact	because	of	its	more	
moderate	and	short‐lived	impact,	allowing	economies	a	longer	time	to	adjust	to	the	initial	
impact.	The	North	Queensland	control	region	is	most	affected,	with	its	gross	regional	product	
being	lower	by	0.66	per	cent	($315	million	in	present	value	terms)	over	10	years.	The	relatively	
large	impact	on	this	region’s	economy	is	partly	explained	by	the	small	number	of	industries	and	
the	limited	capacity	of	the	economy	to	restructure	following	an	external	shock	such	as	closure	of	
a	major	export	market.	This	is	in	contrast	to	the	diverse	industries	found	in	the	other	economies	
including	the	Victorian	control	region.	
The	small	Victorian	outbreak	is	estimated	to	result	in	a	0.03	per	cent	($4.6	billion)	reduction	in	
the	gross	domestic	product,	discounted	over	10	years.	
Table 8 Estimated regional, state and national impacts, small foot‐and‐mouth outbreak 
controlled using stamping out 
Jurisdiction	 Gross	product	
(%) ($m)
New	South	Wales	 –0.01 –605
Victoria	control	area	 –0.28 –809
Rest	of	Victoria	 –0.04 –1 207
North	Queensland	control	area	 –0.66 –315
Rest	of	Queensland	 –0.18 –5 112
South	Australia	 0.01 100
Western	Australia	 0.14 3 345
Tasmania	 –0.06 –163
Northern	Territory	 0.06 112
Australian	Capital	Territory 0.03 100
Australia	 –0.03 –4 554 a
a Gross domestic product. 
Source: ABARES 
Uncertainty	in	the	cost	estimates	
Estimated	results	of	the	likely	impacts	of	an	FMD	outbreak	on	the	Australian	economy	are	
indicative	of	possible	outcomes	in	the	event	of	an	actual	outbreak	situation.	The	absence	of	
disease	experience	relevant	to	the	present	means	some	of	the	data	and	variables	and	
consequently	costs	cannot	be	predicted	with	certainty.	The	main	sources	of	uncertainty	are:	
 Disease	management—the	efficiency	of	operational	activities,	logistics,	communications	and	
the	ability	to	readily	provide	financial,	human	and	technical	requirements	are	untested	in	
actual	FMD	situations.	Although	a	number	of	exercises	to	test	Australia’s	preparedness	for	a	
disease	outbreak	were	successfully	completed,	a	level	of	uncertainty	remains.	
 Likely	reactions	of	main	importers	of	Australian	livestock	products—this	will	determine	the	
duration	of	trade	suspension	and	the	speed	of	full	market	recovery	once	Australia	regains	
FMD‐free	status.	These	are	likely	to	be	influenced	by	a	complex	set	of	factors,	including	
internal	issues	and	Australia’s	trading	partners.	
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 Possible	effects	of	disease	on	domestic	demand	for	livestock	products—consumer	demand	is	
assumed	to	remain	relatively	unaffected	by	the	disease	because	FMD	is	not	considered	to	
significantly	affect	human	health.	However,	consumer	perceptions	of	negative	health	effects	
could	reduce	consumption	and	increase	the	economic	cost	of	the	outbreak.	
Sensitivity	analysis	
AgEmissions	and	AusRegion	estimates	of	direct	and	flow‐on	economic	costs	have	identified	
input	parameters	likely	to	impact	on	the	estimated	economic	effects	of	an	FMD	outbreak.	These	
include	market	access	assumptions,	the	discount	rate	and	the	number	of	livestock	slaughtered	to	
eradicate	the	disease.	Analysis	of	the	sensitivity	of	results	to	changes	in	these	parameters	is	
undertaken	to	assess	if	the	findings	are	robust.	
Market	access	
Assumptions	for	the	return	of	market	access	and	recovery	of	market	share	for	the	small	
outbreak	represent	an	optimistic	return	of	trade.	In	reality,	return	of	market	access	may	vary	as	
recognition	from	the	OIE	may	take	longer	and	importing	countries	are	likely	to	set	their	own	
requirements	to	recognise	eradication	(Appendix	B).	Competition	from	other	exporting	
countries	will	reduce	the	return	of	market	share.	The	potential	effect	of	altering	these	two	
underlying	factors	on	the	market	assumptions	is	explored	using	the	small	outbreak	in	Victoria	
with	stamping	out	as	the	treatment	strategy.	
If	importing	countries	impose	additional	market	access	requirements,	the	recovery	of	trade	will	
be	delayed	(line	b	of	Figure	10).	With	very	few	countries	allowing	trade	in	the	first	few	years,	
trade	is	fully	recovered	in	five	years.	This	is	three	years	longer	than	when	all	countries	are	
assumed	to	comply	with	OIE	guidelines	(Figure	10).	The	economic	loss	from	delayed	market	
access	is	expected	to	be	greater	than	the	estimated	$6	million	for	the	trade	restriction	
(Figure	10).	
A	reduction	in	market	share	is	more	likely	when	market	access	is	delayed	and	importers	find	
alternative	sources	of	product.	If,	in	addition	to	the	delay	in	market	access,	the	return	of	market	
share	is	also	reduced	by	the	country‐specific	expectations,	the	assumed	return	of	trade	will	be	
further	reduced	and	will	not	be	expected	to	recover	to	100	per	cent	in	10	years	(line	c	of	
Figure	10).	Under	these	illustrative	assumptions,	expected	losses	from	the	small	Victorian	
outbreak	would	be	significantly	greater	than	those	presented	in	Table	5,	approaching	losses	
estimated	for	the	large	multi‐state	outbreak.	
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Figure 10 Changes to market access time and market share for beef exports—small 
outbreak in Victoria controlled using stamping out 
	
Source: ABARES 
Increasing	or	decreasing	the	time	to	regain	market	access	and	proportion	of	market	share	is	not	
expected	to	affect	the	least	costly	strategy	for	a	given	outbreak	scenario.	If	either	of	these	two	
factors	is	increased	for	all	control	strategies,	the	magnitude	of	losses	from	an	outbreak	will	
increase	and	the	strategy	that	reduces	the	time	out	of	the	market	will	remain	the	most	effective.	
Discount	rate	
Changes	in	the	discount	rate	will	not	affect	the	relative	economic	costs	of	FMD	outbreaks	and	the	
relative	cost‐effectiveness	of	eradication	strategies.	An	increase	in	the	discount	rate	will	reduce	
total	present	value	of	economic	costs	for	each	scenario	and	strategy.	Conversely,	a	decrease	in	
the	discount	rate	will	increase	the	present	value	of	costs.	
Animals	slaughtered	
Supply	shocks	to	the	economic	models	are	included	as	the	number	of	livestock	(cattle,	sheep	and	
pigs)	slaughtered	in	each	outbreak	scenario	and	for	each	eradication	strategy.	An	increase	in	
these	numbers	will	increase	the	total	economic	costs	of	an	FMD	outbreak.	However,	the	impact	
of	supply	shocks	on	the	estimate	of	economic	costs	is	expected	to	be	negligible	since	the	
proportion	of	animals	slaughtered	is	very	small.	
For	example,	the	number	of	cattle	slaughtered	averaged	0.2	per	cent	of	the	national	herd	for	
both	vaccination	and	stamping	out	strategies	of	a	large	FMD	outbreak.	The	primary	impact	on	
economic	costs	is	expected	to	come	from	the	closure	of	export	markets.	The	volume	of	products	
diverted	to	the	domestic	market	will	average	66	per	cent	of	production	for	beef.	The	number	of	
animals	slaughtered	is	also	a	reflection	of	the	scale	of	outbreak,	which	is	expected	to	increase	the	
time	to	regain	the	markets.	Therefore,	the	increase	in	the	number	of	animals	slaughtered	is	not	
expected	to	change	the	relative	costs	of	an	FMD	outbreak.	
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6 Social impacts of a disease outbreak 
In	considering	the	impact	of	FMD	control	strategies,	the	wider	social	effects	on	households	and	
communities	must	be	considered	alongside	the	economic	effects.	ABARES	has	assessed	the	
potential	social	impacts	of	an	FMD	outbreak	in	Australia	through	a	literature	review	and	
discussions	with	focus	groups	in	Victoria’s	Goulburn	Valley	and	in	North	Queensland.	
The	literature	review	(Kruger	et	al.	forthcoming)	investigated	developed	countries’	experiences	
with	FMD	outbreaks.	It	also	examined	Australia’s	experience	with	other	emergency	animal	
disease	outbreaks,	such	as	equine	influenza,	Newcastle	disease	and	Ovine	Johne’s	disease.	The	
focus	groups	used	semi‐structured	questions	to	examine	the	social	impacts	that	participants	
would	expect	to	occur	following	an	FMD	outbreak.	Focus	group	questions	were	developed	from	
FMD	scenarios	in	AUSVETPLAN,	information	from	the	literature	review	and	consultation	with	
DAFF	experts.	A	detailed	description	of	social	research	methods	used	in	this	study	is	in	Appendix	
C.	
Fifty‐one	people	participated	in	the	social	impact	study.	Participants	were	chosen	in	
consultation	with	state	jurisdictions	to	capture	a	representative	range	of	views	of	those	likely	to	
be	directly	affected	by	particular	outbreak	scenarios.	The	study	does	not	cover	the	social	
impacts	at	a	national	level.	
The	research	shows	that	in	the	event	of	an	FMD	outbreak,	social	impacts	will	occur	at	the	
personal,	household	and	community	levels.	The	severity	of	these	impacts	will	be	influenced	not	
only	by	the	size	of	the	outbreak,	but	also	the	existing	context,	which	influences	the	vulnerability	
of	a	community	and	its	ability	to	recover.	Figure	11	provides	a	conceptual	framework	for	
explaining	the	social	impacts	of	an	FMD	outbreak	and	shows	the	linkages	between	components	
of	the	social	system.	
Many	social	impacts	are	generated	by	the	loss	of	income—particularly	at	the	household	level.	
Others	result	from	the	control	measures	used	to	manage	and	eradicate	FMD.	Due	to	the	complex	
nature	of	social	impacts	it	is	difficult	to	separate	causes.	For	example,	psychological	distress	can	
be	caused	by	both	loss	of	income	and	exposure	to	control	measures	such	as	stamping	out.	
It	is	not	only	producers	who	experience	social	impacts	during	an	outbreak;	those	involved	in	the	
agricultural	supply	chain	and	response	staff	can	also	be	affected.	Stakeholders	in	this	study	
reported	that	the	impacts	on	local	councils,	emergency	response	staff	and	veterinarians	largely	
flow	from	implementation	of	the	control	strategy.	The	effects	on	abattoirs,	stock	transporters,	
stock	agents,	saleyards,	milk	processors	and	associated	agricultural	industries	stem	from	
potential	loss	of	income	and	uncertainty	in	business	continuity	(Figure	11).	
Factors	affecting	the	scale	of	social	impacts	
Several	factors	determine	the	number	of	people	affected	by	an	FMD	outbreak	and	the	magnitude	
of	these	impacts.	These	factors	are	discussed	in	the	context	of	the	small	outbreak	scenarios	in	
North	Queensland	and	Victoria	and	the	large	multi‐state	outbreak	scenario.	
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Figure 11 Framework for analysis of social impacts of a foot‐and‐mouth outbreak 
	
Source: ABARES 
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Differences	in	social	impacts	between	small	and	large	outbreaks	
Several	case	study	participants	believed	that	the	impact	of	an	FMD	outbreak	will	directly	relate	
to	the	size	and	length	of	the	event.	The	longer	the	event,	the	more	difficult	it	is	for	those	affected	
as	they	cannot	employ	coping	mechanisms	for,	for	example,	repression	of	traumatic	memories	
after	a	trauma	passes	(Westen,	Burton	&	Kowalski	2006).	
The	length	of	the	outbreak	and	time	out	of	export	markets	is	likely	to	influence	the	recovery	of	
producers	and	businesses.	Several	producers	doubted	whether	they	would	be	able	to	overcome	
the	impacts	of	even	a	short	outbreak.	Business	participants	said	their	businesses	could	continue	
with	reduced	income	for	a	short	time,	but	this	would	be	unsustainable	for	a	prolonged	period.	
Milk	processing	companies	and	feed	mills	indicated	they	might	be	able	to	meet	the	demand	for	
products	in	the	short	term	by	collaborating	with	similar	businesses.	For	example,	in	order	to	
meet	contracts,	milk	processors	who	sourced	from	within	the	outbreak	control	area	would	top	
up	the	reduced	milk	volumes	from	that	area	with	milk	sourced	from	other	areas	or	processors.	
However,	this	was	not	considered	sustainable.	This	suggests	that	a	large	outbreak	involving	a	
longer	time	frame	is	likely	to	have	more	adverse	flow‐on	effects	to	livestock	related	businesses	
than	a	small	outbreak.	
Some	participants	suggested	the	availability	of	response	staff	would	lessen	the	longer	response	
efforts	continued.	For	example,	response	staff	from	locations	at	a	distance	from	the	outbreak	
would	need	to	return	to	their	families	and	other	obligations	and	veterinarians	cannot	leave	their	
practices	indefinitely.	
Characteristics	of	the	community	
Rural	communities	are	not	homogeneous	and	their	ability	to	cope	with	an	FMD	outbreak	will	
vary.	The	way	a	community	responds	to	a	crisis	will	depend	on	a	range	of	factors.	
Socio‐demographics	
Communities	with	good	economic	performance	and	low	levels	of	social	disadvantage	are	likely	
to	deal	better	and	recover	more	quickly	from	crises	than	communities	with	less	favourable	
profiles	(Productivity	Commission	2002).	Factors	that	can	affect	a	community’s	ability	to	cope	
include	employment	rates,	income,	education,	remoteness	and	frequency	and	scale	of	shocks	
(Productivity	Commission	2002).	An	overview	of	the	North	Queensland	and	Victorian	case	study	
areas	is	in	Appendix	D.	
Experience	with	animal	disease	outbreaks	
Previous	experience	with	an	actual	animal	disease	outbreak	or	a	simulation	exercise	is	likely	to	
enhance	a	community’s	ability	to	cope	with	an	FMD	outbreak.	For	example,	dairy	farming	
communities	in	Victoria	were	involved	in	Exercise	Diva,	a	simulation	conducted	in	2009	by	the	
Victorian	Department	of	Primary	Industries	(DPI).	As	a	result,	Shepparton	Council	residents’	
preparedness	for	an	emergency	animal	disease	outbreak	has	increased.	Precautions	include	
identifying	disposal	sites	for	carcasses	and	putting	agreements	in	place	for	vaccine	storage	and	
carcass	transport.	Council	employees	interviewed	by	ABARES	said	that	before	this	exercise	they	
would	have	relied	on	instructions	from	DPI	in	the	event	of	an	FMD	outbreak.	
Dependence	on	agriculture	
The	level	of	economic	dependence	on	agriculture	in	the	local	community	will	greatly	affect	its	
ability	to	deal	with,	and	recover	from,	the	economic	impacts	of	an	FMD	outbreak.	For	both	case	
study	areas	(except	Shepparton),	agriculture	is	the	main	industry	of	employment	(ABS	2011)	
(Appendix	D).	This	potentially	places	these	communities	at	a	disadvantage	in	recovery	from	an	
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FMD	outbreak.	For	example,	following	the	2001	FMD	outbreak	in	the	UK,	the	hardest	hit	areas	
were	those	that	relied	primarily	on	agriculture	and	tourism	(Convery	et	al.	2005).	
Location	relative	to	an	outbreak	
The	Productivity	Commission	(2002)	identified	that	FMD	control	measures	will	divide	the	
country	into	three	main	areas,	with	the	source	of	social	impacts	and	number	of	people	affected	
differing	in	each	area:	
 In	the	restricted	area	around	the	outbreak,	quarantine	restrictions	will	be	in	place	until	
FMD‐susceptible	animals	and	animal	products	have	been	destroyed	and	the	property	
decontaminated.	Control	measures	are	likely	to	have	a	significant	impact	on	people	in	this	
area	and	those	carrying	out	the	control.	The	number	of	people	in	the	area	is	likely	to	be	
relatively	small.	However,	the	trauma	caused	by	management	techniques	to	prevent	the	
disease	from	spreading	are	often	more	distressing	than	the	disease	itself	(Mort	et	al.	2004).	
 In	the	control	area	around	the	restricted	area,	people	will	be	affected	by	the	movement	
restrictions	on	livestock	imposed	by	AUSVETPLAN.	The	social	impact	of	control	measures	
would	be	small	relative	to	the	quarantine	measures.	With	a	national	standstill	in	place,	this	
area	would	be	very	large	until	restricted	areas	were	accurately	delimited.	
 Outside	the	control	area,	most	people	would	be	largely	unaffected	by	FMD	control	measures.	
However,	loss	of	export	market	revenues	would	generate	significant	financial	stress	for	
livestock	and	related	industries.	
Similar	results	were	found	in	a	survey	analysis	of	the	2007	outbreak	of	equine	influenza	in	
Australia,	where	respondents	reported	elevated	levels	of	psychological	distress	during	the	
outbreak	(Taylor,	Agho	&	Griffin	2008;	Taylor	et	al.	2008).	Higher	levels	of	stress	were	reported	
for	people	who	lived	in	the	high‐risk	and	buffer	zones.	Reported	stress	levels	were	significantly	
higher	for	respondents	whose	main	income	was	dependent	on	horses	(Taylor	et	al.	2008).	
Behaviours	that	affect	efforts	to	control	foot‐and‐mouth	disease	
The	actions	of	producers	can	either	facilitate	or	delay	implementation	of	AUSVETPLAN	control	
measures	in	response	to	an	outbreak.	
According	to	case	study	participants	some	producers	might	engage	in	inappropriate	behaviour	
in	order	to	protect	their	stock	and	livelihoods.	For	example,	it	was	suggested	producers	might	
hide	or	move	stock	to	prevent	them	from	being	culled	or	vaccinated.	Stock	might	also	be	moved	
away	from	the	outbreak	area	to	avoid	the	stigma	attached	to	that	region.	This	behaviour	is	not	
only	risky;	other	producers	may	lose	trust	in	the	government’s	ability	to	control	the	disease	if	no	
action	is	taken	against	such	behaviour.	Swift	action	against	irresponsible	producers	is	an	
important	part	of	maintaining	producers’	trust	in	the	response	effort,	as	is	following	up	on	
reports	of	illegal	behaviour.	
Producers	who	participated	in	focus	groups	indicated	that	if	producers	do	not	trust	that	the	
authorities	have	the	ability	to	deal	with	FMD	adequately,	they	will	be	more	likely	to	take	action	
on	their	own,	including:	
 shooting	feral	animals	in	the	hope	of	preventing	disease	spread	
 burying	culled	stock	if	there	is	a	delay	between	culling	and	burial	
 attempting	to	undertake	their	own	decontamination	process;	in	a	previous	emergency	
animal	disease	outbreak,	one	producer	felt	authorities	took	too	long	to	start	the	
decontamination	process	for	his	sheds,	so	he	set	the	shed	on	fire	in	his	own	attempt	to	
decontaminate.	
Potential	socio‐economic	impacts	of	an	FMD	outbreak	in	Australia	 ABARES	
38	
Social	impacts	of	foot‐and‐mouth	disease	
Personal	impacts	
Personal	impacts	are	defined	here	as	the	way	a	person	experiences	an	event.	Personal	impacts	
are	centred	on	the	mental	and	physical	health	effect	that	an	animal	disease	outbreak	can	cause.	
Mental	health	
Distress	is	one	of	the	main	mental	health	issues	experienced	as	result	of	an	emergency	animal	
disease	outbreak.	Distress	is	any	form	of	mental	suffering,	including	fear,	anxiety,	stress	and	
depression	(Dohrenwend	et	al.	1980).	Psychological	distress	is	emotionally	and	cognitively	
draining	and	compromises	an	individual’s	ability	to	deal	with	everyday	life.	Distress	from	
traumatic	experiences	can	result	in	health‐related	issues,	such	as	sleep	disruptions,	flashbacks,	
uncontrollable	emotions	and	loss	of	concentration	(Bailey	et	al.	2004;	Mort	et	al.	2005).	For	
example,	during	the	2007	equine	influenza	outbreak	in	Australia,	many	emergency	response	
workers	experienced	difficulties	settling	back	into	routine	work	after	the	outbreak	was	
contained	(ENRC	2000;	Mort	et	al.	2005).	
Causes	of	mental	health	issues	
Case	study	participants	referred	to	a	range	of	mental	health	issues	that	could	result	from	an	FMD	
outbreak,	including:	
 loss	of	control	and	identity	
 animal	welfare	concerns	
 uncertainty	
 social	isolation.	
According	to	many	participants,	financial	strain	resulting	from	an	FMD	outbreak	would	be	one	of	
the	biggest	causes	of	mental	health	issues.	As	this	issue	affects	households,	it	is	discussed	in	
‘Household	impacts’.	
Participant	comments	made	during	interviews	and	focus	groups	also	confirmed	the	findings	of	
Mort	and	colleagues	(2004)	that	mental	health	issues	can	result	from	long	working	hours,	
uncertainty	about	income	and	livelihoods,	social	isolation	and	a	feeling	that	life	is	out	of	control.	
A	producer	describing	the	effect	of	this	situation	said,	‘This	would	be	a	pain	that	changes	you’.	
Loss	of	control	and	identity	
Some	producers	interviewed	chose	farming	as	an	occupation	because	they	value	being	in	control	
of	their	own	operation.	Giving	up	control	of	their	farming	operation	during	an	FMD	outbreak	
would	therefore	be	likely	to	have	a	significant	psychological	impact.	For	example,	Berk	(2006)	
notes	that	a	person	draws	part	of	their	identity	from	their	profession.	When	an	event	prevents	
people	from	being	able	to	work	in	their	profession,	or	compromises	the	quality	of	their	work,	
they	can	take	this	as	a	reflection	on	their	abilities.	One	interviewee	said	that,	for	producers,	their	
livelihood	is	a	matter	of	‘what	they	do	is	who	they	are’.	
During	the	outbreak	of	Ovine	Johne’s	disease	in	Australia	in	1999,	farmers	felt	their	life’s	work	
had	been	undone	and	they	had	failed	the	enterprise	they	had	invested	their	lives	in	
(ENRC	2000).	The	overall	feeling	was	one	of	lost	control	and	lost	meaning	in	their	lives	
(Bickerstaff	et	al.	2006).	This	was	mirrored	in	the	2001	FMD	outbreak	in	the	UK	where	culling	
reportedly	invoked	a	sense	of	failure	among	producers,	a	loss	of	a	feeling	of	professionalism	and	
a	sense	of	not	having	‘done	the	job	right’	(Convery	et	al.	2005).	
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ABARES	asked	producer	focus	groups	how	they	would	deal	with	the	culling	process.	This	
included	witnessing	a	culling	team	carrying	out	the	operation	and	what	they	thought	about	their	
own	involvement	in	the	culling	of	their	animals.	In	one	group,	participants	said	they	would	
prefer	to	come	together	as	a	group	of	local	producers	and	undertake	the	culling	themselves	to	
ensure	it	was	done	humanely.	Being	excluded	from	the	culling	process	was	described	as	‘the	
final	kick	in	the	gut’.	In	another	focus	group,	one	producer	said	he	would	prefer	not	to	witness	
the	destruction	of	his	herd.	Participant	responses	to	this	question	suggest	farmers	want	to	have	
influence	over	the	way	that	culling	occurs.	This	reflects	findings	from	the	2001	FMD	outbreak	in	
the	United	Kingdom.	Authorities	entered	properties	and	carried	out	activities	with	little	
consultation	with	landowners.	This	contributed	to	a	sense	of	loss	of	control	and	injustice,	and	
led	to	anger	and	frustration	among	producers	(Productivity	Commission	2002).	
Producers	in	the	focus	groups	also	had	concerns	about	how	they	would	be	perceived	by	others.	
In	Victoria,	for	example,	producers	thought	they	might	be	seen	as	poor	neighbours	or	labelled	as	
lepers	if	their	herd	became	infected	with	FMD.	This	echoes	feelings	of	farmers	involved	in	the	
Australian	outbreak	of	Ovine	Johne’s	(ENRC	2000).	
Animal	welfare	
Witnessing	the	destruction	of	animals	is	distressing	for	producers,	even	though	the	livestock	
would	normally	be	slaughtered.	For	UK	producers	involved	in	the	2001	FMD‐related	slaughter	
there	was	a	sense	of	death	in	the	wrong	time	and	wrong	place	(Convery	et	al.	2005).	In	addition,	
sending	animals	to	the	abattoir	means	farmers	normally	do	not	witness	firsthand	the	killing	of	
their	animals	(Convery	et	al.	2005).	Almost	half	of	farmers	whose	livestock	were	culled	during	
the	2001	FMD	outbreak	in	the	Netherlands	experienced	symptoms	similar	to	post	traumatic	
stress	disorder,	such	as	nightmares,	flashbacks	and	feelings	of	complete	loss	of	autonomy	
(Olff	et	al.	2005).	During	the	1999	outbreak	of	Ovine	Johne’s	in	Australia,	the	culling	program	
was	stopped	because	of	the	severe	emotional	distress	of	farmers,	government	officials	doing	the	
culling	and	non‐farming	rural	families	(Hall	et	al.	2004).	
A	key	theme	that	emerged	from	all	producer	focus	groups	is	the	affection	producers	have	for	
their	animals.	A	producer	describing	his	traumatic	experience	of	culling	a	large	number	of	sheep	
commented,	‘Shooting	is	a	very	traumatic	thing	for	your	family	and	everyone	else.	It	was	the	
worst	thing	I	ever	did,	but	you	just	have	to	deal	with	it’.	He	described	how	months	later,	he	still	
smelt	the	bodies	of	the	sheep,	although	he	added	that	‘It	could	have	been	in	my	head’.	
Animal	welfare	can	also	be	put	at	risk	by	restrictions	on	the	movement	of	animals	
(Rubira	2009).	For	example,	during	the	2001	FMD	outbreak	in	the	United	Kingdom,	stock	feed	
could	not	be	supplied	to	farms	in	quarantined	areas	(Mort	et	al.	2004).	Movement	restrictions	
meant	that	farmers	were	unable	to	sell	stock	and	had	to	hold	the	stock	for	longer.	In	some	cases,	
holding	areas	quickly	became	overstocked	and	turned	muddy	and	unsanitary.	This	caused	
farmers	to	become	stressed	about	the	welfare	of	their	animals.	
Uncertainty	
Producers	in	Queensland	said	it	would	be	stressful	not	knowing	how	long	an	outbreak	might	last	
and	that	it	would	‘feel	like	walking	a	tightrope’.	The	producers	in	the	Victorian	case	study	
emphasised	it	would	be	very	important	for	their	mental	health	to	be	able	to	see	the	light	at	the	
end	of	the	tunnel.	They	said	that	they	would	prefer	to	know	from	the	start	what	they	could	
expect	and	the	steps	involved	in	the	disease	eradication	process.	Feelings	of	uncertainty	about	
income,	livelihoods	and	future	prospects	caused	by	an	outbreak	can	increase	stress	and	reduce	
the	ability	to	cope	with	traumatic	events	(Productivity	Commission	2002).	
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Social	isolation	
Several	case	study	participants	mentioned	that	producers	and	people	from	local	towns	would	be	
likely	to	limit	their	movements	during	an	FMD	outbreak	in	order	to	avoid	contributing	to	disease	
spread.	This	is	despite	AUSVETPLAN	not	restricting	people’s	movement,	other	than	requiring	
decontamination	procedures	on	declared	premises	and	moving	through	roadblocks	during	an	
FMD	outbreak.	Other	self‐imposed	movement	restrictions	can	contribute	to	the	overall	inability	
of	producers	and	the	broader	community	to	participate	in	recreational	activities	to	‘blow	off	
steam’	(Bailey	et	al.	2004;	Mort	et	al.	2005).	
A	survey	of	horse	owners	found	that	during	the	2007	equine	influenza	outbreak	in	New	South	
Wales,	movement	restrictions	left	them	feeling	isolated,	leading	to	psychological	distress	and	
frustration	(Taylor,	Agho	&	Griffin	2008).	Horse	owners	who	did	not	have	infected	animals	also	
became	socially	isolated	because	they	refrained	from	interacting	with	other	people	in	an	attempt	
to	prevent	the	disease	from	spreading	(Myers	2011).	A	significant	proportion	of	horse	owners	
also	reported	feeling	socially	or	professionally	unwelcome	in	less	infected	or	uninfected	areas.	
Half	the	respondents	indicated	that	they	would	not	trust	people	from	an	infected	area	to	
decontaminate	properly	and	they	would	not	be	welcoming	or	willing	to	socialise	with	them.	
A	range	of	people	may	experience	mental	health	issues	
Distress	may	be	experienced	not	only	by	producers	but	also	by	others	involved.	Frontline	
workers	such	as	government	response	workers	and	vets	may	also	experience	high	levels	of	
distress	during	an	animal	disease	outbreak.	In	both	case	study	areas,	participants	who	had	been	
part	of	an	emergency	response	team,	and	those	from	local	councils	who	had	experienced	an	
emergency	animal	disease	outbreak,	reflected	how	increased	workloads,	new	roles	and	working	
with	new	colleagues	brought	in	by	an	outbreak	created	high	levels	of	stress.	For	many	response	
workers	this	was	in	addition	to	having	to	sell	government	response	polices,	which	they	might	
not	personally	support,	to	distressed	producers.	
During	interviews,	veterinarians	believed	that	if	they	were	involved	in	the	response	to	an	FMD	
outbreak	they	might	experience	blame;	for	example,	for	spreading	FMD	between	properties	or	
finding	the	first	FMD	case.	For	veterinary	practices	located	away	from	FMD‐affected	areas,	focus	
group	participants	expected	increased	workload	for	remaining	veterinarians	in	practices	that	
send	some	of	their	veterinarians	to	assist	with	response	efforts.	Participating	veterinarians	
indicated	that	veterinary	practice	that	were	unable	to	meet	demand	from	regular	clients	might	
lose	clients	to	rival	practices.	It	was	also	suggested	that	veterinary	practices	close	to	or	in	FMD‐
affected	areas	might	have	decreased	income	because	of	lower	demand	from	producers	and	the	
broader	community	due	to	reduced	spending	power.	
Physical	health	and	wellbeing	
According	to	producers	in	the	case	studies,	the	main	physical	health	and	wellbeing	impacts	were	
sleepless	nights	that	interfered	with	decision‐making,	concern	about	working	with	chemicals	
during	the	decontamination	process,	and	working	in	overalls	in	North	Queensland	where	the	
temperature	can	reach	40	⁰C.	
Household	impacts	
Impacts	on	individuals	can	also	affect	their	families	because	the	pressure	can	cause	changes	in	
how	people	relate	to	each	other	(Figure	11).	The	economic	impacts	of	an	FMD	outbreak	
discussed	in	this	report	can	also	have	a	profound	effect	on	entire	households.	
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Social	impacts	of	reduced	income	
Several	case	study	participants	suggested	significant	social	impacts	would	result	from	financial	
strain	placed	on	producers	by	an	FMD	outbreak.	As	many	of	Australia’s	meat	and	livestock	
export	markets	would	be	lost,	livestock	producers	would	expect	to	face	substantially	reduced	
incomes.	The	ABARES	economic	modelling	showed	the	livestock	industry	and	other	related	
industries	would	be	greatly	affected.	Each	household’s	financial	status	will	influence	the	capacity	
of	individuals	and	families	to	withstand	these	adverse	changes;	persistent	financial	pressure	
facing	individuals	and	families	often	leads	to	emotional	distress	(Westen,	Burton	&	Kowalski	
2006).	UK	residents	with	lower	incomes	as	a	consequence	of	FMD	reported	lower	quality	of	life	
and	health	(Mort	et	al.	2004).	
In	the	restricted	areas,	eradicating	FMD	by	culling	animals	creates	a	substantial	reduction	in	
short‐term	cashflow	for	affected	farming	families.	Rapid	provision	of	compensation	for	culled	
animals	is	therefore	important.	The	value	of	properties	with	infected	stock	may	be	reduced	by	
their	disease	history	(Productivity	Commission	2002).	Many	producers	use	the	value	of	their	
land	or	their	herd	as	equity	to	borrow	funds;	the	persistent	financial	pressure	could	generate	
emotional	distress	(Westen,	Burton	&	Kowalski	2006).	During	the	Ovine	Johne’s	outbreak,	
Australian	families	in	affected	regions	were	unable	to	sell	their	farms	due	to	quarantine	
restrictions,	but	the	asset	value	of	their	farms	prevented	them	from	accessing	a	pension	(Senate	
Rural	and	Regional	Affairs	and	Transport	References	Committee	1998).	These	impacts	worsen	
the	direct	economic	hardship	caused	by	outbreaks.	
Many	participants	raised	concerns	about	the	effects	of	culling	on	irreplaceable	stock	bloodlines	
that	have	taken	generations	to	develop.	Barclay	(2005)	noted	that	affected	families	may	have	no	
option	but	to	restock	their	farms	with	animals	that	attract	lower	market	prices	than	the	original	
pedigree	stock.	Some	producers	with	stud	animals	gain	significant	income	from	their	prize	
animals	through	semen	sales	or	renting	out	stud	animals.	The	family	would	then	need	to	adapt	
to	the	long‐term	reduced	income	generated	by	on‐farm	activities.	Culling	for	eradication	would	
have	a	negative,	long‐term	impact	on	all	these	business	activities	and	associated	income.	
In	the	control	zones,	movement	restrictions	would	prevent	FMD‐free	farmers	trading	healthy	
stock.	This	would	reduce	income	and	increase	expenditure	on	feeding	this	stock	(Mort	et	al.	
2005).	In	the	2001	FMD	outbreak	in	the	United	Kingdom,	this	had	a	greater	negative	effect	on	
lower	income	households,	which	are	less	financially	resilient	to	shocks,	and	caused	a	higher	level	
of	stress	(Oparinde	&	Birol	2008).	Despite	these	increased	costs	and	loss	of	potential	income,	
FMD‐free	farmers	were	not	eligible	for	compensation	(Mort	el	al.	2005).	
Outside	the	restricted	area,	loss	of	export	market	revenues	can	generate	significant	cashflow	
problems.	Causes	include	reduced	livestock	prices	and	potential	difficulties	in	selling	livestock	
when	there	is	an	oversupply	on	the	domestic	market.	Participants	also	expressed	concerns	
about	a	long‐term	change	in	the	value	of	properties.	Sustained	reductions	in	livestock	prices	
could	reduce	demand	for	farmland	and	farm	machinery	and	lower	potential	sale	prices.	
Difficulties	in	selling	farm	assets	can	increase	the	effect	of	short‐term	cashflow	reductions,	
increasing	the	need	for	assistance.	Producers	identified	negotiation	with	banks	about	debt	
repayments	and	reduced	interest	rates	as	forms	of	assistance	that	would	be	helpful	during	an	
FMD	outbreak.	
Evidence	of	the	financial	pressure	caused	by	FMD	was	observed	in	the	United	Kingdom,	where	
debt‐related	enquiries	at	local	citizen	advice	bureaus	in	FMD‐affected	regions	increased	by	
30	per	cent	(Cumbria	Foot	and	Mouth	Disease	Inquiry	Panel	2002).	Reports	spoke	of	families	
who	‘tightened	their	belts’	to	sustain	their	farm	business	and	who	survived	on	elderly	parents’	
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pensions	(Barclay	2005).	The	uncertainty	about	the	length	of	the	outbreak	and	market	closures	
compounded	the	difficultly	of	managing	household	finances.	
Case	study	participants	pointed	out	that	many	farm	families	had	limited	options	for	generating	
alternative	income.	Many	producers	do	not	have	alternative	employment	skill	sets	and,	if	the	
economy	is	affected	by	an	FMD	outbreak,	job	opportunities	in	the	region	are	likely	to	be	limited.	
Some	producers	mentioned	that	their	partner’s	ability	to	engage	in	off‐farm	employment	might	
also	be	affected.	This	could	be	due	to	self‐imposed	movement	restrictions	or	the	partner’s	
employment	in	the	livestock	industry	being	directly	affected	by	the	FMD	outbreak.	
This	reflects	findings	from	the	United	Kingdom	in	the	2001	FMD	outbreak,	where	movement	
restrictions	prevented	some	households	from	operating	off‐farm	businesses	(Cumbria	Foot	and	
Mouth	Disease	Inquiry	Panel	2002).	In	some	cases,	women	who	normally	stayed	home	took	up	
off‐farm	work,	which	led	to	further	isolation	of	men	who	remained	on‐farm.	The	change	of	
gender	roles	also	sometimes	affected	relationships.	In	some	cases,	women	urged	their	partners	
to	find	another	way	of	life	than	farming	(Barclay	2005).	
Businesses	in	the	agriculture	supply	chain,	such	as	transporters,	abattoirs,	saleyards	and	milk	
processors,	may	also	be	affected.	They	may	have	to	alter	their	operations	in	response	to	an	
outbreak.	For	example,	transporters	of	livestock	products	that	usually	move	through	an	area	
might	be	forced	to	make	detours	or	deliver	at	a	different	location	if	there	is	an	outbreak	in	the	
area.	These	routes	could	be	less	safe	or	longer,	adding	to	the	workload.	Interview	participants	
were	also	concerned	that	current	and	future	business	opportunities	might	be	affected	by	the	
stigma	of	being	located	in	an	FMD‐affected	region.	
In	the	UK	2001	FMD	outbreak,	many	non‐farming	businesses	had	to	draw	on	family	and	
household	financial	resources	to	stay	afloat.	Family	and	household	members	had	to	act	as	a	
buffer	by	increasing	working	hours	and	taking	pay	cuts.	This	placed	pressure	on	the	household	
and	contributed	to	mental	and	physical	health	impacts,	such	as	exhaustion,	increased	tension	
between	family	members	and	general	stress	(Phillipson	et	al.	2002).	
Strained	and	greater	demands	on	family	relationships	
Case	study	participants	mentioned	that	an	FMD	outbreak	in	Australia	may	cause	strain	on	family	
relationships.	For	example,	while	some	marriages	might	grow	stronger,	the	situation	was	likely	
to	put	great	strain	on	these	relationships.	Stress	from	financial	pressure	in	particular	can	
combine	with	the	personal	emotional	challenges	of	an	FMD	outbreak	and	this	can	negatively	
affect	family	relationships.	
Several	focus	group	participants	suggested	the	stress	and	pressure	of	the	situation	will	reduce	
intimacy	within	couples.	Studies	show	that	preoccupation	with	financial	pressures	and	
perceived	lack	of	control	over	financial	situations	can	create	feelings	of	depression,	anger	and	
frustration	(Conger	et	al.	1994;	David	&	Mentler	2004).	These	factors	tend	to	lower	marital	
satisfaction	as	partners	withdraw	rather	than	support	each	other	emotionally	(Conger,	Reuter	&	
Conger	2000).	During	the	2001	FMD	outbreak	in	the	United	Kingdom,	family	arguments	often	
resulted	from	financial	difficulties	and	extra	workloads	(Deaville	et	al.	2003;	Productivity	
Commission	2002).	
Producers	from	the	Queensland	focus	group	indicated	they	were	unlikely	to	seek	emotional	
support	outside	the	house.	This	may	mean	spouses	(usually	wives)	will	play	a	key	role	in	their	
partners’	emotional	support.	According	to	one	producer’s	wife,	some	women	are	already	
equipping	themselves	to	support	their	partners	during	stressful	events.	Given	the	likely	strain	
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on	relationships,	relying	on	partners	for	support	could	add	extra	pressure	or	result	in	lack	of	
support	if	partnerships	break	down.	
Stress	can	also	negatively	affect	parenting.	Parents	experiencing	financial	pressure	may	be	less	
responsive	to	children’s	needs	and	more	hostile	toward	their	children;	this	can	contribute	to	
adolescent	behavioural	problems	(Conger	et	al.	1994).	Some	producers,	recalling	past	periods	of	
stress,	observed	that	children	are	affected	by	the	atmosphere	in	the	home.	
Queensland	producers	were	concerned	that	farming	households	affected	by	FMD	might	no	
longer	be	able	to	afford	to	send	their	children	to	boarding	school.	This	could	lead	to	a	need	for	
home	schooling	which	would	place	additional	strain	on	the	family.	Children	may	also	experience	
less	social	contact	with	their	friends,	while	extracurricular	and	other	recreational	activities	are	
likely	to	be	minimal.	
Some	farming	families	who	participated	in	this	study	reflected	on	their	experiences	of	
emergency	animal	disease	outbreaks.	One	family	member	left	the	area	for	to	escape	the	
situation,	which	included	facing	the	culling	of	livestock	and	experiencing	rejection	and	blame	by	
local	community	members.	The	departure	of	family	members	can	further	disrupt	the	home	
environment,	especially	where	children	are	involved.	
People	who	lose	their	jobs,	such	as	transporters	who	normally	spend	long	periods	away	from	
home,	are	likely	to	spend	more	time	at	home	with	their	families	during	an	outbreak.	This	could	
cause	a	shift	from	the	usual	routine	and,	together	with	the	reduced	cashflow,	may	cause	tension	
within	households.	Other	families	may	experience	extended	periods	of	absence;	for	example,	
families	of	support	workers	recruited	to	assist	with	eradication,	such	as	veterinarians.	
Community	impacts	
The	impact	on	communities	is	largely	the	result	of	cumulative	effects	on	individual	producers,	
their	households	and	agencies	and	businesses	affected	by	a	disease	outbreak	(Figure	11).	
Social	cohesion	
Community	cohesion	refers	to	social	ties,	shared	loyalties,	community	commitments	and	a	sense	
of	belonging	within	communities.	It	is	crucial	to	community	sustainability	and	wellbeing	
(Holdsworth	&	Hartman	2009).	
Communities	with	strong	social	cohesion	are	characterised	by	a	high	level	of	reciprocal	caring,	
sharing	of	knowledge	and	ideas,	and	the	provision	of	services	through	community	groups	and	
charities.	Individuals	involved	in	communities	with	strong	social	cohesion	are	likely	to	trust	one	
another,	share	values	and	support	one	another	in	various	ways.	Reciprocal	relationships	may	
also	encourage	people	to	act	cooperatively	as	there	is	an	expectation	that	the	support	given	will	
be	returned	(ABS	2010).	Social	cohesion	can	help	communities	pull	through	in	times	of	crisis.	
However,	crises	can	damage	social	cohesion	in	communities.	
Producers	gave	mixed	responses	to	how	an	FMD	outbreak	in	the	Victorian	Goulburn	Valley	case	
study	could	affect	social	cohesion.	Some	mentioned	communities	coming	together	during	local	
flooding	to	assist	with	sandbagging	and	other	volunteer	activities.	A	community	representative	
commented	that	local	shires	put	aside	resentment	stemming	from	different	funding	levels	and	
banded	together	to	respond	to	the	2012	floods.	
However,	producers	and	DPI	staff	described	being	accused	of	introducing	and	spreading	anthrax	
and	were	concerned	that	the	general	community	would	similarly	blame	them	during	an	FMD	
outbreak.	One	goat	producer	felt	he	could	be	targeted	because	goats	are	perceived	as	dirty	
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animals.	Furthermore,	verbal	reports	indicated	that	some	producers’	family	members	were	
confronted	and	bullied	during	previous	disease	outbreaks.	
Some	thought	that	migrant	families	in	Shepparton	might	be	blamed	for	introducing	FMD	into	the	
region.	Several	interviewees	suggested	migrants	smuggle	animal	products	into	Australia	and	are	
therefore	a	biosecurity	risk.	The	uneasy	feelings	some	Shepparton	residents	have	toward	other	
cultures,	and	the	fact	that	many	migrants	are	employed	on	farms	or	abattoirs,	was	given	as	a	
possible	reason	for	migrants	being	blamed	for	introducing	or	spreading	FMD.	
Several	Victorian	participants	cited	examples	of	similar	events	during	actual	outbreaks,	
describing	the	strain	between	producers	abiding	by	biosecurity	protocols	and	those	perceived	to	
be	breaking	the	rules.	Residents	were	suspicious	of	strangers	during	this	time;	according	to	one	
interviewee	locals	became	anxious	because	they	associated	unfamiliar	faces	with	illegal	animal	
transport.	Tension	may	also	arise	from	perceptions	that	some	producers	are	illegally	moving	or	
hiding	stock	during	an	emergency	animal	disease	outbreak	(Taylor,	Agho	&	Griffin	2008).	
In	the	North	Queensland	case	study,	most	participants	believed	that	the	community	will	pull	
together	during	an	FMD	outbreak	and	that	the	town	community	would	support	producers.	
Producers	and	townspeople	will	be	likely	to	experience	the	economic	impacts	together	because	
towns	are	highly	reliant	on	graziers	and	a	feeling	of	‘us	and	them’	is	rare.	Few	participants	
believed	FMD‐affected	producers	would	be	stigmatised.	
Community	activities	
Particular	activities,	such	as	the	numerous	agricultural	shows	in	both	case	study	regions,	would	
probably	be	cancelled	during	an	FMD	outbreak	because	of	movement	restrictions	placed	on	
livestock.	A	Victorian	community	representative	advised	that	these	shows	are	well	attended	and	
their	postponement	may	lower	community	morale	and	income.	Further,	producers	who	have	
spent	time	preparing	their	animals	for	agricultural	shows	may	seek	to	blame	someone	for	their	
wasted	effort.	During	an	equine	influenza	outbreak	some	producers	blamed	DPI	staff	for	
preventing	them	from	attending	a	local	pony	show.	
Smaller,	everyday	activities	between	individuals	may	also	be	affected	by	an	FMD	outbreak.	
Producers	described	how,	during	an	anthrax	outbreak,	people	gave	them	a	‘wide	berth’	on	the	
streets	and	refused	to	participate	in	their	regular	lawn	bowling	or	tennis	matches.	Producers’	
children	were	told	not	to	attend	birthday	parties.	These	changes	may	come	about	through	a	
combination	of	fear	of	spreading	the	disease	and	tense	relationships	between	people.	Producers	
in	the	United	Kingdom	had	similar	experiences	(Barclay	2005;	Cumbria	Foot	and	Mouth	Disease	
Inquiry	Panel	2002).	
Community	services	
During	small,	localised	FMD	outbreaks,	essential	local	council	services	can	be	maintained	by	
drawing	on	staff	from	neighbouring	shires.	An	interviewee	confirmed	that	this	occurred	during	
the	Victorian	floods,	where	less	immediate	concerns	such	as	approving	planning	permits	were	
postponed.	A	Queensland	council	representative	believed	that	an	FMD	outbreak	would	affect	a	
multi‐million	dollar	road	construction	project	in	the	region.	The	council’s	usual	service	delivery	
might	also	be	affected	if	staff	were	involved	in	managing	the	outbreak.	
Impacts	on	other	industries	
An	FMD	outbreak	may	have	consequences	for	those	businesses	and	staff	not	eligible	for	
compensation.	The	reduced	spending	power	of	agricultural	families	is	likely	to	affect	most	
businesses	in	rural	towns.	
Potential	socio‐economic	impacts	of	an	FMD	outbreak	in	Australia	 ABARES	
45	
Several	participants	suggested	tourism	would	be	hard	hit	by	an	FMD	outbreak	because	tourists	
would	avoid	the	region.	Towns	north‐east	of	the	Victorian	case	study	area,	such	as	Echuca	and	
Yarrawonga,	are	part	of	a	large	tourism	industry.	A	tourism	officer	at	a	local	council	described	
how	negative	media	portrayal	of	fires	and	drought	had	reduced	tourism	numbers	and	a	
community	representative	confirmed	that	floods	had	reduced	tourist	visits	to	Echuca.	This	
person	was	also	concerned	that	incorrect	perceptions	of	the	health	risks	FMD	poses	could	‘scare	
tourists	off’,	as	was	the	case	during	a	blue‐green	algae	bloom	that	damaged	houseboat	tourism.	
Fruit‐producing	farms	in	the	Victorian	case	study	area	typically	do	not	have	livestock	but	many	
are	surrounded	by	livestock	farms,	so	an	FMD	outbreak	could	affect	horticulture.	As	with	floods	
and	fruit	fly	outbreaks,	road	blocks	may	delay	fruit	deliveries	from	the	farm	to	cold	storage,	
which	diminishes	fruit	quality.	One	interviewee	felt	that	FMD	would	not	significantly	affect	the	
horticulture	industry.	Other	interviewees	were	confident	that	processors	and	the	horticulture	
industry	would	find	a	way	around	the	problem.	
In‐migration	and	out‐migration	
During	an	FMD	response	period,	rural	towns	are	likely	to	experience	an	influx	of	people,	
including	veterinarians,	field	officers	and	slaughter	teams.	Some	participants	from	the	North	
Queensland	case	study	believed	that	efficiency	with	which	the	response	team	works	with	locals	
to	implement	control	strategies	determines	how	readily	the	community	accepts	the	influx	of	
response	personnel.	The	community	is	more	likely	to	accept	response	measures	where	
communication	is	forthcoming	and	transparent.	
Participants	observed	that	few	job	opportunities	exist	outside	the	agricultural	industry,	
especially	in	the	smaller	towns	in	the	case	study	areas,	such	as	Hughenden.	A	lack	of	alternative	
job	opportunities	for	displaced	workers	from	agricultural	and	associated	industries	could	lead	to	
a	loss	of	people	and	skills	from	the	community,	as	workers	leave	to	search	for	work	(Barclay	
2005).	This	could	have	long‐term	consequences	for	small	towns	that	are	trying	to	increase	their	
population	(Senate	Rural	and	Regional	Affairs	and	Transport	References	Committee	1998).	
Choice	of	eradication	strategy	
Some	interviewees	saw	the	three	options	for	eradication	as	sequential:	‘if	stamping	out	fails,	
vaccinate	and	remove	the	animals	from	the	population.	If	too	many	animals	need	to	be	
vaccinated	due	to	uncontrolled	disease	spread,	move	to	vaccinating	and	leaving	the	animals	in	
the	population’	(Appendix	F).	Responses	to	eradication	strategies	can	be	summarised	as:	
 Stamping	out—most	farmers	and	supply	chain	members	favour	this	method	as	the	quickest	
way	to	end	an	outbreak	and	reduce	financial	and	social	impacts	
 Vaccinate	and	remove	the	animals	from	the	population—many	producers	and	industry	
stakeholders	consider	this	method	could	prolong	an	FMD	outbreak	and	social	impacts;	
animal	welfare	concerns	might	arise	because	the	public	would	not	understand	why	healthy	
vaccinated	animals	had	to	be	culled	
 Vaccinate	and	leave	the	animals	in	the	population—producers	and	industry	stakeholders	
feel	this	method	would	affect	them	financially	for	longer	because	export	markets	could	be	
lost	permanently.	Sustaining	operations	with	prolonged	low	meat	prices	would	not	be	
possible.	However,	the	method	may	be	more	attractive	to	livestock	owners	with	alternative	
income	sources	who	do	not	want	to	lose	specialised	breeds	or	valuable	livestock	genetics	to	
culling.	
Producers	need	more	information	about	response	strategies	and	implications	of	using	each.	
Most	producers,	stock	agents	and	livestock	transporters	are	unaware	of	FMD	implications,	plans	
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for	response	activities	and	compensation.	Online	information	about	FMD	rarely	reaches	its	
target	audience.	Producers	are	more	concerned	about	common	diseases	and	have	difficulty	
justifying	the	time	required	to	research	a	disease	that	may	never	occur.	
Broader	community	response	
With	every	new	outbreak,	public	outcry	grows;	large‐scale	culling	of	animals	to	protect	a	
country’s	disease	status	may	no	longer	be	acceptable	to	the	general	public	(Aerts,	Evers	&	Lips	
2006).	Policymakers	need	to	be	aware	that	increased	public	concern	can	escalate	debate	about	
the	best	response	action	and	affect	government	decisions	(COMEST	2005;	Lewis	&	Tyshenko	
2009).	After	the	2001	FMD	outbreak	in	the	United	Kingdom,	the	government	was	criticised	for	
not	using	vaccination	(Anderson	2002;	Campbell	&	Lee	n.d.).	This	led	the	United	Kingdom	
Department	of	Environment,	Food	and	Rural	Affairs	to	revise	the	response	management	plan	to	
FMD	(Anderson	2002).	In	2011	media	coverage	of	Australian	cattle	being	slaughtered	in	
Indonesia	and	the	resulting	public	outcry	led	to	the	Australian	Government	temporarily	
suspending	Australia’s	export	of	live	cattle	to	Indonesia.	While	animal	activists	and	members	of	
the	general	public	praised	the	suspension,	the	agricultural	industry,	particularly	beef	producers,	
were	angered	and	worried	(Hastreiter	2013).	
Public	response	to	a	livestock	disease	outbreak	can	be	influenced	by	community	perceptions	of	
risk	and	other	issues	occurring	in	society	at	the	time	(Kasperson	et	al.	1998;	Lewis	&	Tyshenko	
2009).	The	mass	media	shapes	community	perception	of	and	attention	to	a	disease	outbreak	
(Lewis	&	Tyshenko	2009).	For	example,	sensationalised	news	can	lead	people	to	believe	they	or	
others	(including	animals)	are	at	risk	(Kasperson	et	al.	1988).	In	its	extensive	coverage,	the	
UK	media	often	referred	to	the	2001	FMD	outbreak	as	a	war	and	a	crisis	(Nerlich	et	al.	2002).	
‘Crisis	management	is	as	much	about	dealing	with	human	perceptions	about	the	crisis	and	the	
management	of	a	crisis	as	it	is	about	physically	resolving	the	crisis	situation’	(Miller	&	Ritchie	
2003).	In	the	Republic	of	Korea	in	2010–11,	public	outcry	against	the	slaughter	of	apparently	
healthy	animals	and	the	reportedly	inhuman	methods	used	extended	globally	(CFIA	2011).	
Culling	and	images	of	burning	pyres	and	mass	burials	of	livestock	in	the	United	Kingdom	and	the	
Netherlands	in	2001	caused	public	indignation	(European	Parliament	2002a,	b).	In	the	
Netherlands,	media	coverage	of	the	destruction	of	vaccinated	animals	provoked	calls	to	allow	
the	animals	to	live	(European	Parliament	2002b).	
Australia’s	response	strategy	for	FMD	should	consider	the	opinions	of	those	whose	taxes	pay	for	
the	response	(AHA	2011).	Welfare	of	livestock	under	movement	controls	should	also	be	
monitored.	In	the	United	Kingdom	in	2001,	the	public	calls	to	allow	movement	of	some	animals	
for	welfare	reasons	(Spickler	&	Roth	2008).	The	importance	of	ensuring	the	welfare	of	animals	
under	movement	controls	needs	to	be	noted	and	provided	for	in	response	plans	(European	
Parliament	2002a).	
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7 Managing social impacts of a 
disease outbreak 
This	chapter	identifies	ways	to	minimise	social	impacts	caused	by	the	response	strategy	and	its	
financial	impacts.	
The	United	Kingdom	has	experienced	two	major	outbreaks	of	foot‐and‐mouth	disease	(FMD)	in	
the	last	15	years—in	2001	and	2007.	The	UK	Government’s	handling	of	the	first	outbreak	was	
widely	criticised	and	contributed	to	the	devastating	impact	of	FMD	on	the	UK	economy	and	
society	(Anderson	2002).	An	inquiry	held	in	2001	after	the	first	outbreak	identified	nine	lessons	
to	be	learned.	Implemented	in	the	2007	outbreak,	the	lessons	helped	improve	procedures	and	
minimised	social	and	economic	impacts	(Anderson	2008).	
Build	an	effective	response	team	
A	skilled	response	team	stands	at	the	centre	of	an	effective	response	effort.	Frontline	response	
staff	are	the	face	of	the	government’s	response	strategy.	Community	and	stakeholder	
interactions	with	frontline	staff	can	influence	perceptions	of	how	effectively	the	government	is	
implementing	the	response	plan.	When	building	a	response	team:	
 Look	beyond	technical	skills	in	response	staff—ABARES	focus	group	participants	
recommended	each	response	team	appoint	someone	with	interpersonal	skills	to	liaise	with	
producers	affected	by	the	FMD	outbreak.	Skills	would	include	negotiating	and	dealing	
sensitively	with	distressed	producers.	Either	a	trusted	local	person	from	the	farming	
community	or	an	industry	liaison	officer	could	act	as	a	focus	for	consultation	and	advice	to	
local	industry	under	the	AUSVETPLAN.	
 Communicate	roles	and	responsibilities	clearly	and	early—a	DPI	employee	recalled	a	
frustrating	lack	of	clarity	about	her	role	and	responsibilities	during	an	actual	emergency	
animal	disease	response.	Clearly	defined	roles	and	responsibilities	as	part	of	response	
procedures	will	enable	response	teams	to	begin	work	quickly	and	effectively.	They	will	also	
need	regular	and	prompt	updates	when	circumstances	or	approaches	change.	
 Involve	regional	DPI	staff	in	simulation	exercises—to	ensure	efficiency	and	effectiveness	
of	local	emergency	animal	disease	disaster	management	plans.	This	would	also	build	DPI	
staff	confidence	in	their	and	the	Australian	Government’s	ability	to	manage	an	FMD	
outbreak.	In	2009	Victoria’s	Exercise	Diva	simulation	tested	the	state’s	capability	to	deal	
with	a	hypothetical	outbreak	of	FMD.	During	the	exercise,	regional	DPI	staff	used	their	local	
knowledge	and	networks	to	refine	the	response	plan	and	put	agreements	in	place	for	carcass	
disposal	sites,	vaccine	storage	facilities,	sealed	transport	for	carcasses	and	decontamination	
of	premises.	
 Establish	protocols	for	involving	veterinarians—according	to	veterinarians	in	the	
ABARES	focus	group,	not	all	veterinarians	would	participate	in	an	FMD	response.	Before	
agreeing	to	make	themselves	available	for	future	response	teams,	veterinarians	need	to	
know	the	conditions	for	involvement,	such	as	remuneration	and	logistical	support,	are	well	
defined	in	advance.	
Communicate	effectively	
Access	to	timely	and	accurate	information	can	contribute	to	community	resilience	in	an	FMD	
outbreak	because	it	is	fundamental	to	good	decision‐making	(Longstaff	&	Yang	2008).	Poor	
communication	from	agencies	can	make	a	crisis	worse	as	people	will	seek	answers	elsewhere	
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(Miller	&	Ritchie	2003),	potentially	resulting	in	misinformed	decisions.	Slow	information	
provision	can	contribute	to	confusion,	frustration	and	noncompliance	with	regulations.	
Principles	to	guide	the	development	of	any	communication	strategy	include:	
 Provide	information	in	an	accessible,	regular	and	consistent	way—explain	policies,	
plans,	practices	and	requirements	concisely	and	in	plain	English,	with	key	messages	clearly	
summarised	(Barclay	2005).	Producers	and	others	do	not	always	understand	bureaucratic	
(Mort	et	al.	2004)	or	legal	language	(ENRC	2000).	One	interviewee	reflected	that	during	
previous	animal	disease	outbreaks,	she	had	to	ask	DPI	staff	to	clarify	and	translate	
information	for	producers.	Providing	regular	information	updates	ensures	people	are	
informed	and	reduces	frustration.	Ensuring	information	is	consistent	reduces	confusion	and	
builds	confidence	that	the	response	is	being	implemented	effectively.	
 Use	multiple	communication	methods—using	a	wider	range	of	communication	methods	
(including	online)	meant	community	and	stakeholder	engagement	in	the	2007	FMD	
outbreak	in	the	United	Kingdom	was	better	than	during	the	2001	outbreak	(Anderson	
2008).	Interviewees	in	the	ABARES	study	concurred,	recommending	use	of	multiple	
communication	methods	during	an	Australian	outbreak	(Appendix	E).	
 Involve	people	who	producers	and	rural	communities	know	and	trust	to	assist	in	
communicating	key	messages—messages	are	better	received	by	communities	when	they	
come	from	someone	they	know	and	trust,	such	as	local	veterinarians	and	stock	agents.	
During	the	2007	equine	influenza	response	in	Australia,	horse	owners’	attitudes	changed	
when	they	heard	information	from	well‐known,	respected	members	of	the	horse‐owning	
community	who	were	appointed	as	industry	liaison	officers	(Webster	2011).	
 Include	good	news	stories—several	ABARES	interviewees	mentioned	that	hearing	positive	
stories	about	communities	banding	together,	or	containment	success,	would	boost	people’s	
morale	during	an	FMD	outbreak.	
 Communicate	reasons	behind	decision‐making—local	communities’	trust	in	government	
information	sources	could	be	lost	if	government	decisions	appear	irrational,	if	requirements	
are	impractical	or	if	government	does	not	deliver	on	promises.	
The	media	can	help	disseminate	information	during	an	FMD	outbreak.	However,	Victorian	
producers	and	veterinarians	with	animal	disease	experience	spoke	of	being	hounded	by	
reporters	during	the	response	phase	and	the	outbreak	situation	being	misrepresented	in	the	
media.	Veterinarians	described	being	followed	by	reporters	as	they	travelled	to	clients’	
properties.	Producers	talked	of	the	frustration	of	not	being	able	to	answer	media	questions	
because	of	a	lack	of	information.	
Several	interviewees	were	concerned	about	the	negative	media	portrayal	of	FMD	outbreak	
responses.	For	example,	there	was	concern	that	if	producers	need	to	cull	animals	for	welfare	
reasons	during	an	outbreak,	this	would	be	misrepresented	by	the	media.	Participants	stressed	
the	need	for	a	spokesperson	to	handle	the	press	on	producers’	behalf.	This	would	ease	the	
emotional	toll	on	producers.	Other	suggestions	included	police‐enforced	restriction	on	media	
access	to	FMD‐infected	areas.	
Information	needs	of	different	stakeholders	
Communication	strategies	should	provide	information	targeted	to	address	the	needs	of	different	
stakeholder	groups	in	an	outbreak.	This	section	details	major	stakeholder	groups,	the	
information	they	will	need	during	an	outbreak	and	methods	to	communicate	with	each	group.	
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Producers	and	industry	stakeholders	
Uncertainty	can	cause	psychological	distress	during	an	emergency	disease	outbreak	(see	‘Mental	
health’).	Effective	communication	is	central	to	overcoming	uncertainty	and	reducing	distress.	
Uncertainty	would	be	at	its	highest	level	early	in	the	outbreak	and	is	likely	to	relate	to	several	
factors	(Hagar	&	Haythornthwaite	2005;	Productivity	Commission	2002):	
 market	access—how	long	markets	will	be	closed	and	the	impact	on	current	and	next	
season’s	prices	
 income—short‐term	cashflow	and	how	long	the	cashflow	will	be	affected	by	the	closure	of	
markets;	stakeholders	also	need	clear	information	about	compensation,	including	who	is	
eligible	and	for	what	
 information	about	what	to	do—to	deal	with	the	outbreak	effectively,	producers	need	
information	on	
‐ how	to	diagnose	the	disease	
‐ how	to	prevent	infection	
‐ what	to	do	if	infection	is	suspected	
‐ how	to	comply	with	disease	control	policies	
‐ who	will	come	to	their	farms	to	carry	out	livestock	culls	and	dispose	of	animal	carcasses	
‐ how	to	apply	for	movement	permits	
‐ available	financial	and	mental	health	support	services	
‐ the	nature	of	the	outbreak	in	their	area,	such	as	which	farms	are	infected	and	what	
animals	are	involved	
 government	involvement—including	timing	and	extent	of	government	financial	support,	
policy	interventions	and	the	effectiveness	and	consistency	of	disease	containment	efforts	
 face‐to‐face	communication—one	of	the	most	effective	ways	to	engage	producers	and	
industry	stakeholders	about	sensitive	issues,	this	provides	people	with	the	opportunity	to	
ask	questions	(Kruger	et	al.	2012).	
Local	communities	and	the	wider	public	
Information	for	local	communities	and	the	wider	public	should	focus	on	explaining:	
 what	FMD	is	and	what	it	means	for	human	health	
 that	FMD	poses	no	food	safety	risk	and	that	meat	from	FMD‐vaccinated	animals	is	safe	for	
human	consumption	(AHA	2012)	
 what	the	government’s	response	plan	is	and	reasons	for	animal	culling	and/or	vaccination	
 where	carcass	burial	sites	are	located	and	procedures	in	place	to	prevent	risks	to	human	
health.	
Addressing	community	information	needs	and	misconceptions	will	reduce	community	tension	
that	may	arise	from	fear	or	uncertainty	and	could	reduce	the	demand	for	information	from	on‐
ground	response	staff.	Anticipating	community	questions	and	misconceptions	can	reduce	
misinformation	and	generate	greater	cooperation.	For	example,	DPI	staff	participating	in	the	
case	studies	felt	the	public	would	be	less	confrontational	with	response	staff	if	they	understood	
the	need	for	roadblocks	and	other	response	actions	that	cause	inconvenience.	
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Engage	local	residents	and	producers	
The	2001	FMD	experience	in	the	United	Kingdom	shows	that	communities	can	become	
frustrated	and	disenfranchised	when	response	teams	do	not	consult	them	about	response	
actions	(Anderson	2002).	Engaging	with	residents	during	the	response	builds	trust	and	social	
acceptability	for	the	process.	The	UK	Government’s	inclusion	of	local	residents	in	the	response	in	
the	2007	FMD	outbreak	is	thought	to	have	led	to	fewer	social	impacts	than	the	earlier	outbreak	
(Anderson	2008).	Points	to	note	are:	
 Locals	may	hold	valuable	information	about	their	local	area	that	can	help	response	teams	
tailor	response	strategies	(Anderson	2008;	Barclay	2005).	This	includes	knowledge	of	
geography,	road	networks,	local	contractors	and	suppliers,	or	trade	routes.	For	example,	
Queensland	focus	group	participants	pointed	out	that	Google	maps	includes	roads	that	do	
not	exist.	
 Policies	need	to	provide	producers	with	the	option	of	participating	in	the	response	process	
on	their	property.	This	may	include	culling	and/or	vaccination	of	their	animals	(see	‘Causes	
of	mental	health	issues’)	and	the	use	of	lay	vaccinators,	such	as	producers	or	stock	handlers.	
This	would	also	reduce	resourcing	pressures.	
Establish	support	services	
Producers	and	other	business	representatives	interviewed	indicated	that	financial	support	
during	an	outbreak	would	be	vital	to	keep	their	businesses	afloat	and	would	greatly	contribute	
to	reducing	stress.	
Financial	support	
Focus	groups	and	the	literature	identified	financial	support	needs	as:	
 Relief	from	debt	pressure	for	affected	producers—	according	to	those	interviewed	
financial	compensation	should	be	provided	quickly	to	prevent	cashflow	problems	and	keep	
the	bank	and	other	creditors	‘at	bay’	during	an	FMD	outbreak.	Producers	would	like	support	
from	government	to	approach	banks	and	financial	organisations	to	ask	for	leniency	for	their	
loan	repayments.	
 Provide	access	to	financial	advice—producers	from	the	Victorian	focus	groups	suggested	
rural	financial	counsellors	provided	as	part	of	drought	assistance	could	be	helpful.	This	type	
of	service	was	heavily	used	during	the	2001	FMD	outbreak	in	the	United	Kingdom	and	
helped	producers	develop	financial	strategies	and	feel	more	in	control	(Cumbria	Foot	and	
Mouth	Diseases	Inquiry	Panel	2002).	
 Equitable	support	policies—interviewees	were	concerned	for	producers	and	businesses	
that	would	not	be	eligible	for	compensation	but	whose	income	might	be	reduced	during	an	
FMD	outbreak.	This	includes	livestock	transporters,	stock	agents	and	abattoir	employees.	
During	the	2001	FMD	outbreak	in	the	United	Kingdom,	this	inequality	of	access	to	support	
drew	wide	criticism	(Scott,	Christie	&	Midmore	2004).	Producers	whose	animals	were	not	
infected	were	caught	in	restricted	areas	and	were	therefore	unable	to	sell	the	livestock.	
However,	they	still	had	to	feed	and	care	for	the	animals.	Unequal	treatment	of	different	
affected	groups	can	increase	tension	within	communities	and	undermine	social	cohesion	
(Barclay	2005;	Taylor	et	al.	2008).	
ABARES	is	not	advocating	a	particular	approach	to	support	measures	in	this	paper;	it	is	
reporting	comments	from	others.	
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Mental	health	support	
International	experiences	highlight	the	need	for	mental	health	support	services	during	an	FMD	
outbreak.	The	Australian	Psychological	Society	could	provide	advice	on	the	availability	and	
appropriateness	of	mental	health	support	services	and	providers.	Principles	for	providing	
emotional	support	to	affected	communities	include:	
 Make	preventive	treatment	available—interviewees	mentioned	the	importance	of	having	
appropriate	mental	health	delivery	systems	in	place	before	an	outbreak.	A	Queensland	
psychologist	pointed	out	that	preventive	mental	health	care	is	just	as	important	as	treatment	
for	mental	health	issues	after	they	arise.	Response	staff	suggested	inviting	a	qualified	person	
to	talk	about	mental	health	issues;	for	example,	a	frontline	worker	in	a	previous	disease	
outbreak	might	encourage	people	to	be	more	open	toward	and	aware	of	opportunities	to	
seek	emotional	support	during	an	outbreak.	A	producer’s	wife	said	she	and	others	are	
educating	themselves	about	how	to	support	their	husbands	during	stressful	times	and	would	
welcome	professional	help	with	this	if	it	were	offered.	
 Build	upon	existing	support	networks—the	community	and	mental	health	workers	in	
both	case	study	areas	reported	that	people	in	rural	areas	take	time	to	develop	trust	in	using	
mental	health	services	provided	by	non‐community	members	and	that	most	seek	support	
from	existing	support	services	and	networks	in	their	local	community,	such	as	voluntary	
organisations,	church	groups	and	other	civic	groups.	These	can	become	important	providers	
of	emotional	and	practical	support	during	an	outbreak	(Hall	et	al.	2004;	Peck	2005;	
Peck	et	al.	2002).	
 Provide	group	counselling	in	social	settings—interviewees	preferred	talking	to	others	
with	similar	experiences.	This	technique	was	been	used	in	the	Queensland	case	study	area	to	
help	people	cope	with	the	impacts	of	natural	disasters.	Group	counselling	for	producers	and	
response	workers	could	be	delivered	in	small,	informal	social	settings.	Some	participants	
suggested	these	sessions	could	involve	or	be	facilitated	by	a	trained	counsellor.	This	would	
ensure	appropriate	support	is	offered	and	that	anyone	showing	symptoms	of	a	diagnosable	
mental	health	condition	is	treated	or	referred	appropriately.	Some	producers	suggested	
meetings	during	an	FMD	outbreak	where	people	can	share	their	experiences.	This	could	be	a	
barbecue,	or	an	FMD	update	meeting	with	refreshments	provided	afterward	to	encourage	
producers	to	talk	to	each	other.	Advertising	these	sessions	as	counselling	sessions	will	be	
likely	to	deter	people	from	attending.	
 Make	services	available	to	the	wider	community	and	be	innovative—mental	health	
services	should	be	provided	for	all	those	affected	by	an	FMD	outbreak,	not	solely	for	
producers	with	infected	livestock	(ENRC	2000;	Peck	2005).	For	example,	veterinarians	and	
other	response	personnel	who	are	overwhelmed	with	work	may	require	mental	health	
support.	These	services	could	be	delivered	in	innovative	ways	so	that	they	reach	target	
audiences.	For	example,	veterinarians	participating	in	this	study	suggested	that	counsellors	
should	ring	them	every	few	days	during	an	outbreak	to	see	how	they	are	coping,	rather	than	
the	veterinarian	having	to	call	the	counsellor.	In	Victoria,	interviewees	spoke	highly	of	a	
mental	health	service	available	during	the	drought,	where	family	or	friends	could	call	in	if	
they	suspected	someone	was	experiencing	mental	health	problems.	An	expert	would	then	
follow	up	with	this	person.	
 Ensure	long‐term	support	is	available	beyond	the	recovery	phase—normal	experiences	
of	psychological	distress	can	become	a	diagnosable	mental	illness	if	a	person	is	still	
experiencing	severe	symptoms	some	time	after	the	event	(DSM‐IV‐TR	2004).	A	psychologist	
in	the	Queensland	case	study	region	reported	still	seeing	people	suffering	psychological	
distress	from	Cyclone	Yasi,	which	had	affected	the	area	more	than	a	year	earlier	in	2011.	
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8 Conclusion 
An	outbreak	of	foot‐and‐mouth	disease	(FMD)	is	expected	to	have	substantial	economic	and	
social	impacts	on	Australian	livestock	industries,	related	industries	and	the	Australian	
community.	Investment	in	prevention,	eradication	and	restoring	market	access	is	expected	to	
reduce	these	effects.	The	different	effects	of	an	outbreak	across	regions	will	require	customised	
support	and	communication	to	promote	recovery	and	reduce	hardship.	
Prevention	and	early	detection	
An	FMD	outbreak	in	Australia,	whether	limited	or	widespread,	is	likely	to	impose	economic	and	
social	costs.	A	large	multi‐state	outbreak	is	expected	to	result	in	extreme	economic	and	social	
losses.	Costs	could	be	reduced	through	biosecurity	efforts	aimed	at	preventing	an	FMD	outbreak,	
such	as	offshore	and	onshore	measures.	This	is	crucial	given	increases	in	the	number	of	people	
and	goods	entering	Australia	and	the	associated	risk	of	disease	introduction.	
The	Australian	Government	Department	of	Agriculture	helps	keep	Australia	FMD‐free	by	
managing	biosecurity	controls	onshore	to	minimise	the	risk	of	the	disease	entering	the	country.	
The	Australian	Government	is	also	responding	to	the	2008	Beale	review	of	Australia’s	
quarantine	and	biosecurity	arrangements	and	to	the	Matthews	(2011)	review	of	Australia’s	
preparedness	for	the	threat	of	FMD.	The	Matthews	review	stated	that	it	is	now	time	to	attend	
relatively	more	to	the	prevention	and	preparedness	issues	of	the	FMD	emergency	management	
continuum.	Australia’s	biosecurity	system	has	worked	well	in	the	past	but	the	system	is	far	from	
perfect	and	Australia’s	biosecurity	agencies	are	significantly	under‐resourced	(Beale	et	al.	2008).	
Early	detection	and	eradication	of	FMD	is	to	Australia’s	advantage.	First,	the	economic	and	social	
costs	of	shorter	outbreaks	are	significantly	smaller	than	longer	ones,	primarily	due	to	ongoing	
delays	in	regaining	market	access.	Second,	the	disease	may	not	be	eradicated	if	it	escapes	early	
detection	and	becomes	widespread.	Areas	of	investment	to	consider	include	resourcing	of	
surveillance,	response	and	livestock	tracing.	
Surveillance	
Resourcing	of	surveillance	to	assist	in	swift	detection	of	an	outbreak	is	fundamental.	Producers,	
stock	agents	and	livestock	transporters	could	help	identify	symptoms	of	an	outbreak	early.	
However,	few	are	aware	of	FMD	implications	and	plans	for	associated	response	activities.	
Results	from	the	case	study	interviews	indicated	that	producers	do	not	actively	seek	FMD‐
related	information;	they	are	more	concerned	about	common	diseases	and	have	difficulty	
justifying	the	time	required	to	research	a	disease	that	may	never	occur.	Online	information	
about	FMD	is	not	reaching	its	target	audience.	Surveillance	measures	that	identify	the	role	of	
government,	businesses	and	community	are	important	in	detecting	the	disease	early	and	
reducing	the	potential	costs	of	an	outbreak.	
Emergency	response	
Resourcing	of	the	emergency	response	will	help	ensure	rapid	eradication	of	an	FMD	outbreak	
and	reduce	economic	and	social	impacts.	Ongoing	preparation	for	an	outbreak	could	include	
simulations	exercises,	identifying	available	resources,	developing	arrangements	for	producer	
participation	in	eradication	activities	and	improving	livestock	tracing.	
Involving	regional	department	of	primary	industry	staff	in	simulation	exercises,	as	has	occurred	
for	such	exercises	in	the	past,	will	improve	their	preparedness	for	an	FMD	outbreak.	Protocols	
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should	be	established	for	involving	veterinarians	in	an	FMD	outbreak	response	team.	Simulation	
exercises	can	also	serve	as	an	indicator	of	the	number	of	veterinarians	willing	to	participate	in	
the	response	team.	
Biosecurity	engagement	with	private	veterinarians,	industry	and	other	sources	(for	example,	
emergency	response	volunteers)	and	resource	sharing	at	national	level	could	make	better	use	of	
available	resources.	Allowing	producers	and	stock	handlers	to	participate	in	eradication	
activities,	such	as	vaccinating	their	own	livestock,	can	free	up	veterinary	and	other	expertise	for	
technical	tasks	such	as	stamping	out	and	enhanced	surveillance.	This	could	also	reduce	social	
impacts	of	eradication	activities	such	as	feelings	of	loss	of	control.	
Livestock	tracing	
A	standardised	system	of	national	livestock	traceability	could	improve	the	technical	response	to	
an	FMD	outbreak	and	the	capacity	for	Australian	industries	to	regain	market	access.	When	FMD	
is	detected,	tracing	at‐risk	livestock	and	livestock	products	is	essential	to	understanding	the	
nature	and	spread	of	the	outbreak.	Successful	implementation	of	the	livestock	standstill	and	
accurate	livestock	tracing	will	provide	accurate	and	timely	information	on	the	extent	of	the	
spread,	helping	decision‐makers	choose	optimal	response	measures.	
Effective	livestock	traceability	is	also	important	during	vaccination	and	subsequent	management	
of	vaccinated	animals.	It	can	help	demonstrate	that	all	vaccinated	animals	have	been	destroyed	
or	tested	for	FMD	antibodies	to	prove	that	they	are	not	infected.	Accurate	livestock	traceability	
would	be	important	to	satisfy	World	Organisation	for	Animal	Health	and	trading	partner	
requirements.	It	could	enhance	the	confidence	of	Australia’s	trading	partners	that	the	outbreak	
is	being	controlled	and	in	future	claims	of	disease‐free	status.	
Accurate	livestock	traceability	systems	for	sheep	and	goats	are	particularly	important	for	tracing	
FMD	risk.	Sheep	and	goats	show	either	no	or	few	clinical	symptoms,	increasing	the	risk	of	
undetected	FMD	spread.	Further,	if	Australia	pursued	a	geographical	zoning	approach	or	an	
enterprise‐level	compartmentalisation	approach	to	more	rapidly	facilitate	trade,	all	traded	
livestock	and	their	products	would	need	to	be	certified	as	only	coming	from	a	free	zone	or	free	
compartment.	
Market	access	
Closure	of	export	markets	is	expected	to	generate	most	of	the	cost	from	an	FMD	outbreak.	Any	
efforts	that	speed	up	re‐establishing	market	access	and	recovery	in	market	prices	will	reduce	
the	overall	cost	of	on	outbreak.	
The	Department	of	Agriculture	and	industry	market	access	programs,	such	as	those	run	by	the	
Red	Meat	Market	Access	Committee,	could	play	an	important	role	in	restoring	markets.	This	was	
demonstrated	by	the	UK	Export	Certification	Partnership	following	the	2007	FMD	outbreak.	
Such	partnerships	help	prioritise	negotiations	with	key	markets,	address	biosecurity	risk	
mitigation	requirements	for	each	partner	and	reach	agreement	on	restoring	market	access	more	
quickly.	
Maintaining	biosecurity	reputation	and	improving	existing	technical	cooperation	with	trading	
partners	and	animal	health	organisations	can	reduce	the	time	to	satisfy	verification	and	
administrative	requirements	of	trading	partners.	This	work	could	include	establishment	of	pre‐
agreed	trading	arrangements	with	trading	partners	to	reduce	the	time	for	negotiating	market	
access.	For	example,	work	on	the	trans‐Tasman	FMD	Action	Plan,	a	bilateral	initiative	between	
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Australia	and	New	Zealand,	aims	to	reduce	the	time	taken	to	resume	trade	in	livestock	products	
across	the	Tasman	in	the	event	of	an	FMD	outbreak.	
Impacts	of	an	outbreak	on	industry	could	also	be	reduced	by	establishing	agreements	with	
trading	partners	on	commodity‐specific	strategies	to	meet	certification	requirements,	such	as	
FMD	treatments	for	wool	and	dairy	products.	Understanding	the	potential	for	zoning	and	
compartmentalisation	as	mechanisms	to	facilitate	resumption	of	trade	is	also	important	to	
managing	an	outbreak.	DAFF	is	working	with	the	Animal	Health	Quadrilateral	Group	(United	
States,	Australia,	New	Zealand	and	Canada)	to	build	Australian	capacity	to	implement	zoning	
arrangements	acceptable	to	other	key	commodity	markets.	
Export‐oriented	industries	are	expected	to	benefit	from	efforts	to	restore	export	market	access.	
Industries	with	mainly	a	domestic	market	focus	would	benefit	to	a	lesser	extent,	as	opening	of	
export	markets	will	help	domestic	price	recovery	by	absorbing	some	of	the	excess	supplies	of	
both	the	product	and	its	substitute	products	on	the	domestic	market.	
Maintaining	domestic	consumer	confidence	and	support	will	also	be	important	in	minimising	
the	effects	of	an	outbreak.	Industry	and	government	are	collaborating	to	develop	a	
communications	strategy,	including	dissemination	of	authoritative	statements	from	Food	
Standards	Australia	New	Zealand	about	the	safety	of	livestock	products	during	an	FMD	
outbreak.	
Australia	has	developed	plans	and	procedures	to	manage	the	technical	aspects	of	FMD	control.	
However,	findings	from	this	report	suggest	investment	in	developing	plans	and	procedures	to	
deal	with	trade	and	market	access	issues	could	generate	significant	benefits.	
Selection	of	eradication	strategy	
In	selecting	the	eradication	strategy	to	implement	in	the	event	of	an	outbreak,	the	epidemiology,	
economic	effect	and	the	social	impacts	of	an	outbreak	and	control	measures	should	be	
considered.	
Economic	and	epidemiology	considerations	
The	least	costly	strategy	to	eradicate	the	disease	will	depend	on	the	initial	conditions	of	the	
outbreak	and	the	type	of	production	system	in	the	outbreak	areas.	Eradication	plans	and	
capacity	should	therefore	be	flexible.	Under	all	the	scenarios	examined,	total	direct	economic	
costs	were	minimised	by	the	eradication	strategy	that	restored	market	access	fastest.	
Stamping	out	
Stamping	out	is	shown	to	be	more	cost	effective	for	a	small	outbreak	in	extensive	livestock	
production	systems	(such	as	the	hypothetical	outbreak	in	Queensland).	In	extensive	production	
areas,	rates	of	disease	spread	are	expected	to	be	low,	requiring	fewer	resources	for	culling	and	
disposal	and	enabling	these	measures	to	keep	pace	with	new	cases	of	infected	and	at‐risk	
animals.	Conditions	under	which	the	spread	of	the	disease	was	expected	to	be	slower	favour	
implementation	of	the	stamping	out	management	strategy.	Using	vaccination	under	these	
conditions	could	add	to	the	total	cost	of	the	outbreak,	as	shown	in	the	Queensland	outbreak	
scenario.	
For	a	small	outbreak	in	a	more	intensive	production	area	(such	as	the	hypothetical	outbreak	in	
Victoria),	vaccination	with	stamping	out	was	shown	to	reduce	eradication	time,	compared	with	
stamping	out	only.	Vaccination	also	reduced	the	variability	in	time	to	eradicate	the	disease,	and	
reduced	the	chance	of	an	extended	outbreak	occurring.	However,	on	average,	the	reduction	in	
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eradication	time	was	not	sufficient	to	offset	the	delay	in	market	access	associated	with	the	
removal	of	vaccinated	animals.	
Vaccination	
For	potentially	wider	and	fast‐spreading	outbreaks,	resources	may	not	be	adequate	to	keep	up	
with	stamping	out	requirements,	with	the	risk	that	the	outbreak	will	not	be	adequately	
controlled.	In	the	large	multi‐state	outbreak	scenario,	vaccination	allowed	earlier	return	to	
trade,	even	when	taking	into	account	the	need	to	remove	vaccinated	animals	from	the	
population	to	regain	World	Organisation	for	Animal	Health	disease‐free	status.	For	the	large	
outbreak,	the	reduction	in	eradication	time	with	vaccination	more	than	offsets	the	additional	
time	needed	to	deal	with	vaccinated	animals,	allowing	a	quicker	resumption	of	trade.	Under	
these	circumstances	vaccination	is	likely	to	be	an	effective	disease	management	tool,	offering	a	
greater	certainty	in	reducing	the	time	taken	to	contain	and	eradicate	the	disease,	and	therefore	
reduce	the	duration	of	the	outbreak.	
Vaccination	would	be	preferable	with	successively	longer	delays	in	detecting	the	disease	or	
lower	availability	of	resources	to	fight	an	outbreak.	Either	of	these	factors	would	place	greater	
demands	on	available	resources,	increasing	the	chances	of	the	disease	spread	overwhelming	
containment	efforts.	This	effect	is	demonstrated	in	the	simulated	outbreak	scenarios	for	Victoria,	
where	results	suggest	early	vaccination	could	be	beneficial.	The	merits	of	vaccination	are	yet	to	
be	proven	for	less	intensive	livestock	production	areas	in	other	states.	
Importantly,	targeted	vaccination	was	shown	to	be	as	effective	as	widespread	vaccination	while	
reducing	the	total	numbers	vaccinated.	The	use	of	targeted	vaccination	could	reduce	the	
constraints	on	resources	while	allowing	eradication	to	be	undertaken	quickly.	
In	addition	to	monetary	cost	savings,	using	vaccination	could	also	reduce	the	need	for	rapid	
large‐scale	pre‐emptive	culling	and	disposal	of	animals.	This	could,	as	seen	in	the	2001	UK	
outbreak,	reduce	social	and	environmental	costs	associated	with	stamping	out.	
Developing	clearer	and	more	detailed	guidelines	on	the	use	of	FMD	vaccination	as	part	of	an	
effective	response	will	therefore	be	important	in	outbreak	preparedness.	Ongoing	research	
directed	at	developing	diagnostic	tests	to	distinguish	between	vaccinated	and	infected	animals	
supports	the	need	for	continual	updating	of	FMD	control	policies.	Developments,	made	in	
conjunction	with	efforts	to	review	the	provisions	of	the	World	Organisation	for	Animal	Health	
guidelines,	could	see	vaccination‐to‐live	given	the	same	terms	for	regaining	disease‐free	status	
as	vaccination	with	culling.	If	research	efforts	came	to	fruition	and	trading	partners	
acknowledged	the	findings,	then	a	shift	toward	using	vaccination	as	a	major	component	of	FMD	
control	could	be	considered.	
Social	considerations	
Most	farmers	and	supply	chain	members	in	the	social	impact	analysis	nominated	stamping	out	
as	their	first	preference,	followed	by	vaccinating	and	removing	the	animals	from	the	population	
(Appendix	F).	Vaccinating	and	leaving	the	animals	in	the	population	was	the	least	preferred	
method.	Several	people	saw	these	three	options	as	sequential;	that	is,	‘if	stamping	out	is	failing,	
then	vaccinate	and	remove	the	animals	from	the	population.	If	too	many	animals	need	to	be	
vaccinated	due	to	uncontrolled	disease	spread,	move	to	vaccinating	and	leaving	the	animals	in	
the	population’.	
Many	producers	and	industry	stakeholders	saw	stamping	out	without	vaccination	as	a	more	
viable	option	than	vaccination	alone,	which	they	felt	could	prolong	the	FMD	outbreak	and	
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associated	social	impacts.	Vaccination‐to‐live	is	likely	to	be	viewed	favourably	by	livestock	
owners	with	specialised	breeds	or	valuable	livestock	genetics.	However,	interviewees	were	
concerned	that	this	method	would	have	a	greater	and	more	protracted	financial	effect	because	
export	markets	could	be	lost	permanently.	Also	raised	was	concern	that	the	public	would	not	
understand	why	healthy	vaccinated	animals	had	to	be	culled	and	that	this	may	create	animal	
welfare	concerns.	Respondents	felt	that	members	of	the	public	who	do	not	have	a	financial	
connection	to	the	agriculture	industry	may	support	vaccinate‐to‐live	measures	due	to	the	
perceived	animal	welfare	benefits.	
Nationally	and	internationally,	public	objections	to	government	policies	with	perceived	negative	
animal	welfare	implications	are	increasing.	Use	of	stamping	out	to	eradicate	disease,	especially	
where	large	numbers	of	animals	are	culled,	has	resulted	in	a	large	negative	public	response.	
Regions	will	be	affected	differently	
Both	economically	and	socially,	the	impacts	are	not	confined	to	regions	directly	affected	by	the	
eradication	strategy.	Outside	the	control	areas	of	each	outbreak	scenario,	the	loss	of	export	
markets	is	expected	to	cause	significant	economic	and	financial	stress.	Industries	related	to	the	
affected	industries,	including	service	providers	such	as	transport,	trade	and	feedstock	suppliers,	
are	expected	to	be	affected	by	the	outbreak.	As	a	result,	psychological	and	financial	support	
within	and	outside	the	control	areas	will	be	important	as	households	and	communities	face	
losses	in	income	and	uncertainty	surrounding	business	continuity.	
Changes	in	economic	activity	will	differ	across	states	and	regions,	and	in	accordance	with	the	
dependence	of	each	region	on	livestock	production	and	livestock	export	markets.	For	example,	
Queensland	and	Victoria’s	regional	areas	have	a	greater	economic	reliance	on	the	affected	
industries	than	do	other	area	and	state	economies.	Economies	such	as	Western	Australia	are	
estimated	to	grow	due	to	expansion	in	mining	and	related	sectors	as	they	become	more	
competitive	in	the	international	market.	
A	range	of	business	types	can	be	financially	affected	by	an	FMD	outbreak.	These	businesses	may	
require	financial	support	during	the	outbreak	and	during	recovery.	Assistance	could	include	
compensation	or	indirect	support	from	banks	holding	loans.	Engagement	with	agencies	and	
institutions	to	provide	support	(for	example,	Centrelink,	charity	organisations)	would	be	vital.	
Measures	to	manage	social	impacts	
An	FMD	response	plan	and	the	way	it	is	implemented	presents	opportunities	to	manage	social	
impacts.	Communications,	social	support,	counselling	and	recovery	arrangements	will	need	to	
target	not	just	those	individuals	and	communities	directly	affected	by	control	measures,	but	
affected	communities	Australia‐wide.	
When	implementing	the	response	plan,	local	residents	and	producers	should	be	involved	as	they	
may	hold	valuable	knowledge	about	their	local	areas	that	can	assist	in	tailoring	response	
strategies	to	the	local	area.	Giving	producers	the	option	to	participate	in	the	culling	process	may	
reduce	the	social	impact	of	loss	of	control	and	the	psychological	distress	it	creates.	
Providing	financial	and	mental	health	support	services	may	reduce	the	overall	social	impacts	of	
an	FMD	outbreak.	A	socially	focused	plan	of	action	that	includes	appropriate	counselling	
services	for	a	range	of	stakeholders	(for	example,	producers	and	response	staff)	during	and	after	
the	outbreak	will	help	individuals,	households	and	communities	recover	after	an	outbreak.	
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Building	an	effective	response	team	by	including	staff	with	strong	people	and	technical	skills	will	
create	confidence	in	the	government’s	ability	to	respond	to	an	FMD	outbreak.	Clearly	
communicating	roles	and	responsibilities	to	the	response	team	will	reduce	confusion.	
Communication	
A	communication	strategy	that	is	well	understood	by	the	livestock	industry	and	government	
agencies	and	support	staff	involved	in	a	response	strategy	is	vital.	Livestock	producers	and	
potential	support	staff	seem	largely	unaware	of	current	communication	strategies,	such	as	the	
‘Model	Arrangements	for	Leadership	during	Emergencies	of	National	Consequence’	that	the	
Council	of	Australian	Governments	endorsed	in	2008.	This	suggests	a	need	for	engagement	with	
stakeholders	to	ensure	effective	roll‐out	of	an	integrated	FMD	response	and	a	communication	
strategy	needs	to	be	implemented	and	reinforced	among	stakeholders.	
During	an	FMD	outbreak,	a	clear	communication	strategy	presented	in	plain	English	will	build	
stakeholder	and	public	confidence	that	the	government	is	responding	appropriately	to	the	
outbreak.	This	could	include	clear	information	about	compensation	policies	to	alleviate	
stakeholder	concerns	about	eligibility	and	build	confidence	in	government’s	ability	to	respond	to	
an	FMD	outbreak.	A	checklist	for	an	effective	communication	strategy	is	contained	in	Chapter	7.	
Response	centres	need	to	provide	producers	with	more	information	about	the	response	
strategies	and	implications	of	using	different	strategies.	Confusion	about	the	strategies	could	
lead	to	frustration	and	delayed	or	inappropriate	responses	by	producers.	
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Appendix A: Disease spread results 
from AusSpread 
The	three	hypothetical	outbreak	scenarios	developed	by	Garner	(2012)	for	single	point	
outbreaks	in	Victoria	and	North	Queensland	and	a	multi‐state	outbreak	starting	in	Victoria	are	
discussed	briefly.	
Small	hypothetical	outbreak	in	North	Queensland	
Foot‐and‐mouth	disease	(FMD)	is	introduced	in	May	in	a	smallholder	pig	farm	in	Dalrymple	
(Map	A1a)	through	illegal	swill	feeding.	It	spreads	for	28	days	before	it	is	detected	(silent	phase)	
on	the	pig	farm	and	in	local	sheep	and	beef	farms—a	total	of	five	infected	premises	and	one	
immune	farm.	Given	the	intensity	of	livestock	production	in	nearby	areas,	the	region—Aramac,	
Belyando,	Dalrymple,	Flinders,	Longreach	and	Winton—is	declared	a	control	area.	The	
AusSpread	model	has	1429	mostly	beef	farms	in	this	control	area	(Map	A1b)	(Garner	2012).	
Map A1 Small outbreak, North Queensland 
	
Source: Garner 2012 
Two	control	strategies	are	used:	stamping	out	and	stamping	out	with	extensive	vaccination.	
Control	measures	are	implemented	in	the	restricted	area	within	the	AusSpread	model,	including:	
 a	10	kilometre	restricted	area	around	infected	premises	
 a	3	kilometre	surveillance	zone	around	infected	and	direct	contact	premises	
 if	vaccination	is	used,	a	10	kilometre	suppressive	ring	vaccination	for	all	species	around	all	
infected	and	direct	contact	premises	(begins	12	days	into	the	control	program).	
As	well,	four	teams	are	assigned	for	surveillance	and	operations	in	infected	premises	during	the	
first	three	days	of	control	measures,	increasing	to	35	teams	after	eight	days.	Ten	teams	attend	
vaccinations	at	the	start,	increasing	to	30	teams	after	three	weeks.	
a. Point	of	introduction	of	FMD	 b. Farms	within	control	area	
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Small	hypothetical	outbreak	in	Victoria	
Introduction	of	FMD	occurs	in	May	when	pigs	in	a	Goulburn	Valley	farm	are	fed	swill	(Map	A2a).	
When	the	disease	is	detected	21	days	after	incursion	18	premises	are	reported	as	infected.	The	
Statistical	Divisions	of	Loddon,	Goulburn	and	Ovens–Murray	(MapA2a)	are	declared	a	control	
area.	The	area	comprises	13	249	agricultural	businesses,	including	beef,	dairy,	sheep,	beef–
sheep,	feedlot,	pig	and	smallholder	farms	(Garner	2012).	Unlike	the	North	Queensland	outbreak	
area,	where	production	is	predominantly	cattle	on	rangelands,	the	Victorian	outbreak	area	is	a	
high	density	livestock	production	area	(Map	A2b).	
Map A2 Small outbreak, Victoria 
	
Source: Garner 2012 
Control	strategies	and	measures	are	the	same	as	for	the	small	outbreak	in	North	Queensland.	
However,	when	vaccination	is	used,	a	small	radius	vaccination	zone	(5	kilometres	instead	of	10	
kilometres)	was	used,	reflecting	the	smaller	sizes	and	the	close	proximity	of	farms	in	this	region.	
The	smaller	farm	sizes	mean	vaccination	can	be	done	more	quickly.	However,	due	to	the	
intensity	of	livestock	production	in	the	area,	resources	for	eradication	are	greater	than	the	
outbreak	in	North	Queensland	(see	‘Control	costs’).	
Large	hypothetical	multi‐state	outbreak	
This	outbreak	uses	the	large	FMD	outbreak	scenario	developed	by	the	Animal	Health	
Committee’s	FMD	Resources	Working	Group	as	part	of	a	work	plan	to	help	the	working	group	
estimate	resources	required	to	achieve	eradication	(Garner	2012).	
In	this	scenario,	FMD	is	introduced	through	contaminated	waste	food	that	is	brought	into	
Australia	by	a	traveller	returning	from	overseas	and	illegally	fed	to	pigs	in	a	small	pig	farm	in	
Victoria.	The	disease	is	not	detected	for	three	to	four	weeks	after	its	introduction	in	May.		
Out‐of‐region	traces	of	FMD	are	used	to	initiate	infection	in	other	areas.	By	the	time	the	disease	
is	detected,	infection	has	spread	to	New	South	Wales,	Queensland,	South	Australia	and	Tasmania	
(Garner	2012)	(Map	A3).	
At	the	time	the	disease	is	detected	62	premises	are	identified	as	infected	across	the	five	states	
(Garner	2012).	
a. Point	of	introduction	of	FMD b. Farms	within	control	area	
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Map A3 Number and distribution of infected premises, multi‐state outbreak 
	
Source: Garner 2012 
As	with	the	small	outbreak	scenarios,	the	two	control	strategies	are	used:	stamping	out	and	
combining	stamping	out	with	ring	vaccination.	It	is	assumed	that	when	vaccination	is	used,	
sufficient	vaccine	is	available.	Two	strategies	for	vaccination	are	explored	(Garner	2012):	
targeted	vaccination	and	ring	vaccination.	The	targeted	risk‐based	approach	to	ring	vaccination	
involves	vaccination	of	cattle	only	(and	sheep	on	cattle–sheep	mixed	farms)	in	Victoria,	given	the	
extent	of	the	outbreak	in	this	state.	Broad	brush	suppressive	ring	vaccination	is	used	in	all	
infected	jurisdictions	for	all	FMD‐susceptible	species.	
It	is	assumed	here	that	all	jurisdictions	have	adequate	capacity	to	implement	vaccination	with	
vaccination	teams	available	during	the	entire	vaccination	program.	Control	program	for	the	
multi‐state	outbreak	includes	a	72‐hour	national	standstill	after	first	diagnosis	of	FMD	and	
declaration	of	a	state‐wide	control	area	for	jurisdictions	with	infected	animals.	
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Appendix B: Market access 
assumptions 
Time	for	trade	to	recover	
‘The	point	in	time	following	eradication	of	FMD	when	export	trade	resumes	will	be	determined	
by	Australia’s	individual	trading	partners’,	once	they	have	‘satisfy[ied]	themselves	that	
eradication	has	indeed	been	achieved.	This	may	take	months	after	Australian	authorities	had	
declared	Australia	disease	free’	(Matthews	2011).	
The	time	required	for	trade	to	recover	depends	on	the	elapse	between	eradication	and	
recognition	by	trading	partners	of	disease‐free	status	and	the	resumption	of	(Figure	B1).	Once	
access	to	a	market	has	been	granted,	exports	can	recommence;	however,	the	return	of	exports	to	
pre‐outbreak	levels	may	be	delayed	and	in	some	cases	may	not	recover.	
Figure B1 Time to regain market access following an outbreak 
 
OIE = World Organisation for Animal Health 
Source: ABARES 
Resumption	of	trade	
To	regain	FMD‐free	status	under	World	Organisation	for	Animal	Health	(OIE)	guidelines	a	
country	must	wait	a	designated	period	after	the	last	case	and	submit	documented	evidence	
supporting	its	case	(Figure	B1).	OIE	guidelines	require	a	waiting	period	of	three	months	after	the	
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last	case	of	infected	and	vaccinated	animals	are	slaughtered	or	six	months	after	the	last	
vaccination‐to‐live.	Despite	these	standard	waiting	times,	following	stamping	out,	on	average	it	
took	4.5	months	(1.5	months	longer)	for	countries	to	be	recognised	by	the	OIE	as	FMD‐free	
(Junker	et	al.	2009).	For	some	countries	this	time	can	be	much	longer.	It	took	some	18	months	
for	the	Republic	of	Korea	to	regain	FMD‐free	status	after	the	last	infected	animal	was	destroyed	
in	2000	(Junker	et	al.	2009).	Uruguay	waited	22	months	after	the	last	outbreak	in	2001	(Junker	
et	al.	2009).	
The	World	Trade	Organization’s	(WTO)	sanitary	and	phytosanitary	arrangements	recognise	that	
is	it	not	always	appropriate	to	impose	the	same	international	standards	because	of	differences	in	
climate,	existing	pests	or	diseases	or	food	safety	conditions	(WTO	1998).	WTO	members	may	
choose	to	adopt	a	higher	level	of	protection	(Welte	2000).	Trading	countries	therefore	have	
bilateral	agreements	that	do	not	necessarily	comply	with	all	the	OIE	requirements	(AusVet	&	
CSIRO	2005).	For	example,	the	agreed	health	certificate	between	Australia	and	the	Republic	of	
Korea	for	export	of	beef	requires	Australia	to	have	been	free,	for	the	past	two	years,	from	foot‐
and‐mouth	disease	(DAFF	2004).	
For	Australia’s	main	export	destinations,	two	periods	may	increase	the	time	required	to	regain	
market	access	beyond	OIE	requirements:	
 First,	country	specific	requirements	for	proof	of	freedom—a	period	beyond	OIE	declaring	
freedom	before	trading	partners	recognise	that	Australia	is	free	of	FMD.	The	country‐specific	
proof	of	freedom	may	require	time	to	complete	paperwork	and	research,	the	time	for	
negotiation	or	for	visits	from	country	representatives	to	agree	to	resume	trade	(Figure	B1).	
 Second,	operational	period—a	period	following	agreement	to	resume	trade	to	ensure	
applicable	health	certificates	are	in	place	so	trade	can	commence.	This	operational	
administration	may	require,	for	example,	negotiation	of	new	certificates	or	waiting	until	the	
time	specified	in	existing	health	certificates	is	met	(Figure	B1).	
Factors	that	can	influence	the	time	for	a	country	to	regain	access	to	international	livestock	
markets	include	disease	management	expertise,	outbreak	size	and	duration	and	political	factors	
(Johnson	&	Stone	2011).	For	example,	although	the	United	Kingdom	regained	FMD‐free	status	
nearly	four	months	after	the	large	outbreak	in	2001,	it	took	six	months	to	re‐export	pig	genetics	
to	non‐EU	markets	and	50	months	to	reinstate	live	pig	certificates	to	China	(UKECP	2009).	
Following	the	small	2007	outbreak,	the	use	of	face‐to‐face	meetings	with	veterinary	authorities	
in	priority	countries	helped	re‐establish	certification	faster.	Recommencement	of	trade	in	pig	
genetics	to	non‐EU	markets	was	reduced	to	six	weeks	and	live	pig	certificates	to	China	to	five	
months.	This	example	highlights	the	significance	of	the	outbreak	size	and	demonstrates	the	
importance	of	negotiation	in	regaining	market	access	(UKECP	2009).	
Recovery	of	market	share	
Following	a	disease	outbreak,	the	return	of	exports	to	pre‐outbreak	values	may	be	relatively	
quick,	significantly	delayed	or	in	some	cases	may	not	recover	(Figure	B1).	Following	the	2003	
bovine	spongiform	encephalopathy	outbreaks	in	Canada	and	the	United	States,	the	time	taken	
for	export	revenue	recovery	was	31	and	50	months	respectively.	However,	following	a	small	
outbreak	of	FMD	in	Argentina	in	2006,	exports	recovered	within	a	few	months	with	most	
countries	continuing	to	accept	beef	from	FMD‐free	zones	within	Argentina	(Johnson	&	Stone	
2011).	
Importers	may	find	alternative	sources	of	products,	depending	on	availability	from	competing	
countries.	As	one	exporter	loses	market	share	others	will	gain	market	share.	For	example,	
following	the	1997	FMD	outbreak	in	Taiwan,	pork	exports	valued	in	1996	at	US$1.6	billion	fell	to	
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US$234	million	in	1997	with	loss	of	the	Japanese	market	(Chang,	Hsia	&	Griffith	2005).	The	loss	
of	exports	from	Taiwan	to	the	Japanese	market	resulted	in	expanding	pork	shipments	from	the	
United	States	(23	per	cent),	Denmark	(18	per	cent)	and	Canada	(5	per	cent),	to	the	exclusion	of	
Taiwan	(Johnson	&	Stone	2011;	Yang	2012).	
Factors	that	may	influence	the	length	of	market	recovery	include	previously	exported	product	
type	and	value	and	disease	management	timeline.	Other	factors	include	domestic	price	changes	
for	inputs	and	products,	weather	changes	that	impact	productivity,	consumer	response	and	
prices	for	competing	protein	products	(Johnson	&	Stone	2011).	
Domestic	market	response	
With	loss	of	export	destinations,	product	originally	destined	for	export	markets	will	be	diverted	
to	the	domestic	market.	The	action	of	diverting	previously	exported	products	on	domestic	
markets	creates	an	oversupply	of	produce	and	the	subsequent	fall	in	prices	lowers	returns	to	
producers.	
During	the	1997	FMD	outbreak	in	Taiwan,	loss	of	exports	to	Japan,	which	accounted	for	
90	per	cent	of	Taiwan’s	total	pork	export,	saw	27	million	tonnes	of	pig	meat	diverted	to	the	
domestic	market	(Chang,	Hsia	&	Griffith	2005).	This	oversupply,	combined	with	domestic	
consumers	shying	away	from	pork	consumption,	resulted	in	a	dramatic	fall	in	prices.	Pork	prices	
fell	immediately	from	NT$55	to	NT$17	after	the	announcement	of	the	FMD	outbreak—well	
below	the	NT$40	cost	of	production—with	the	loss	in	export	revenues	estimated	at	
approximately	NT$600	million	per	annum	(Chang,	Hsia	&	Griffith	2005).	
For	other	exporters,	outbreaks	of	FMD	have	seen	similarly	large	diversion	of	product	to	
domestic	markets.	In	2000	the	Republic	of	Korea	diverted	80	265	tonnes	of	pork	destined	for	
Japan	to	the	domestic	market	following	an	FMD	outbreak	(Park,	Jin	&	Bessler	2008).	After	an	
outbreak	in	July	2000	Argentina’s	exports	of	beef	fell	52	per	cent	from	276	094	tonnes	to	
132	966	tonnes	(Rich	2004).	The	fall	in	beef	exports,	principally	due	to	the	loss	of	high	value	
markets	including	the	United	States,	Canada,	Japan	and	Republic	of	Korea,	resulted	in	a	
62	per	cent	drop	in	value,	worth	$440	million	(Rich	2004).	In	Uruguay,	beef	export	volumes	
declined	by	38	per	cent	($152	million)	after	an	outbreak	in	2000	(Rich	2004).	In	Brazil,	loss	of	
the	Russian	export	market	(which	accounted	for	65	per	cent	of	pork	exports)	resulted	in	price	
declines	of	30	per	cent	below	the	cost	of	production,	causing	serious	damage	to	the	pork	
industry	(FAO	2006).	
The	ability	of	the	domestic	market	to	absorb	excess	supply	will	influence	the	magnitude	of	any	
price	changes.	Some	products	can	experience	greater	price	reductions	where	there	is	little	
demand	on	the	domestic	market.	The	ban	on	exports	following	the	2001	FMD	outbreak	in	the	
United	Kingdom	led	to	light	lambs	and	sow	meat	originally	destined	for	Europe	being	diverted	to	
local	relatively	small	markets	(DEFRA	&	DCMS	2002).	Negative	consumer	perceptions	and	
willingness	to	consume	infected	meat	can	reduce	demand	further	(Box	B1).	
Government	and	industry	are	collaborating	on	a	communications	strategy	that	could	help	
maintain	domestic	consumer	confidence	in	the	event	of	an	outbreak.	Initiatives	include	an	
authoritative	statement	from	the	Food	Standards	Authority	of	Australia	and	New	Zealand	about	
the	safety	of	livestock	products;	this	is	ready	for	distribution.	
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Box B1 Consumer preference 
How	FMD	will	affect	domestic	demand	for	livestock	products	will	be	shaped	by	social	and	economic	factors	that	
influence	consumer	food‐purchasing	behaviour,	including	risk	perception,	price	and	preference	for	a	product.	
Price	and	attachment	
Reduced	meat	prices	may	induce	some	consumers	to	increase	their	consumption	of	animal	products.	The	price	at	
which	this	occurs	may	be	influenced	by	household	income	and	expenditure	and	the	individuals’	perception	of	risk.	In	
the	United	States,	‘demand	response	to	food	safety	is	small	compared	to	price	and	expenditure,	suggesting	that	
although	some	consumers	will	reduce	demand	for	food	safety,	they	will	be	will	be	more	likely	to	be	swayed	by	price’	
(Piggott	&	Marsh	2004).	In	Australia,	price	seems	to	be	a	significant	driver	of	the	quantity	of	meat	consumed.	
Historically	in	Australia,	a	reduction	in	the	price	of	meat	has	resulted	in	a	similar	increase	in	consumption	
(Productivity	Commission	2002).	Price	is	therefore	expected	to	be	a	significant	determinant	in	people’s	consumption	
of	meat	following	an	outbreak	of	FMD.	
Risk	perception	
While	FMD	is	not	a	human	health	problem,	‘there	could	be	significant	domestic	consumer	resistance	to	consuming	
meat	and	animal	products	following	an	FMD	outbreak’	(Matthews	2011).	This	reaction	could	be	influenced	by	social	
factors	such	as	food	safety	perception	and	downplaying	or	exaggerating	the	risk.	
Food	safety—concern	about	food	contamination	by	bacteria	or	germs,	and	the	link	between	food	and	disease	can	
reduce	animal	product	purchases	(Horwitz	2012;	McCarty	2007).	This	may	be	magnified	by	limited	knowledge	of	a	
disease	and	lead	to	confusion	with	unrelated	diseases	that	have	human	health	effects,	such	as	bovine	spongiform	
encephalopathy	(BSE).	Following	the	FMD	outbreak	in	Taiwan,	domestic	demand	for	pork	fell	with	consumer	concern	
about	food	safety;	this	was	despite	assurances	from	the	government	(Chang,	Hsia	&	Griffith	2005).	Consumers	tend	to	
have	short	attention	spans	for	food	safety	issues	and,	in	the	absence	of	frequent	message	reception,	are	unlikely	to	
adjust	their	preferences	(Dahlgren	&	Fairchild	2002).	Reduction	in	pork	demand	in	Taiwan	is	variously	reported	to	
have	lasted	from	six	to	12	months	(Yang	et	al.	1999).	
Downplaying	of	risk—other	events	during	an	outbreak	can	impact	consumers’	risk	perception	of	animal	products.	For	
example,	during	the	outbreak	of	BSE	in	Canada,	consumers	increased	their	consumption	of	beef	despite	the	risk	of	
contracting	the	BSE	variant	Creutzfeldt‐Jakob	disease.	This	was	in	contrast	to	the	reaction	of	consumers	in	other	
affected	countries,	including	the	United	Kingdom,	Germany	and	Japan.	Research	has	attributed	this	counter‐intuitive	
behaviour	to	distractions	from	other	social	issues—namely	the	war	in	Iraq,	severe	acute	respiratory	syndrome	and	
West	Nile	virus	(Lewis	&	Tyschenko	2009).	
Exaggeration	of	risk—negative	media	coverage	of	FMD	can	influence	consumers’	perception	of	contamination	risk,	
and	hence	their	purchasing	behaviour.	Research	suggests	that	media	coverage	contributed	to	reduced	domestic	
demand	for	fresh	and	frozen	animal	products	during	animal	disease	outbreaks	in	several	countries	(Beach	et	al.	2008;	
Yang	&	Goddard	2011).	Negative	media	can	be	compounded	by	the	reactions	of	scientists,	government,	activists,	
supermarket	chains,	celebrities	and	peers,	who	reaffirm	or	heighten	consumer	perceptions	of	product	safety.	In	the	
2001	FMD	outbreak	in	the	United	Kingdom,	supermarkets	indicated	they	would	not	stock	product	made	from	
vaccinated	animals	for	fear	of	consumer	backlash	(Matthews	2011).	
Potential	cost	of	FMD	in	Australia	
Various	studies	have	estimated	the	impact	an	FMD	outbreak	could	have	on	Australia.	Tozer	and	
colleagues	(2010)	used	a	bioeconomic	optimisation	model	to	estimate	the	economic	impact	on	
the	beef	industry.	Using	several	scenarios	that	differed	by	depopulation	rates	and	trade	ban	
settings,	livestock	producers	were	estimated	to	experience	significant	losses	under	scenarios	
with	uniform	trade	bans.	Under	scenarios	where	one‐year	trade	bans	applied	across	Australia,	
expected	losses	were	between	$465	million	and	$765	million	for	livestock	producers.	Over	the	
longer	term,	beef	trade	would	return	to	pre‐outbreak	levels.	In	the	interim,	beef	exports	to	the	
United	States,	Korea	and	Indonesia	would	fall	in	some	years	by	80	per	cent	before	export	
recovery	began.	
A	study	by	Dent	and	colleagues	(2002)	used	the	Monash	Multi‐Regional	Forecasting	model	to	
estimate	the	potential	impact	of	FMD	on	Queensland’s	livestock	and	meat‐processing	industries.	
Under	a	long‐term	market	closure	condition,	where	export	markets	to	FMD‐free	countries	were	
closed	for	six	years,	it	would	take	15	years	for	Queensland	to	return	to	pre‐outbreak	levels	of	
economic	output.	Losses	in	gross	domestic	product	over	the	15	years	would	be	an	estimated	
$7.1	billion,	with	the	heaviest	losses	in	year	seven.	Results	of	the	short‐term	scenario—where	
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trade	bans	are	enforced	for	two	years—show	the	Queensland	economy	taking	10	years	to	
recover,	with	estimated	losses	of	$900	million	over	three	years.	
In	its	estimates	of	losses	for	the	Australian	livestock	industry	from	FMD,	the	Centre	for	
International	Economics	(2010)	modelled	two	scenarios:	a	six‐month	contained	outbreak	and	a	
one‐year	extensive	outbreak.	Under	the	contained	scenario	where	50	per	cent	of	markets	were	
closed	in	the	first	year,	losses	were	approximately	$9	billion.	This	compared	with	$18	billion	
under	the	extensive	scenario	in	which	100	per	cent	of	export	markets	were	closed	in	the	first	
year.	Market	access	losses	represented	90	per	cent	of	total	losses	with	export	markets	taking	
between	two	to	four	years	to	fully	recover,	depending	on	the	size	of	the	outbreak.	
The	Productivity	Commission	estimated	(2002)	income	losses	to	the	Australian	livestock	and	
meat	processing	sector	of	a	large	FMD	outbreak	(without	zoning	and	taking	12	months	to	
eradicate)	at	$12.8	billion	to	$14.8	billion	over	10	years	(or	$17.3	billion	to	$20	billion	in	2012–
13	dollars),	with	around	75	per	cent	of	this	cost	accounted	for	by	export	revenue	losses	(Table	
B1).		
Table B1 Direct income losses for the livestock and meat processing sectors 
Outbreak	 Export	revenue	losses
($m)	
Domestic	revenue	
losses	($m)	
Total	revenue	losses
($m)	
Small	 3 333 2 373 5 706
Medium	 4 611 2 994 7 605
Large	 9 480 3 332 12 812
Large	(with	zoning)	 – – 4 200
Large	(two‐year	trade	ban) 10 398 4 396 14 794
Note: Estimates given in 2002 dollars. 
Source: Productivity Commission 2002 
Other	livestock	products	
Australia	exports	an	additional	$2.3	billion	of	other	livestock	products	including	offal,	skins,	hair	
and	furs,	prepared	and	preserved	livestock	products,	other	live	animals	(such	as	dairy	cattle,	
horses	and	birds),	animal	feed	(such	as	pet	food),	meat	of	other	animals	(including	kangaroo,	
emu,	reptiles)	and	other	products	(including	semen	and	animal‐based	fertilisers)	(ABS	2012).	
Products	derived	from	FMD‐susceptible	animals	(such	as	offal	and	bovine	skin)	are	likely	to	be	
shut	out	of	the	market	for	the	same	periods	as	meat	products	that	are	exported	without	
extensive	treatment.	This	will	increase	the	loss	in	value	of	animals	significantly.	
Despite	not	being	susceptible	to	the	disease,	other	livestock	industries—such	as	horses,	
kangaroo	and	emu—may	also	be	affected.	Some	countries	have	import	health	certificates	that	
require	FMD‐free	status	on	these	products;	these	requirements	could	prevent	market	access	
(DAFF	2013).	
Other	commodities	
Trade	of	grain	and	used	farm	machinery	was	temporarily	suspended	by	Australia	following	the	
outbreak	of	FMD	in	the	United	Kingdom;	other	countries	could	implement	similar	restrictions	
for	an	outbreak	in	Australia.	Export	disruption	of	these	products	is	expected	to	be	minimal,	
especially	for	wheat—given	pressure	on	world	supply	and	with	FMD‐afflicted	countries	such	as	
Argentina	continuing	to	be	major	wheat	exporters	(Productivity	Commission	2002).	
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Appendix C: Social impact analysis 
methods 
In	May	and	June	2012	ABARES	reviewed	the	literature	on	the	social	impacts	of	foot‐and‐mouth	
disease	(FMD)	outbreaks	(Kruger	et	al.	forthcoming).	The	review	investigated	FMD	outbreaks	in	
developed	countries	and	experiences	in	Australia	of	other	emergency	animal	disease	outbreaks	
such	as	equine	influenza,	Newcastle	disease	and	Ovine	Johne’s	disease.	This	work	was	
commissioned	by	DAFF	Animal	Biosecurity.	
This	work	was	extended	during	September	to	December	2012	to	include	two	case	studies	in	
Victoria	and	Queensland.	The	social	component	of	the	Victorian	case	study	was	undertaken	on	
22	and	26	October	2012	in	Shepparton,	Tatura	and	Tongala.	The	social	component	of	the	
Queensland	case	study	area	was	undertaken	between	19	and	23	November	2012	in	Charters	
Towers	and	Hughenden.	
During	phone	conferences	in	August	2012	the	ABARES	project	team	and	representatives	from	
the	Victorian	Department	for	Primary	Industries	and	the	Queensland	Department	of	Agriculture,	
Fisheries	and	Forestry	chose	the	case	study	locations	and	interview	and	focus	group	participants	
(Table	C1).	
Table C1 Interviews and focus group participants 
Stakeholder	 Victoria	 Queensland
Interviews	(one	or	two	participants)	
Abattoir	 1	 1
Agriculture	association	staff	member	(organises	agriculture
related	events)	
1	 1
Agriculture	input	business	 2	 0
Department	of	primary	industry	staff	a	 0	 2
Chamber	of	commerce	 0	 1
Ethnic	council	 1	 0
Livestock	transporter	 1	 1
Local	council	staff	(incl.	emergency	response	staff,	mayor,	CEO) 3	 4
Mental	health	staff	 1	 1
Milk	processor	 1	 0
Livestock	producer	 1	 1
Saleyard	manager	 1	 1
Stock	agent	 1	 1
Vets	 2	 0
Focus	groups	(three	or	more	participants)	
Department	of	primary	industry	staff	a	 1	(4	participants)	 0
Producers	 2	(4	& 6	participants)	 1	(6	participants)
Vets	 0	 1
a DPI staff participated in their capacity as potential FMD response staff. 
FMD	outbreak	scenarios	were	developed	for	different	stakeholder	groups	based	on	the	
Australian	Veterinary	Emergency	Plan	(AUSVETPLAN),	information	drawn	from	the	literature	
review	and	in	consultation	with	FMD	experts	in	the	Department	of	Agriculture.	These	scenarios	
were	sent	to	participants	before	the	interview	and	focus	group	sessions	to	give	them	an	
understanding	of	what	to	expect	during	an	FMD	outbreak.	
The	semi‐structured	questions	focused	on	the	social	impacts	that	participants	expected	would	
occur	following	an	FMD	outbreak,	including	what	could	be	done	to	prepare	them	for	an	outbreak	
and	who	would	make	the	preparations,	what	support	would	be	needed	during	an	outbreak	and	
the	characteristics	of	the	community	likely	to	influence	how	an	individual	might	respond	to	an	
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outbreak.	Questions	designed	to	address	the	circumstances	of	different	stakeholder	groups	were	
also	asked.	Finally,	participants	were	asked	to	provide	their	thoughts	about	three	outbreak	
response	options,	including:	
 stamping	out—where	no	vaccine	used	
 vaccinate‐to‐kill—where	vaccine	is	used	to	prevent	the	disease	from	spreading	and	all	
vaccinated	animals	are	culled	once	the	disease	has	been	eradicated	in	order	to	regain	
Australia’s	FMD‐free	status	as	soon	as	possible	
 vaccinate‐to‐live—where	vaccine	is	used	to	prevent	the	disease	from	spreading	and	the	
vaccinated	animals	are	left	in	the	national	herd	to	live	out	their	lives.	
A	qualitative	data	analysis	was	carried	out	on	the	interview	and	focus	group	data	to	identify	
themes.	These	were	integrated	with	the	findings	from	the	literature	review	in	order	to	develop	
the	social	impact	component	of	this	report.	
Interview	questions	
About	the	organisation	
 What	is	your	role	in	the	organisation?	
 What	experience	has	the	organisation	had	with	crises,	such	as	other	emergency	animal	
diseases	or	otherwise	bushfires	or	floods?	
 What	lessons	have	you	learned	from	these	experiences	that	might	be	applicable	to	an	FMD	
outbreak?	
 What	do	you	think	an	FMD	outbreak	in	this	area	would	mean	for	the	organisation?	[could	
prompt	with	how	many	staff	will	be	caught	up	in	the	outbreak,	effect	on	other	services	and	
resources,	etc.]	
 What	would	your	organisation	need	to	be	prepared	for	an	FMD	outbreak?	[ensure	
communication	needs	are	explored]	
 To	what	extent	do	these	resources/services	exist?	
 What	would	your	organisation	need	during	an	outbreak?	[ensure	communication	needs	are	
explored]	
 To	what	extent	do	these	resources/services	exist?	
About	the	community	
 Who	in	the	community	do	you	think	would	be	impacted	by	an	FMD	outbreak	and	how	do	you	
think	they	would	be	impacted?	
 How	do	you	think	community	members	would	respond	to	an	FMD	outbreak?	[could	prompt	
with	where	would	they	seek	help?]	
 What	characteristics	of	the	community	might	help	it	cope	with	an	FMD	outbreak?	
 What	characteristics	of	the	community	might	make	it	more	difficult	for	them	to	cope	with	an	
FMD	outbreak?	
 What	do	you	think	community	members	would	need	during	an	FMD	outbreak?	
 To	what	extent	do	you	think	these	needs	can	be	met	by	resources/services	available	in	your	
area?	
 What	would	the	community	need	to	be	more	prepared	for	an	FMD	outbreak?	[could	prompt	
with	‘For	example,	what	would	be	their	communication	needs?’]	
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 As	a	member	of	the	community,	how	do	you	think	this	area’s	community	would	respond	to	
the	issues	around	FMD	vaccination?	[provide	explanation,	using	FMD	pros/cons	table].	
Focus	group	questions	
Vaccination	(25	minutes)	
Provide	overview	of	the	three	response	options.	Then	ask:	
 What	option	do	you	prefer	and	why?	
 Which	one	do	you	like	least	and	why?	
 How	will	you	be	impacted	under	each	of	these	options?	
Social	impacts	(45	minutes)	
 Let’s	talk	about	the	scenarios	we’ve	sent	to	you.	[give	background	to	scenarios,	including	
that	they	can	criticise	it	and	say	‘that	doesn’t	apply	to	us,	this	area	or	this	community’]	We’ll	
go	through	them	stage	by	stage	and	I’ll	give	you	a	quick	overview	of	each	stage	as	well	as	
across	the	zones.	Then	I’d	like	us	to	discuss	what	each	stage	would	mean	for	you.	[go	through	
‘FMD	response	stages’	sheet]	
 What,	of	all	the	things	we	have	discussed,	concerns	you	most?	
 Let’s	talk	about	what	this	scenario	would	mean	for	members	of	your	household	and	the	
relationships	between	them?	
 What	would	it	mean	for	your	relationship	with	people	outside	your	household;	that	is,	
neighbours,	friends	and	family	and	others	in	the	community?	
 Now	let’s	talk	about	the	differences	between	a	large	and	a	small	outbreak.	[provide	
overview,	including	handout	sheet	with	numbers	about	number	of	animals	culled	and	
percentage	price	drop;	also	mention	impacts	on	export	markets,	ability	to	source	feed]	
Recovery	(20	minutes)	
 Now	let’s	imagine	we	are	some	years,	(say	five)	down	the	track	since	the	outbreak	and	you	
are	as	good	as	back	to	normal.	
 How	did	you	get	there?	
 What	kind	of	things	did	you	do?	
 Who	helped	you?	
 What	kind	of	things	were	most	helpful?	[prompt	with	‘What	kind	of	things	did	you	do?’		
‘Who	provided	assistance?’	What	kind	of	assistance	was	most	helpful?]	
Communication	needs	(15	minutes)	
 What	kind	of	communication	would	you	need	to	prepare	you	for	an	FMD	outbreak?	
 What	kind	of	communication	would	you	need	during	an	FMD	outbreak?	[can	prompt	with	
‘Remember,	your	communication	needs	may	change	during	the	outbreak	period’]	
Context	(15	minutes)	
 Let’s	talk	about	the	current	context.	How	are	the	livestock	industries	currently	going?	[could	
prompt	with	‘What	is	good	and	not	so	good	at	the	moment?’]	
 How	do	these	issues	influence	how	you	will	respond	to	an	emergency	animal	disease	
outbreak	such	as	FMD?	
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Appendix D: Socio‐demographic profile 
of the case study regions 
This	section	provides	an	overview	of	the	social	demographic	profile	of	the	two	case	study	areas.	
It	draws	on	ABARES	fieldwork	and	data	from	the	Australian	Bureau	of	Statistics.	
Victorian	case	study	area	profile	
DAFF	foot‐and‐mouth	disease	(FMD)	experts	chose	the	Victorian	case	study	location	to	
represent	an	intensive	livestock	production	area.	ABARES	social	scientists	visited	Shepparton,	
Tatura	and	Tongala	as	part	of	the	fieldwork	for	this	case	study.	The	livestock	industries	in	this	
region	are	dominated	by	dairying,	but	also	involve	beef,	sheep,	pig	and	goat	production.	
An	overview	of	each	town’s	population,	median	age	and	weekly	income	and	main	employment	
industries	is	provided	in	Table	D1.	Shepparton	(within	the	Greater	Shepparton	Local	
Government	Area)	is	one	of	the	largest	towns	in	the	region	(ABS	2011).	It	is	a	hub	for	
surrounding	farmlands	and	has	greater	economic	diversity	than	neighbouring	smaller	
townships.	All	these	towns	had	weekly	median	household	incomes	below	the	Victorian	average	
of	$1216	(ABS	2011).	
Table D1 Overview of the towns visited in Victoria 
Town	 Population	 Median	age Median	weekly	
household	income	
Top	industries	of	employment
Tongala	 1	869 40	years $834 Dairy	cattle	farming;	meat	and	meat	
processing;	residential	care	services	
Tatura	 4	448 41	years $953 Dairy	product	manufacturing;	water	
supply,	sewage	and	drainage	services;	
dairy	cattle	farming		
Greater	
Shepparton	
29	553 36	years $925 School	education;	hospitals;	cafes,	
restaurants	and	takeaway	food	services	
Source: ABS 2011 
Increasing	mechanisation	of	the	dairy	industry,	recent	downsizing	of	the	SPC	Ardmona	food	
processing	factory	and	closure	of	the	Heinz	factory	in	2012	have	reduced	job	opportunities	in	
the	Greater	Shepparton	area	in	recent	years.	Jobs	at	Murray	Water	have	also	declined.	
The	area	has	experienced	several	animal	disease	outbreaks	(including	anthrax	and	Ovine	Johne’s	
disease),	bushfires	and	floods.	Many	producers,	already	in	a	precarious	financial	situation	due	to	
prolonged	drought	during	the	2000s,	have	been	hit	by	recent	low	milk	prices.	Several	small	
producers	have	left	the	region	and	have	been	replaced	by	large	corporations.		
Greater	Shepparton	is	a	thoroughfare	for	freight	between	Queensland,	New	South	Wales	and	
Victoria.	The	case	study	area	has	a	large	agri‐tourism	industry	in	the	upper	north	and	along	the	
Murray	River.	
The	demographics	of	Greater	Shepparton	are	changing:	year‐round	employment	in	horticulture,	
enabled	by	the	irrigation	system,	attracts	migrant	families.	Around	14	per	cent	of	Shepparton	
residents	were	born	overseas	and	14	per	cent	of	local	residents	speak	a	language	other	than	
English	at	home	(ABS	2011).		
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Queensland	case	study	profile	
The	case	study	region	was	chosen	for	its	geographically	extensive	livestock	industry	and	
because	it	is	crossed	by	the	Flinders	Highway,	a	transport	route	between	Queensland	and	the	
Northern	Territory.	Social	scientists	visited	Charters	Towers	and	Hughenden	to	do	fieldwork	for	
this	case	study.	An	overview	of	population,	median	age,	weekly	income	and	main	employment	
industries	in	these	towns	is	provided	in	Table	D2.	
Table D2 Overview of the towns visited in Queensland 
Suburb	 Population	 Median	age Median	
weekly	
household	
income	
Top	industries	of	employment	
Charters	
Towers	
3	934	 39	years $974 Sheep,	beef	cattle	and	grain	farming;	
metal	ore	mining;	school	education.		
Hughenden	 1	792	 40	years $935 Sheep,	beef	cattle	and	grain	farming;	
local	government	administration;	rail	
freight	transport.	
Source: ABS 2011 
Hughenden	is	located	in	the	statistical	local	area	of	Flinders	and	is	the	main	business	district	of	
the	region.	Charters	Towers	is	in	the	statistical	local	area	of	Dalrymple,	an	area	heavily	
dependent	on	agriculture.	Even	the	school	education	industry	involves	boarding	schools	
servicing	children	from	agricultural	families.	Agriculture	is	a	major	contributor	to	retail	and	
services	sector	income.	Weekly	livestock	sales	at	the	Charters	Towers	saleyard	draw	many	
producers	and	their	families	to	town,	where	they	purchase	goods	at	local	stores.	A	strong	
relationship	exists	between	the	Charters	Towers	Queensland	Department	of	Agriculture	
Fisheries	and	Forestry	office,	graziers	and	the	Charters	Towers	Regional	Council.	Strong	
communication	networks	exist	within	the	community.		
Recent	Queensland	Government	budget	cuts	have	reduced	service	provision	in	both	areas,	
particularly	in	mental	health,	disability	employment	and	drug	and	alcohol	treatment	services.	
According	to	community	members	from	both	regions,	the	communities	are	very	cohesive	and	
people	rally	together	to	help	each	other	in	times	of	need.	Both	regions	had	limited	experience	of	
emergency	animal	disease	outbreaks;	however,	they	have	regularly	experienced	natural	
disasters	such	as	fires	and	floods.	
Seventy	per	cent	of	the	products	from	livestock	industries	in	the	Charters	Towers	and	
Hughenden	regions	are	destined	for	export	markets.	Due	to	the	geographically	extensive	nature	
of	their	business	and	large	property	sizes,	producers	do	not	have	regular	contact	with	their	
livestock.	The	Flinders	Highway	runs	through	some	properties.
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Appendix E: Communication tools 
Participants	provided	feedback	on	communication	tools	that	could	be	used	in	preparation	for	and	during	an	outbreak	of	foot‐and‐mouth	disease	
(FMD).	A	range	of	communication	tools	are	needed	in	order	to	reach	the	intended	audience.	Participants	also	pointed	out	that	people	might	change	
their	habits	during	an	outbreak;	for	example,	the	need	for	regular	updates	during	an	outbreak	may	motivate	people	who	rarely	use	the	internet	to	use	
it	as	an	information	source.	
Table E1 Overview of participant feedback about communication tools 
Tool	 Preparing During	outbreak Considerations	and	comments
Industry Producers Local	
community	
Television	 Yes	 Yes Yes Check	which	timeslots	would	be	most	effective	for	target	groups.	TV	programs	such	as	Border	
Security	can	be	used	to	emphasise	preparedness.	
Websites	 Yes	 Yes Yes Can	be	updated	quickly.	Access	requires	a	reasonable	internet	connection.	Large	documents	can	
be	difficult	to	open.	Coloured	documents	printed	in	black	and	white	sometimes	do	not	make	sense.	
Some	local	websites,	such	as	Charters	Towers	E‐village,	are	popular.	
Agricultural	newspapers,	including	
Stock	and	Land,	The	Weekly	Times	
Yes	 na na Many	producers	have	a	subscription	to	an	agricultural	newspaper.	Can	assist	in	creating	
awareness	about	FMD	and	what	response	might	involve.	Use	coloured	pictures	to	get	readers’	
attention.	Focus	on	economic	impacts	as	this	is	what	is	important	to	producers.	Too	slow	for	
updates	during	outbreaks.	
Established	networks,	including	
word‐of‐mouth	
Yes	 Yes Yes Stock	agents	and	veterinarians	are	trusted	sources	of	information	for	producers.	Communication	
from	key,	credible	people	within	community	carries	more	weight.	
Mail‐outs	and information	sheets	
delivered	to	households	
Yes	 na na Appeals	to	older	producers.	Can	be	attached	to	monthly	milk	reports	supplied	by	milk	processors.	
Many	time‐poor	producers	only	glance	at	mail.	
Information	kit and	reporting	
contact	details	
Yes	 na na Can	provide	basic	information	and	photos	about	what	disease	symptoms	look	like	and	who	to	
report	them	to.	Can	be	stored	for	easy	reference.	
Emails	 Yes	 Yes Yes Already	used	by	some	supply	chain	members	to	communicate	with	producers.	Appeals	more	to	
young	producers.	Some	rural	residents	do	not	use	emails.	
Social	media	 na	 na Yes Can	be	updated	quickly.	Appeals	to	younger	people.	Not	used	by	many	older	producers.	Is	affected	
by	internet	availability.	An	important	space	to	refute	rumours	and	misconceptions.	
Local	radio	stations na	 Yes Yes Most	producers	have	the	radio	on while they	are	in	the	dairy	shed,	on	the	tractor	or	in	the	car.	
Most	community	members	listen	to	the	radio	commuting	to/from	work.	Preferred	stations	vary—
need	to	have	messages	on	various	radio	stations.	
Department	of	primary	industries	
hotline	with	pre‐recorded	messages	
na	 Yes na Has	been	successful	during	other	emergency	animal	disease outbreak	responses.	Good	for	generic	
messages.	
Department	of	primary	industries	
hotline	answered	by	staff	
na	 na na Can	provide	information	and	advice	about	specific	situations.	Staff	operating	the	lines	need	to	
have	a	good	understanding	of	the	area	and	how	the	rules	apply	to	different	industries.	
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Tool	 Preparing During	outbreak Considerations	and	comments
Industry Producers Local	
community	
Department	of	primary	industries	
personal	communication	with	staff.	
Farm	visits	by	response	officer	or	
district	veterinary	officer	to	inform	
producers	of	procedures	
na	 Yes na Producers	appreciated	this	interaction	during	actual emergency	animal	disease	outbreaks.	Very	
effective,	but	costly.	
Meetings,	including	community	and	
industry	meetings	
Yes	 Yes Yes Played	a	key	role	in	previous emergencies.	Some	producers	thought	FMD	would	be	a	suitable	
topic	for	regular	industry	group	meetings,	while	others	thought	it	would	only	attract	producers	if	
FMD	sessions	were	piggy‐backed	onto	other	events.	Some	producers	are	not	inclined	to	attend	
meetings	unless	an	outbreak	is	occurring.	Some	producers	might	not	attend	for	fear	of	spreading	
FMD	to	their	farm.	Meetings	may	be	targeted	by	the	media.	Need	people	who	can	facilitate	
emotive	audiences	and	are	well	informed	about	the	outbreak	situation	and	how	the	rules	apply	in	
different	circumstances.	
Mobile	phone	text	messaging	 na	 na na Widely	used	for	communication	during	bush	fires.	Quick	way	to	reach	many	people	with	short	
sharp	message	and	reference	to	where	to	find	more	information.	Mobile	reception	is	an	issue	in	
some	areas.	Not	all	producers	are	mobile	phone	users.	
na = not applicable. 
Source: ABARES
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Appendix F: Participant comments on 
response strategy 
At	interviews	and	focus	group	sessions,	most	farmers	and	supply	chain	members	nominated	
stamping	out	as	their	first	preference,	followed	by	vaccinate‐to‐kill	and	then	vaccinate‐to‐live.	
Several	people	saw	these	options	as	sequential;	if	stamping	out	is	failing,	employ	vaccinate‐to‐
kill.	If	too	many	animals	need	to	be	vaccinated	due	to	uncontrolled	disease	spread,	move	to	
vaccinate‐to‐live.	Table	F1	provides	an	overview	of	the	comments	that	participants	gave	to	the	
three	response	strategies.	
Table F1 Participant comments about three disease control response strategies 
Response	
strategy	
Positive	comments	 Negative comments Other	comments	
Stamping	
out	
Provides	fastest	return	to	
FMD‐free	status	and	is	the	
quickest	way	to	regain	
export	markets	
Likelihood	that	the	disease	is	not	
controlled	and	gets	out	of	hand	
Before	outbreaks,	need	to	
establish	tipping	point	when	
stamping	out	is	no	longer	
effective	and	vaccination	is	
required	to	control	disease	
Vaccinate‐
to‐kill	
Provides	balance	between	
ensuring	disease	is	
controlled	within	
reasonable	time	frame	and	
safeguarding	from	
uncontrolled	spread	
Ensures	‘good	business’	for	
abattoirs	shortly	after	
outbreak	period	
Almost impossible	to	get	100 per	
cent	muster	on	extensive	
Queensland	properties—difficult	to	
vaccinate	all	animals	and	find	all	
vaccinated	animals	to	cull	
Could	prolong	trauma	in	comparison	
with	stamping	out	
Farmers	might	hide	animals	from	
being	vaccinated	or	hide	vaccinated	
animals,	for	example,	for	breeding	
purposes	
Healthy	vaccinated	animals	of	all	
ages	need	to	be	slaughtered	
Abattoirs	might	be	unable	to	cope	
with	increased	demand	for	slaughter	
Limited	number	of	abattoirs	
servicing	Queensland	case	
study	area	are	struggling	to	
keep	up	with	demand.	Might	
have	to	send	vaccinated	animals	
to	abattoirs	Rockhampton	or	
beyond,	which	might	cause	
animal	welfare	issues	and	the	
cost	of	transport	will	be	high	
Vaccinate‐
to‐live	
Healthy	vaccinated	animals	
will	not	be	slaughtered	
unnecessarily.	
Precious	genetic	lines	will	
not	be	lost	unless	they	are	
FMD‐infected	
Takes longest	to	regain FMD‐free
status.	Could	lose	export	markets	
permanently	
Many	farmers	reported	they	will	not	
be	able	to	operate	with	prolonged	
low	meat	prices	
Some	concern	that	vaccine	might	
hide	FMD	infections	and	that	it	
would	come	back	
Several	believed	they	would	struggle	
to	find	markets	for	vaccinated	
animals	
Likely	to	be	viewed	favourably	
by	livestock	owners,	such	as	
small	breeders,	who	have	
alternative	income	sources	and	
specialised	breeds	or	valuable	
genetics	
Not	necessarily	more	humane	
as	livestock	will	eventually	be	
slaughtered	for	consumption	
Overall	
comments	
–	 Decisions	about	which	animals	are
vaccinated	first	could	cause	tension	
between	and	within	livestock	
industries	
–
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